Narrative:

We were approaching the airport from the east. I had gotten the ATIS and advised the captain the current WX and that ILS runway 18C was in effect. His response was that we would do the visual. That was the extent of the briefing. At around 10 mi from the airport; the captain told me to tell the controller that he had the airport. I responded by asking the captain if he had the runway. He said no; but he has the airport. I did not have the runway in sight nor the airport. I advised the approach control that we had the airport and we were cleared for the visual to runway 18C. We had runway 18C ILS tuned in both navigation radios. The captain lined up on a final to runway 18L. I told him that this approach didn't look right as the localizer needle was showing a fly right indication. He continued until the approach controller cleared us to 5000 ft and turn to a heading of 090 degrees the captain started climbing and turned to a heading of 270 degrees. We were then brought back around for a visual to runway 18C. We were vectored to line up with runway 18C but not given any lower until about a 3 or 4 mi final. The captain accepted the visual and dove for the runway. We had reported for duty at XA45Z on apr/sun/06 and it was now XF15Z on the apr/mon/06. The flight was a tail end crash fire rescue equipment 91 flight after a day of crash fire rescue equipment part 121 flying. This captain is in his late 50's and out of shape. The even bigger cause of this occurrence was the fact that the FAA allows air carrier's to schedule crew for 16 hours of duty and then allows these same crews to ferry an aircraft crash fire rescue equipment part 91 after the 16 hours of duty. If the crews refuse the flight in most cases they will be fired.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-800 CAPT MAKES VISUAL APCH TO WRONG RWY AT CVG.

Narrative: WE WERE APCHING THE ARPT FROM THE E. I HAD GOTTEN THE ATIS AND ADVISED THE CAPT THE CURRENT WX AND THAT ILS RWY 18C WAS IN EFFECT. HIS RESPONSE WAS THAT WE WOULD DO THE VISUAL. THAT WAS THE EXTENT OF THE BRIEFING. AT AROUND 10 MI FROM THE ARPT; THE CAPT TOLD ME TO TELL THE CTLR THAT HE HAD THE ARPT. I RESPONDED BY ASKING THE CAPT IF HE HAD THE RWY. HE SAID NO; BUT HE HAS THE ARPT. I DID NOT HAVE THE RWY IN SIGHT NOR THE ARPT. I ADVISED THE APCH CTL THAT WE HAD THE ARPT AND WE WERE CLRED FOR THE VISUAL TO RWY 18C. WE HAD RWY 18C ILS TUNED IN BOTH NAV RADIOS. THE CAPT LINED UP ON A FINAL TO RWY 18L. I TOLD HIM THAT THIS APCH DIDN'T LOOK R AS THE LOC NEEDLE WAS SHOWING A FLY R INDICATION. HE CONTINUED UNTIL THE APCH CTLR CLRED US TO 5000 FT AND TURN TO A HDG OF 090 DEGS THE CAPT STARTED CLBING AND TURNED TO A HDG OF 270 DEGS. WE WERE THEN BROUGHT BACK AROUND FOR A VISUAL TO RWY 18C. WE WERE VECTORED TO LINE UP WITH RWY 18C BUT NOT GIVEN ANY LOWER UNTIL ABOUT A 3 OR 4 MI FINAL. THE CAPT ACCEPTED THE VISUAL AND DOVE FOR THE RWY. WE HAD RPTED FOR DUTY AT XA45Z ON APR/SUN/06 AND IT WAS NOW XF15Z ON THE APR/MON/06. THE FLT WAS A TAIL END CFR 91 FLT AFTER A DAY OF CFR PART 121 FLYING. THIS CAPT IS IN HIS LATE 50'S AND OUT OF SHAPE. THE EVEN BIGGER CAUSE OF THIS OCCURRENCE WAS THE FACT THAT THE FAA ALLOWS ACR'S TO SCHEDULE CREW FOR 16 HRS OF DUTY AND THEN ALLOWS THESE SAME CREWS TO FERRY AN ACFT CFR PART 91 AFTER THE 16 HRS OF DUTY. IF THE CREWS REFUSE THE FLT IN MOST CASES THEY WILL BE FIRED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.