Narrative:

I failed to obtain maintenance control authority/authorized for a right fadec #1 fault status message (MEL). We pushed off the gate and held on the ramp for over 2 hours during a ground stop into ord. When ground informed us to expect another 1 hour 40 min delay; I decided to start the left engine and return to the gate. While taxiing in; ground informed us we would be released immediately; we started the right engine; proceeded to runway 26L and prepared for takeoff. We noticed the right fadec #1 fault message. We pulled off near the hold short; and informed tower we needed a couple of mins. I read the MEL 73-4 and realized we could defer the item. Tower informed us we had 3 mins to take off or lose our slot. Additionally; we were approaching our minimum takeoff fuel quantity. I noticed in MEL 73-4 a column titled 'advanced notification to dispatch required' with a 'no' listed beneath it. I incorrectly assumed this instruction applied to crew placarding procedures. Seeing an opportunity to get airborne and avoid additional delay; I thought this language in the MEL gave me relief from contacting maintenance control for authority/authorized. Unsure; I called my dispatcher on my cell phone and discussed it with him. He gave me a date/time group for the MEL; and we launched. During cruise; I reviewed the flight crew placarding instructions in the general section of the MEL and realized my mistake. I wrote up the discrepancy and reported it to maintenance upon landing. Cause: I failed to comply with the MEL procedures not from blatant disregard; but rather from my poor understanding and inexperience with MEL procedures coupled with self-induced pressure to get airborne to avoid additional delay.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PRESSURED BY COMPANY AND ATC TO DEPART; INEXPERIENCED CAPT OF CRJ-700 TAKES OFF WITH IMPROPERLY ANNOTATED AML.

Narrative: I FAILED TO OBTAIN MAINT CTL AUTH FOR A R FADEC #1 FAULT STATUS MESSAGE (MEL). WE PUSHED OFF THE GATE AND HELD ON THE RAMP FOR OVER 2 HRS DURING A GND STOP INTO ORD. WHEN GND INFORMED US TO EXPECT ANOTHER 1 HR 40 MIN DELAY; I DECIDED TO START THE L ENG AND RETURN TO THE GATE. WHILE TAXIING IN; GND INFORMED US WE WOULD BE RELEASED IMMEDIATELY; WE STARTED THE R ENG; PROCEEDED TO RWY 26L AND PREPARED FOR TKOF. WE NOTICED THE R FADEC #1 FAULT MESSAGE. WE PULLED OFF NEAR THE HOLD SHORT; AND INFORMED TWR WE NEEDED A COUPLE OF MINS. I READ THE MEL 73-4 AND REALIZED WE COULD DEFER THE ITEM. TWR INFORMED US WE HAD 3 MINS TO TAKE OFF OR LOSE OUR SLOT. ADDITIONALLY; WE WERE APCHING OUR MINIMUM TKOF FUEL QUANTITY. I NOTICED IN MEL 73-4 A COLUMN TITLED 'ADVANCED NOTIFICATION TO DISPATCH REQUIRED' WITH A 'NO' LISTED BENEATH IT. I INCORRECTLY ASSUMED THIS INSTRUCTION APPLIED TO CREW PLACARDING PROCS. SEEING AN OPPORTUNITY TO GET AIRBORNE AND AVOID ADDITIONAL DELAY; I THOUGHT THIS LANGUAGE IN THE MEL GAVE ME RELIEF FROM CONTACTING MAINT CTL FOR AUTH. UNSURE; I CALLED MY DISPATCHER ON MY CELL PHONE AND DISCUSSED IT WITH HIM. HE GAVE ME A DATE/TIME GROUP FOR THE MEL; AND WE LAUNCHED. DURING CRUISE; I REVIEWED THE FLT CREW PLACARDING INSTRUCTIONS IN THE GENERAL SECTION OF THE MEL AND REALIZED MY MISTAKE. I WROTE UP THE DISCREPANCY AND RPTED IT TO MAINT UPON LNDG. CAUSE: I FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE MEL PROCS NOT FROM BLATANT DISREGARD; BUT RATHER FROM MY POOR UNDERSTANDING AND INEXPERIENCE WITH MEL PROCS COUPLED WITH SELF-INDUCED PRESSURE TO GET AIRBORNE TO AVOID ADDITIONAL DELAY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.