Narrative:

We released brakes for pushback. The pushback crew had already stated 'walkaround complete.' just prior to aircraft movement we got a 'door' open warning light. The guy on headset said we had a late bag. I stressed to him the importance of informing us if any doors need to be opened during pushback operation. After loading the bags the tug driver started to push us rearward. My first officer looked to his right and noticed a baggage cart inside the line. I told the pushback crew to stop the push and clear the safety area. He acknowledged me and they moved the equipment out of the way. After a min or two we continued pushback. When the push was almost complete the pushback crew informed me they had loaded the bags in the incorrect pit. We called operations for confirmation; and operations told us to return to the gate. The bags were loaded in pit 3 and needed to be in pit 4. I directed the pushback crew to continue the push and disconnect when able. We had already started 1 engine; so after receiving a wave off the crew marshalled us back to the gate. At the gate I elected not to open the L-1 door so as not to delay our next pushback. Knowing we only had about 31 passenger; I felt it would only take a couple of mins to repos the bags. This was true; it did take a few extra mins though to hook up the tug again. We pushed back out uneventfully and were on our way. I feel that we trapped these errors appropriately. Operations said his load program caught the misloading. All 3 errors were ramp problems; and all 3 are safety hazards.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: GND CREW OPENS UP CARGO DOORS ON MD80 IN THE MIDST OF PUSHBACK.

Narrative: WE RELEASED BRAKES FOR PUSHBACK. THE PUSHBACK CREW HAD ALREADY STATED 'WALKAROUND COMPLETE.' JUST PRIOR TO ACFT MOVEMENT WE GOT A 'DOOR' OPEN WARNING LIGHT. THE GUY ON HEADSET SAID WE HAD A LATE BAG. I STRESSED TO HIM THE IMPORTANCE OF INFORMING US IF ANY DOORS NEED TO BE OPENED DURING PUSHBACK OP. AFTER LOADING THE BAGS THE TUG DRIVER STARTED TO PUSH US REARWARD. MY FO LOOKED TO HIS R AND NOTICED A BAGGAGE CART INSIDE THE LINE. I TOLD THE PUSHBACK CREW TO STOP THE PUSH AND CLR THE SAFETY AREA. HE ACKNOWLEDGED ME AND THEY MOVED THE EQUIP OUT OF THE WAY. AFTER A MIN OR TWO WE CONTINUED PUSHBACK. WHEN THE PUSH WAS ALMOST COMPLETE THE PUSHBACK CREW INFORMED ME THEY HAD LOADED THE BAGS IN THE INCORRECT PIT. WE CALLED OPS FOR CONFIRMATION; AND OPS TOLD US TO RETURN TO THE GATE. THE BAGS WERE LOADED IN PIT 3 AND NEEDED TO BE IN PIT 4. I DIRECTED THE PUSHBACK CREW TO CONTINUE THE PUSH AND DISCONNECT WHEN ABLE. WE HAD ALREADY STARTED 1 ENG; SO AFTER RECEIVING A WAVE OFF THE CREW MARSHALLED US BACK TO THE GATE. AT THE GATE I ELECTED NOT TO OPEN THE L-1 DOOR SO AS NOT TO DELAY OUR NEXT PUSHBACK. KNOWING WE ONLY HAD ABOUT 31 PAX; I FELT IT WOULD ONLY TAKE A COUPLE OF MINS TO REPOS THE BAGS. THIS WAS TRUE; IT DID TAKE A FEW EXTRA MINS THOUGH TO HOOK UP THE TUG AGAIN. WE PUSHED BACK OUT UNEVENTFULLY AND WERE ON OUR WAY. I FEEL THAT WE TRAPPED THESE ERRORS APPROPRIATELY. OPS SAID HIS LOAD PROGRAM CAUGHT THE MISLOADING. ALL 3 ERRORS WERE RAMP PROBS; AND ALL 3 ARE SAFETY HAZARDS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.