Narrative:

It was the proverbial dark and stormy night. The flight left the gate on time; yet required a lengthy deice to remove 1/2 inch of stubborn in-flight accumulation from the prior leg. After deicing we taxied to runway 34L for departure; perhaps a 5 min journey. During this taxi both engines were running; with both bleed air valves open and feeding the air cycle machine. No irregularities were noted. The aircraft was appropriately configured for takeoff on the clean runway; planned using flaps 17 degrees; reduced torque; bleeds open. At the runway the first officer took the controls; added power and began the takeoff roll. The aircraft was relatively light and accelerated rapidly. After my '80 KTS' call I suddenly wondered why I couldn't see out the windscreen. After another breath I realized it was a burnt smell; and both the cabin and cockpit were filling with smoke. At between 90-100 KTS I grabbed the power levers and threw them into full reverse; stood on the brakes; and called 'abort; abort; abort.' the first officer informed tower of our situation and briefed our passenger before we even came to a stop. Decelerating; tower instructed us to clear the runway at the next turnoff. Despite being under the impression that we were on fire; for some reason I felt compelled to comply with this instruction. In my haste I misidented the location of the taxiway and turned off the runway centerline prematurely. When nothing but snow bank was illuminated in the landing lights we realized my error; slowed further; and maneuvered to the proper turnoff. I set the brake; and as a crew we briefly discussed our next action. The smoke was dissipating rapidly; quelling our concerns of an active fire onboard. It was a windy -10 degree F; and an evacuate/evacuation was an unpleasant option in the absence of an urgent need to do so. Crash fire rescue equipment arrived rapidly; and I asked them to examine our exterior looking for any obvious damage; smoke; or fire. When they found none; I asked them to verify that all our ties were still inflated after my enthusiastic brake usage. The tires were still usable; so we elected to taxi back to the gate under crash fire rescue equipment escort. Despite my shaking hands; I managed to write up the event in the aircraft log. Maintenance could not duplicate the smoke at any power setting. We had already flown 7 legs this day and attempted an eighth; had been on duty for nearly 13 hours; and had the adrenaline rush of a serious event. Fatigued was an understatement. Our company wanted us to take the aircraft with passenger and try again. We declined; as we didn't want to deal with another emergency situation in our condition and in the lousy WX in the area. Our company then wanted us to test fly the aircraft to attempt to duplicate the problem; again we declined. Eventually another aircraft was assigned and we accepted it to fly to our destination. Understandably; our passenger had lost interest; and we left empty. A later test flight of the problem aircraft yielded no defects. The smoke was likely a large quantity of propylene glycol deice fluid passing through an engine and the air cycle machine. I learned an awful lot from this exciting night. The decision to abort was a sound one. At 16000 ft by 200 ft; runway 34L is the longest runway in the state; and approaching V1 is not the time to be identing the nature and flavor of smoke in the cockpit. The decision to not stop on the runway was terrible; as in our panic we nearly took a sound aircraft off the runway and into a snow bank. We mentally slowed down after the brake was set and decision making improved. I feel crash fire rescue equipment was well utilized; and that taxiing back to the gate was prudent. The decision not to play test pilot in low WX; at night; fatigued and frightened was also sound; despite later findings that the aircraft was airworthy. In retrospect the glycol smoke itself was not a threat to flight safety; but in the time allotted one had to take the conservative path; abort; and ponder the problem on the ground. I still can't conceive of how such a quantity of glycol entered the environmental system at that awkward moment; but I may consider a brief high-power engine run prior to departure after deicing to blow any contaminants throughthe system before the takeoff roll.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BE1900 CREW ABORTED TKOF AT DEN.

Narrative: IT WAS THE PROVERBIAL DARK AND STORMY NIGHT. THE FLT LEFT THE GATE ON TIME; YET REQUIRED A LENGTHY DEICE TO REMOVE 1/2 INCH OF STUBBORN INFLT ACCUMULATION FROM THE PRIOR LEG. AFTER DEICING WE TAXIED TO RWY 34L FOR DEP; PERHAPS A 5 MIN JOURNEY. DURING THIS TAXI BOTH ENGS WERE RUNNING; WITH BOTH BLEED AIR VALVES OPEN AND FEEDING THE AIR CYCLE MACHINE. NO IRREGULARITIES WERE NOTED. THE ACFT WAS APPROPRIATELY CONFIGURED FOR TKOF ON THE CLEAN RWY; PLANNED USING FLAPS 17 DEGS; REDUCED TORQUE; BLEEDS OPEN. AT THE RWY THE FO TOOK THE CTLS; ADDED PWR AND BEGAN THE TKOF ROLL. THE ACFT WAS RELATIVELY LIGHT AND ACCELERATED RAPIDLY. AFTER MY '80 KTS' CALL I SUDDENLY WONDERED WHY I COULDN'T SEE OUT THE WINDSCREEN. AFTER ANOTHER BREATH I REALIZED IT WAS A BURNT SMELL; AND BOTH THE CABIN AND COCKPIT WERE FILLING WITH SMOKE. AT BTWN 90-100 KTS I GRABBED THE PWR LEVERS AND THREW THEM INTO FULL REVERSE; STOOD ON THE BRAKES; AND CALLED 'ABORT; ABORT; ABORT.' THE FO INFORMED TWR OF OUR SITUATION AND BRIEFED OUR PAX BEFORE WE EVEN CAME TO A STOP. DECELERATING; TWR INSTRUCTED US TO CLR THE RWY AT THE NEXT TURNOFF. DESPITE BEING UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT WE WERE ON FIRE; FOR SOME REASON I FELT COMPELLED TO COMPLY WITH THIS INSTRUCTION. IN MY HASTE I MISIDENTED THE LOCATION OF THE TXWY AND TURNED OFF THE RWY CTRLINE PREMATURELY. WHEN NOTHING BUT SNOW BANK WAS ILLUMINATED IN THE LNDG LIGHTS WE REALIZED MY ERROR; SLOWED FURTHER; AND MANEUVERED TO THE PROPER TURNOFF. I SET THE BRAKE; AND AS A CREW WE BRIEFLY DISCUSSED OUR NEXT ACTION. THE SMOKE WAS DISSIPATING RAPIDLY; QUELLING OUR CONCERNS OF AN ACTIVE FIRE ONBOARD. IT WAS A WINDY -10 DEG F; AND AN EVAC WAS AN UNPLEASANT OPTION IN THE ABSENCE OF AN URGENT NEED TO DO SO. CFR ARRIVED RAPIDLY; AND I ASKED THEM TO EXAMINE OUR EXTERIOR LOOKING FOR ANY OBVIOUS DAMAGE; SMOKE; OR FIRE. WHEN THEY FOUND NONE; I ASKED THEM TO VERIFY THAT ALL OUR TIES WERE STILL INFLATED AFTER MY ENTHUSIASTIC BRAKE USAGE. THE TIRES WERE STILL USABLE; SO WE ELECTED TO TAXI BACK TO THE GATE UNDER CFR ESCORT. DESPITE MY SHAKING HANDS; I MANAGED TO WRITE UP THE EVENT IN THE ACFT LOG. MAINT COULD NOT DUPLICATE THE SMOKE AT ANY PWR SETTING. WE HAD ALREADY FLOWN 7 LEGS THIS DAY AND ATTEMPTED AN EIGHTH; HAD BEEN ON DUTY FOR NEARLY 13 HRS; AND HAD THE ADRENALINE RUSH OF A SERIOUS EVENT. FATIGUED WAS AN UNDERSTATEMENT. OUR COMPANY WANTED US TO TAKE THE ACFT WITH PAX AND TRY AGAIN. WE DECLINED; AS WE DIDN'T WANT TO DEAL WITH ANOTHER EMER SITUATION IN OUR CONDITION AND IN THE LOUSY WX IN THE AREA. OUR COMPANY THEN WANTED US TO TEST FLY THE ACFT TO ATTEMPT TO DUPLICATE THE PROB; AGAIN WE DECLINED. EVENTUALLY ANOTHER ACFT WAS ASSIGNED AND WE ACCEPTED IT TO FLY TO OUR DEST. UNDERSTANDABLY; OUR PAX HAD LOST INTEREST; AND WE LEFT EMPTY. A LATER TEST FLT OF THE PROB ACFT YIELDED NO DEFECTS. THE SMOKE WAS LIKELY A LARGE QUANTITY OF PROPYLENE GLYCOL DEICE FLUID PASSING THROUGH AN ENG AND THE AIR CYCLE MACHINE. I LEARNED AN AWFUL LOT FROM THIS EXCITING NIGHT. THE DECISION TO ABORT WAS A SOUND ONE. AT 16000 FT BY 200 FT; RWY 34L IS THE LONGEST RWY IN THE STATE; AND APCHING V1 IS NOT THE TIME TO BE IDENTING THE NATURE AND FLAVOR OF SMOKE IN THE COCKPIT. THE DECISION TO NOT STOP ON THE RWY WAS TERRIBLE; AS IN OUR PANIC WE NEARLY TOOK A SOUND ACFT OFF THE RWY AND INTO A SNOW BANK. WE MENTALLY SLOWED DOWN AFTER THE BRAKE WAS SET AND DECISION MAKING IMPROVED. I FEEL CFR WAS WELL UTILIZED; AND THAT TAXIING BACK TO THE GATE WAS PRUDENT. THE DECISION NOT TO PLAY TEST PLT IN LOW WX; AT NIGHT; FATIGUED AND FRIGHTENED WAS ALSO SOUND; DESPITE LATER FINDINGS THAT THE ACFT WAS AIRWORTHY. IN RETROSPECT THE GLYCOL SMOKE ITSELF WAS NOT A THREAT TO FLT SAFETY; BUT IN THE TIME ALLOTTED ONE HAD TO TAKE THE CONSERVATIVE PATH; ABORT; AND PONDER THE PROB ON THE GND. I STILL CAN'T CONCEIVE OF HOW SUCH A QUANTITY OF GLYCOL ENTERED THE ENVIRONMENTAL SYS AT THAT AWKWARD MOMENT; BUT I MAY CONSIDER A BRIEF HIGH-PWR ENG RUN PRIOR TO DEP AFTER DEICING TO BLOW ANY CONTAMINANTS THROUGHTHE SYS BEFORE THE TKOF ROLL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.