Narrative:

I had just relieved the manhattan departure sector at socal TRACON. Working alone; no assistant. I acknowledged an automated rundown on A319 as a crossover; departing runway 24 complex at lax; crossover to us at sct and lax tower means everyone is aware that the aircraft will be turned to cross the runway 25 complex. I issued radar contact to A319 and climb clearance to 13000 ft; and advised them not to exceed 250 KTS. (Standard clearance with little to no traffic). Lax tower had entered additional aircraft in my rundown list. I vectored A319 left heading 190 degrees; then began pulling strips containing data on the newly rundown traffic. I only had my eyes away from the scope for mere seconds; when I looked up; I saw MD82 had departed the south (runway 25) complex; and was on a 250 degree heading; aiming directly at A319. MD82 had 'leap frogged' my A319 flight and was 600 ft above him. The shift supervisor was at the supervisors radar scope watching; so I asked him if he witnessed the situation. He had just arrived also; but he immediately came down to my sector; and I explained to him what had happened. At the time; there was no chance of evasive action; because I had no knowledge of MD82 departing the runway 25 complex; MD82 was being worked by my peer at the adjacent sector malibu. This and other similar situations have been occurring over the last 3-4 months. Lax tower is fully aware that as a manhattan controller; we have to turn the departing crossover traffic across the runway 25 extended centerline to vector them on course. Only as recently as the last 4 months have they refused to either wait until the proceeding aircraft (crossover); has passed the runway 25 departure end; then launch their runway 25 departure. Lax tower also has another option; they can run down the runway 24 departure as a 210 degree heading; then wait for appropriate spacing; and then begin to launch traffic from the south complex (runway 25's); based on the position of the crossover. Myself and at least 1 other controller in my area have documented this hazard several times in the past 4 months. The first time I encountered this 'sidewall' with my crossover traffic; I had no choice but to take evasive action. In that situation fortunately I was able to restrict flight to 2000 ft and avoid in the best case scenario; a near miss. Lax tower is a certified limited approach tower. Recently it seems their attitude is that if the traffic has departed the runways; they no longer need to separate. There have been slight improvements and changes in airspace and procedures; lax tower in the past has never operated this way until recently. I reported this incident today between the MD82 and A319 to my supervisor. My initial assessment of the separation was approximately 2.7 mi lateral; and approximately 600 ft vertical. Upon investigation and observing data reduction; it was determined that there was 3.1 mi lateral separation. The 3.1 mi separation occurred by sheer luck and not by controller awareness on the part of lax tower. I consider the potential for near midair collision/loss of separation as very high due to the misinterp of radar departure separation by lax tower.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR A319 DEPARTED LAX RWY 24 COMPLEX WITH A L TURN OUT HAS A NEAR CONFLICT WITH A DEPARTING ACR OFF THE RWY 25 COMPLEX THAT TWR RELEASED WITHOUT ENSURING MINIMUM SEPARATION.

Narrative: I HAD JUST RELIEVED THE MANHATTAN DEP SECTOR AT SOCAL TRACON. WORKING ALONE; NO ASSISTANT. I ACKNOWLEDGED AN AUTOMATED RUNDOWN ON A319 AS A CROSSOVER; DEPARTING RWY 24 COMPLEX AT LAX; CROSSOVER TO US AT SCT AND LAX TWR MEANS EVERYONE IS AWARE THAT THE ACFT WILL BE TURNED TO CROSS THE RWY 25 COMPLEX. I ISSUED RADAR CONTACT TO A319 AND CLB CLRNC TO 13000 FT; AND ADVISED THEM NOT TO EXCEED 250 KTS. (STANDARD CLRNC WITH LITTLE TO NO TFC). LAX TWR HAD ENTERED ADDITIONAL ACFT IN MY RUNDOWN LIST. I VECTORED A319 L HDG 190 DEGS; THEN BEGAN PULLING STRIPS CONTAINING DATA ON THE NEWLY RUNDOWN TFC. I ONLY HAD MY EYES AWAY FROM THE SCOPE FOR MERE SECONDS; WHEN I LOOKED UP; I SAW MD82 HAD DEPARTED THE S (RWY 25) COMPLEX; AND WAS ON A 250 DEG HDG; AIMING DIRECTLY AT A319. MD82 HAD 'LEAP FROGGED' MY A319 FLT AND WAS 600 FT ABOVE HIM. THE SHIFT SUPVR WAS AT THE SUPVRS RADAR SCOPE WATCHING; SO I ASKED HIM IF HE WITNESSED THE SITUATION. HE HAD JUST ARRIVED ALSO; BUT HE IMMEDIATELY CAME DOWN TO MY SECTOR; AND I EXPLAINED TO HIM WHAT HAD HAPPENED. AT THE TIME; THERE WAS NO CHANCE OF EVASIVE ACTION; BECAUSE I HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF MD82 DEPARTING THE RWY 25 COMPLEX; MD82 WAS BEING WORKED BY MY PEER AT THE ADJACENT SECTOR MALIBU. THIS AND OTHER SIMILAR SITUATIONS HAVE BEEN OCCURRING OVER THE LAST 3-4 MONTHS. LAX TWR IS FULLY AWARE THAT AS A MANHATTAN CTLR; WE HAVE TO TURN THE DEPARTING CROSSOVER TFC ACROSS THE RWY 25 EXTENDED CTRLINE TO VECTOR THEM ON COURSE. ONLY AS RECENTLY AS THE LAST 4 MONTHS HAVE THEY REFUSED TO EITHER WAIT UNTIL THE PROCEEDING ACFT (CROSSOVER); HAS PASSED THE RWY 25 DEP END; THEN LAUNCH THEIR RWY 25 DEP. LAX TWR ALSO HAS ANOTHER OPTION; THEY CAN RUN DOWN THE RWY 24 DEP AS A 210 DEG HDG; THEN WAIT FOR APPROPRIATE SPACING; AND THEN BEGIN TO LAUNCH TFC FROM THE S COMPLEX (RWY 25'S); BASED ON THE POS OF THE CROSSOVER. MYSELF AND AT LEAST 1 OTHER CTLR IN MY AREA HAVE DOCUMENTED THIS HAZARD SEVERAL TIMES IN THE PAST 4 MONTHS. THE FIRST TIME I ENCOUNTERED THIS 'SIDEWALL' WITH MY CROSSOVER TFC; I HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO TAKE EVASIVE ACTION. IN THAT SITUATION FORTUNATELY I WAS ABLE TO RESTRICT FLT TO 2000 FT AND AVOID IN THE BEST CASE SCENARIO; A NEAR MISS. LAX TWR IS A CERTIFIED LIMITED APCH TWR. RECENTLY IT SEEMS THEIR ATTITUDE IS THAT IF THE TFC HAS DEPARTED THE RWYS; THEY NO LONGER NEED TO SEPARATE. THERE HAVE BEEN SLIGHT IMPROVEMENTS AND CHANGES IN AIRSPACE AND PROCS; LAX TWR IN THE PAST HAS NEVER OPERATED THIS WAY UNTIL RECENTLY. I RPTED THIS INCIDENT TODAY BTWN THE MD82 AND A319 TO MY SUPVR. MY INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF THE SEPARATION WAS APPROX 2.7 MI LATERAL; AND APPROX 600 FT VERT. UPON INVESTIGATION AND OBSERVING DATA REDUCTION; IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THERE WAS 3.1 MI LATERAL SEPARATION. THE 3.1 MI SEPARATION OCCURRED BY SHEER LUCK AND NOT BY CTLR AWARENESS ON THE PART OF LAX TWR. I CONSIDER THE POTENTIAL FOR NMAC/LOSS OF SEPARATION AS VERY HIGH DUE TO THE MISINTERP OF RADAR DEP SEPARATION BY LAX TWR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.