Narrative:

Due to a maintenance issue with our inbound aircraft; we were informed of a crew swap in ZZZ for our leg to ZZZ1. It was also going to be a quick turn. When we arrived with the inbound flight; I stayed to secure the arriving aircraft at the gate; while the first officer left to power up the airplane we were to receive to get it ready for departure as fast as possible. When I arrived he said that during his walkaround prior to power up; he had noted that we had already been loaded with our baggage for the ZZZ1 trip. After some customer service related delays we departed for ZZZ1. The aircraft was loaded with; estimated from memory; 37 adults and less than 30 bags. The center of gravity was close to the forward limit at 8 up pitch trim; however on the takeoff roll; both the first officer and I noted the aircraft seemed to rotate much more easily than we expected given our load situation. We arrived in ZZ1 without incident and prior to giving the airplane to the receiving crew; the ramp supervisor asked me what I wanted him to do with the 600 pounds of sandbags in our baggage compartment. The first officer and I were unaware of any ballast on the airplane; and asked if he was sure it had come with us. He said it had. I had him offload the 600 pounds of sandbags; and then informed the receiving crew and dispatch so that the location of the sandbags would be known to the company. We went back and checked the load paperwork and did not exceed any aircraft limitation; with or without the excess weight. The ground crew in ZZZ completely failed to tell us of the ballast in the cargo compartment. There might have been a slight chance one of us would have noticed it on the walk around; however the first officer had noted the baggage compartment had already been loaded with regular baggage before we arrived at the aircraft. He did not see any ballast; so the only way we could have known there was ballast on the airplane was for the ramp agents to have told us. This is a serious safety oversight on the part of ramp personnel. It did not cause us any control problems; but in any number of different load situations this oversight could have had far more serious consequences regarding aircraft control. For example: autorotation; over rotation; tail strike; takeoff stall; landing stall; or loss of aircraft pitch control during either takeoff or landing phases of flight. Or job as flight crew is to take the best information given to us by all the various sources and ensure the aircraft is safely and properly loaded and balanced. We cannot do this if ground crews fail to give us accurate load information. Had we known of the ballast; we would have certainly asked for it to be removed prior to the flight. The essence of my concern is that the safety of the crew and passenger on this flight was jeopardized because somebody did not do the job they were supposed to do and notify the crew of the ballast in the aft baggage compartment.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN EMB135 DEPARTS WITH 600 LBS OF UNDOCUMENTED SAND BAGS AS BALLAST; WT AND BAL DID NOT REFLECTED WT. CREW FELT ACFT NOSE LIGHT ON TKOF.

Narrative: DUE TO A MAINT ISSUE WITH OUR INBOUND ACFT; WE WERE INFORMED OF A CREW SWAP IN ZZZ FOR OUR LEG TO ZZZ1. IT WAS ALSO GOING TO BE A QUICK TURN. WHEN WE ARRIVED WITH THE INBOUND FLT; I STAYED TO SECURE THE ARRIVING ACFT AT THE GATE; WHILE THE FO LEFT TO PWR UP THE AIRPLANE WE WERE TO RECEIVE TO GET IT READY FOR DEP AS FAST AS POSSIBLE. WHEN I ARRIVED HE SAID THAT DURING HIS WALKAROUND PRIOR TO PWR UP; HE HAD NOTED THAT WE HAD ALREADY BEEN LOADED WITH OUR BAGGAGE FOR THE ZZZ1 TRIP. AFTER SOME CUSTOMER SVC RELATED DELAYS WE DEPARTED FOR ZZZ1. THE ACFT WAS LOADED WITH; ESTIMATED FROM MEMORY; 37 ADULTS AND LESS THAN 30 BAGS. THE CENTER OF GRAVITY WAS CLOSE TO THE FORWARD LIMIT AT 8 UP PITCH TRIM; HOWEVER ON THE TKOF ROLL; BOTH THE FO AND I NOTED THE ACFT SEEMED TO ROTATE MUCH MORE EASILY THAN WE EXPECTED GIVEN OUR LOAD SITUATION. WE ARRIVED IN ZZ1 WITHOUT INCIDENT AND PRIOR TO GIVING THE AIRPLANE TO THE RECEIVING CREW; THE RAMP SUPERVISOR ASKED ME WHAT I WANTED HIM TO DO WITH THE 600 LBS OF SANDBAGS IN OUR BAGGAGE COMPARTMENT. THE FO AND I WERE UNAWARE OF ANY BALLAST ON THE AIRPLANE; AND ASKED IF HE WAS SURE IT HAD COME WITH US. HE SAID IT HAD. I HAD HIM OFFLOAD THE 600 LBS OF SANDBAGS; AND THEN INFORMED THE RECEIVING CREW AND DISPATCH SO THAT THE LOCATION OF THE SANDBAGS WOULD BE KNOWN TO THE COMPANY. WE WENT BACK AND CHECKED THE LOAD PAPERWORK AND DID NOT EXCEED ANY ACFT LIMITATION; WITH OR WITHOUT THE EXCESS WEIGHT. THE GND CREW IN ZZZ COMPLETELY FAILED TO TELL US OF THE BALLAST IN THE CARGO COMPARTMENT. THERE MIGHT HAVE BEEN A SLIGHT CHANCE ONE OF US WOULD HAVE NOTICED IT ON THE WALK AROUND; HOWEVER THE FO HAD NOTED THE BAGGAGE COMPARTMENT HAD ALREADY BEEN LOADED WITH REGULAR BAGGAGE BEFORE WE ARRIVED AT THE ACFT. HE DID NOT SEE ANY BALLAST; SO THE ONLY WAY WE COULD HAVE KNOWN THERE WAS BALLAST ON THE AIRPLANE WAS FOR THE RAMP AGENTS TO HAVE TOLD US. THIS IS A SERIOUS SAFETY OVERSIGHT ON THE PART OF RAMP PERSONNEL. IT DID NOT CAUSE US ANY CTL PROBS; BUT IN ANY NUMBER OF DIFFERENT LOAD SITUATIONS THIS OVERSIGHT COULD HAVE HAD FAR MORE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES REGARDING ACFT CTL. FOR EXAMPLE: AUTOROTATION; OVER ROTATION; TAIL STRIKE; TKOF STALL; LNDG STALL; OR LOSS OF ACFT PITCH CTL DURING EITHER TKOF OR LNDG PHASES OF FLIGHT. OR JOB AS FLT CREW IS TO TAKE THE BEST INFO GIVEN TO US BY ALL THE VARIOUS SOURCES AND ENSURE THE ACFT IS SAFELY AND PROPERLY LOADED AND BALANCED. WE CANNOT DO THIS IF GND CREWS FAIL TO GIVE US ACCURATE LOAD INFO. HAD WE KNOWN OF THE BALLAST; WE WOULD HAVE CERTAINLY ASKED FOR IT TO BE REMOVED PRIOR TO THE FLT. THE ESSENCE OF MY CONCERN IS THAT THE SAFETY OF THE CREW AND PAX ON THIS FLT WAS JEOPARDIZED BECAUSE SOMEBODY DID NOT DO THE JOB THEY WERE SUPPOSED TO DO AND NOTIFY THE CREW OF THE BALLAST IN THE AFT BAGGAGE COMPARTMENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.