Narrative:

I need to report what has become a chronic problem at my air carrier and that is pressure from maintenance supervisory personnel on pilots to accept aircraft that have been dispatched with mechanical problems under authority/authorized of our MEL or; in one case I've experienced; to influence the way an aircraft with serious in-flight mechanical problems had those problems entered into the aircraft logbook. I'll start with the last issue first. Was flying into ZZZ1 when the A320 on which I was captain; aircraft #1 had a series of mechanical failures which ultimately disabled the autoplts; autothrottles and provided bad information to the primary airspeed indicators. We had 22 ECAM warnings and 8 ECAM failure messages in the 16 mins between the appearance of the first problem and landing. Landing was accomplished in direct law and with the captain's and first officer's airspeed indicators differing by 20 KIAS due to adiru problems. At the gate; a maintenance supervisor came to the cockpit to find out what happened and when we got done telling him everything his reply was; 'well; if you write it up like that; you're going to ground the airplane for more than a day.' which it did. Another time I was reassigned an aircraft to fly ZZZ2 under far 121.191(a)(2) (method #2). The aircraft (aircraft #2) was previously scheduled to fly to the east coast; but that captain refused the airplane because 2 of the 3 pneumatic bleed sources (the APU and the #2 engine) were inoperative. I also refused the airplane because of the MEL restrs on the flight; it was night; and the fact that if we had a problem with the #1 engine or its bleed; we'd have no bleed air whatsoever. I went to the gate after refusing the airplane and was met by a maintenance supervisor who said he had no parts to fix the airplane and that the flight would be delayed for 3 hours if my refusal stayed on the airplane. I told him to fix the airplane or we'd wait. 15 mins later; a bleed valve was found for the APU but only after the supervisor had pointedly reminded me several times that the flight was being delayed by my refusal. Another time I was assigned to fly an airplane with an inoperative WX radar. This was at night with rain showers in the forecast which precluded dispatch per the MEL. I had refused the aircraft with the radar inoperative much earlier in the day to give the company time to either change aircraft or fix the radar. Nothing was apparently being done about the radar up to this point. As I entered my statement into ACARS; the jet bridge phone rang and a flight attendant said maintenance was on the phone and wanted to talk to me. I answered the phone and it was line maintenance who asked me if I was still refusing the airplane with the radar inoperative. I said yes and he responded 'good man' and hung up. After some delay; the right/T unit on the radar was replaced. Yet another time I was assigned to fly aircraft #4. After initiating taxi from pushback; I did the required brake check and discovered I had no brakes. The normal brakes did not work and did not automatically switch to alternate brakes. I did the immediate action dictated in our normal procedures to activate the alternate brakes and was able to stop the aircraft. When we stopped; 2 ECAM messages appeared related to the brake system. We stayed put and called our maintenance controllers using my cell phone. They directed pulling and resetting of circuit breakers to restore the system. We did that; the ECAM's went away and we continued taxiing. About 1 min later; more ECAM's related to the brake system appeared and this time; I believe; the brakes automatically went to the alternate system. This airplane had a recent history of these ECAM's with nothing being done other than pulling and resetting circuit breakers. That plus snow and braking action advisories convinced me to turn down the airplane. After we returned to the gate; our contract maintenance personnel found some valve in the brake and/or nosewheel steering system had failed and the airplane was grounded pending replacement of the valve. I was assigned to fly; arrived inbound with 3 write-ups; an inoperative forward lavatory sink drain; a red cids light illuminated on the door 1L control panel and an inoperative cabin light. When I arrived at the aircraft; a line mechanic was in the cockpit pulling and resetting circuit breakers in order to get the cids light out. He was eventually successful. I did not notice until very shortly before departure that line maintenance had not fixed the sink drain but instead had deferred it under our MEL and; per the MEL; had taped over the sink and written on the tape 'do not use' and placed a large pile of sani-wipes next to the sink. We had a 5 hour flight and a nearly full airplane and I wanted more done to restore the sink; if possible; before departure. I called line maintenance from the jetway and asked them to send the mechanic back out to see if the sink drain problem was due only to debris in the drain line. I was willing to accept responsibility for the delay; but line maintenance told me I'd have to refuse the airplane in order to get a mechanic back to the airplane. So I did. 15 mins later; a maintenance supervisor came into the cockpit and said 'I need you guys to take the plane as is because it's going to take 2 or 3 hours to fix this.' long story short; this issue went to flight operations supervisory personnel; a flight operations supervisor who was apparently called at home by station personnel because our flight office was closed. Almost one hour after I initially called to have a mechanic pull the drain lines; the maintenance supervisor showed up again with the original mechanic who had pulled the circuit breakers to restore the cids system; the drain lines were then pulled; nothing obvious was found; so I removed the refusal and we left for ZZZ8. En route; the red cids light once again illuminated and we wrote it up as a chronic. This problem had a history going back a week and each time it was written up; line maintenance had pulled; reset and signed the plane off. Line maintenance found that the forward drain mast heater on the aircraft had failed and was causing the drain problem and illuminating the cids light. These incidents all took place at different air carrier hubs but they all have the common thread of being prosecuted by line maintenance supervisors. Whether it's meet the captain at the airplane or call him in operations and tell him he's delaying the flight (or in the extreme; shout the MEL time limit at him); this is now SOP at air carrier when faced with a difficult refusal. This is; at the very least; arm twisting (coercion?) and there are capts here who will give in to that pressure. I have been in the airline industry almost 19 yrs and air carrier is my 5TH carrier; but I have never before seen this degree or nature of pressure to not 'down' an airplane due to maintenance.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN A319 PLT DESCRIBES NUMEROUS INCIDENTS IN WHICH HIS ACR'S MAINT ATTEMPTED TO GET HIM TO FLY ACFT THAT HE FELT WERE NOT READY FOR FLT.

Narrative: I NEED TO RPT WHAT HAS BECOME A CHRONIC PROB AT MY ACR AND THAT IS PRESSURE FROM MAINT SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL ON PLTS TO ACCEPT ACFT THAT HAVE BEEN DISPATCHED WITH MECHANICAL PROBS UNDER AUTH OF OUR MEL OR; IN ONE CASE I'VE EXPERIENCED; TO INFLUENCE THE WAY AN ACFT WITH SERIOUS INFLT MECHANICAL PROBS HAD THOSE PROBS ENTERED INTO THE ACFT LOGBOOK. I'LL START WITH THE LAST ISSUE FIRST. WAS FLYING INTO ZZZ1 WHEN THE A320 ON WHICH I WAS CAPT; ACFT #1 HAD A SERIES OF MECHANICAL FAILURES WHICH ULTIMATELY DISABLED THE AUTOPLTS; AUTOTHROTTLES AND PROVIDED BAD INFO TO THE PRIMARY AIRSPD INDICATORS. WE HAD 22 ECAM WARNINGS AND 8 ECAM FAILURE MESSAGES IN THE 16 MINS BTWN THE APPEARANCE OF THE FIRST PROB AND LNDG. LNDG WAS ACCOMPLISHED IN DIRECT LAW AND WITH THE CAPT'S AND FO'S AIRSPD INDICATORS DIFFERING BY 20 KIAS DUE TO ADIRU PROBS. AT THE GATE; A MAINT SUPVR CAME TO THE COCKPIT TO FIND OUT WHAT HAPPENED AND WHEN WE GOT DONE TELLING HIM EVERYTHING HIS REPLY WAS; 'WELL; IF YOU WRITE IT UP LIKE THAT; YOU'RE GOING TO GND THE AIRPLANE FOR MORE THAN A DAY.' WHICH IT DID. ANOTHER TIME I WAS REASSIGNED AN ACFT TO FLY ZZZ2 UNDER FAR 121.191(A)(2) (METHOD #2). THE ACFT (ACFT #2) WAS PREVIOUSLY SCHEDULED TO FLY TO THE EAST COAST; BUT THAT CAPT REFUSED THE AIRPLANE BECAUSE 2 OF THE 3 PNEUMATIC BLEED SOURCES (THE APU AND THE #2 ENG) WERE INOP. I ALSO REFUSED THE AIRPLANE BECAUSE OF THE MEL RESTRS ON THE FLT; IT WAS NIGHT; AND THE FACT THAT IF WE HAD A PROB WITH THE #1 ENG OR ITS BLEED; WE'D HAVE NO BLEED AIR WHATSOEVER. I WENT TO THE GATE AFTER REFUSING THE AIRPLANE AND WAS MET BY A MAINT SUPVR WHO SAID HE HAD NO PARTS TO FIX THE AIRPLANE AND THAT THE FLT WOULD BE DELAYED FOR 3 HRS IF MY REFUSAL STAYED ON THE AIRPLANE. I TOLD HIM TO FIX THE AIRPLANE OR WE'D WAIT. 15 MINS LATER; A BLEED VALVE WAS FOUND FOR THE APU BUT ONLY AFTER THE SUPVR HAD POINTEDLY REMINDED ME SEVERAL TIMES THAT THE FLT WAS BEING DELAYED BY MY REFUSAL. ANOTHER TIME I WAS ASSIGNED TO FLY AN AIRPLANE WITH AN INOP WX RADAR. THIS WAS AT NIGHT WITH RAIN SHOWERS IN THE FORECAST WHICH PRECLUDED DISPATCH PER THE MEL. I HAD REFUSED THE ACFT WITH THE RADAR INOP MUCH EARLIER IN THE DAY TO GIVE THE COMPANY TIME TO EITHER CHANGE ACFT OR FIX THE RADAR. NOTHING WAS APPARENTLY BEING DONE ABOUT THE RADAR UP TO THIS POINT. AS I ENTERED MY STATEMENT INTO ACARS; THE JET BRIDGE PHONE RANG AND A FLT ATTENDANT SAID MAINT WAS ON THE PHONE AND WANTED TO TALK TO ME. I ANSWERED THE PHONE AND IT WAS LINE MAINT WHO ASKED ME IF I WAS STILL REFUSING THE AIRPLANE WITH THE RADAR INOP. I SAID YES AND HE RESPONDED 'GOOD MAN' AND HUNG UP. AFTER SOME DELAY; THE R/T UNIT ON THE RADAR WAS REPLACED. YET ANOTHER TIME I WAS ASSIGNED TO FLY ACFT #4. AFTER INITIATING TAXI FROM PUSHBACK; I DID THE REQUIRED BRAKE CHK AND DISCOVERED I HAD NO BRAKES. THE NORMAL BRAKES DID NOT WORK AND DID NOT AUTOMATICALLY SWITCH TO ALTERNATE BRAKES. I DID THE IMMEDIATE ACTION DICTATED IN OUR NORMAL PROCS TO ACTIVATE THE ALTERNATE BRAKES AND WAS ABLE TO STOP THE ACFT. WHEN WE STOPPED; 2 ECAM MESSAGES APPEARED RELATED TO THE BRAKE SYS. WE STAYED PUT AND CALLED OUR MAINT CTLRS USING MY CELL PHONE. THEY DIRECTED PULLING AND RESETTING OF CIRCUIT BREAKERS TO RESTORE THE SYS. WE DID THAT; THE ECAM'S WENT AWAY AND WE CONTINUED TAXIING. ABOUT 1 MIN LATER; MORE ECAM'S RELATED TO THE BRAKE SYS APPEARED AND THIS TIME; I BELIEVE; THE BRAKES AUTOMATICALLY WENT TO THE ALTERNATE SYS. THIS AIRPLANE HAD A RECENT HISTORY OF THESE ECAM'S WITH NOTHING BEING DONE OTHER THAN PULLING AND RESETTING CIRCUIT BREAKERS. THAT PLUS SNOW AND BRAKING ACTION ADVISORIES CONVINCED ME TO TURN DOWN THE AIRPLANE. AFTER WE RETURNED TO THE GATE; OUR CONTRACT MAINT PERSONNEL FOUND SOME VALVE IN THE BRAKE AND/OR NOSEWHEEL STEERING SYS HAD FAILED AND THE AIRPLANE WAS GNDED PENDING REPLACEMENT OF THE VALVE. I WAS ASSIGNED TO FLY; ARRIVED INBOUND WITH 3 WRITE-UPS; AN INOP FORWARD LAVATORY SINK DRAIN; A RED CIDS LIGHT ILLUMINATED ON THE DOOR 1L CTL PANEL AND AN INOP CABIN LIGHT. WHEN I ARRIVED AT THE ACFT; A LINE MECH WAS IN THE COCKPIT PULLING AND RESETTING CIRCUIT BREAKERS IN ORDER TO GET THE CIDS LIGHT OUT. HE WAS EVENTUALLY SUCCESSFUL. I DID NOT NOTICE UNTIL VERY SHORTLY BEFORE DEP THAT LINE MAINT HAD NOT FIXED THE SINK DRAIN BUT INSTEAD HAD DEFERRED IT UNDER OUR MEL AND; PER THE MEL; HAD TAPED OVER THE SINK AND WRITTEN ON THE TAPE 'DO NOT USE' AND PLACED A LARGE PILE OF SANI-WIPES NEXT TO THE SINK. WE HAD A 5 HR FLT AND A NEARLY FULL AIRPLANE AND I WANTED MORE DONE TO RESTORE THE SINK; IF POSSIBLE; BEFORE DEP. I CALLED LINE MAINT FROM THE JETWAY AND ASKED THEM TO SEND THE MECH BACK OUT TO SEE IF THE SINK DRAIN PROB WAS DUE ONLY TO DEBRIS IN THE DRAIN LINE. I WAS WILLING TO ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE DELAY; BUT LINE MAINT TOLD ME I'D HAVE TO REFUSE THE AIRPLANE IN ORDER TO GET A MECH BACK TO THE AIRPLANE. SO I DID. 15 MINS LATER; A MAINT SUPVR CAME INTO THE COCKPIT AND SAID 'I NEED YOU GUYS TO TAKE THE PLANE AS IS BECAUSE IT'S GOING TO TAKE 2 OR 3 HRS TO FIX THIS.' LONG STORY SHORT; THIS ISSUE WENT TO FLT OPS SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL; A FLT OPS SUPVR WHO WAS APPARENTLY CALLED AT HOME BY STATION PERSONNEL BECAUSE OUR FLT OFFICE WAS CLOSED. ALMOST ONE HR AFTER I INITIALLY CALLED TO HAVE A MECH PULL THE DRAIN LINES; THE MAINT SUPVR SHOWED UP AGAIN WITH THE ORIGINAL MECH WHO HAD PULLED THE CIRCUIT BREAKERS TO RESTORE THE CIDS SYS; THE DRAIN LINES WERE THEN PULLED; NOTHING OBVIOUS WAS FOUND; SO I REMOVED THE REFUSAL AND WE LEFT FOR ZZZ8. ENRTE; THE RED CIDS LIGHT ONCE AGAIN ILLUMINATED AND WE WROTE IT UP AS A CHRONIC. THIS PROB HAD A HISTORY GOING BACK A WK AND EACH TIME IT WAS WRITTEN UP; LINE MAINT HAD PULLED; RESET AND SIGNED THE PLANE OFF. LINE MAINT FOUND THAT THE FORWARD DRAIN MAST HEATER ON THE ACFT HAD FAILED AND WAS CAUSING THE DRAIN PROB AND ILLUMINATING THE CIDS LIGHT. THESE INCIDENTS ALL TOOK PLACE AT DIFFERENT ACR HUBS BUT THEY ALL HAVE THE COMMON THREAD OF BEING PROSECUTED BY LINE MAINT SUPVRS. WHETHER IT'S MEET THE CAPT AT THE AIRPLANE OR CALL HIM IN OPS AND TELL HIM HE'S DELAYING THE FLT (OR IN THE EXTREME; SHOUT THE MEL TIME LIMIT AT HIM); THIS IS NOW SOP AT ACR WHEN FACED WITH A DIFFICULT REFUSAL. THIS IS; AT THE VERY LEAST; ARM TWISTING (COERCION?) AND THERE ARE CAPTS HERE WHO WILL GIVE IN TO THAT PRESSURE. I HAVE BEEN IN THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY ALMOST 19 YRS AND ACR IS MY 5TH CARRIER; BUT I HAVE NEVER BEFORE SEEN THIS DEGREE OR NATURE OF PRESSURE TO NOT 'DOWN' AN AIRPLANE DUE TO MAINT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.