Narrative:

We arrived at the gate for an on-time push. Light snow had just began to fall; and we requested to be deiced prior to departure. Visibility was dropping and we required a takeoff alternate which we coordination with dispatch. Release revision #1. We pushed 10 ft off the gate to be deiced using type I fluid; then proceeded to push for taxi out. Visibility was dropping and as we approached the departure end of the runway; we stopped to inspect our wings; having exceeded our holdover time by 4 mins and the wings being contaminated. We returned to the gate to replenish our fuel and again to be deiced. We again pushed back 10 ft to be deiced with both type I and type iv fluid. We then continued our push for engine start. We were unable to start due to 0 duct pressure. We tugged back onto the gate to coordination our MEL for the APU; release revision #2. At the gate; I inspected the wings. There was snow adhering to the outer portion of the left wing; and I felt the last application of the deicing fluid was inadequate; so I again requested deicing. We deiced at the gate with both type I and type iv fluid in anticipating use of the huffer for engine start. Not having shut down the APU; we then had sufficient duct pressure. I heard another company aircraft who was off the gate requesting the huffer because they; too; were unable to start their engines. I told ground operations we would not need the huffer so they could tow it out to the other aircraft. At that point; ATC informed us the runway was closed and would be for about 1 hour. We deplaned the passenger and I went down to operations to coordination our anticipated departure. Operations told me we would be the first of 4 aircraft to depart and the others would have to wait to be deiced. 15 mins prior to our anticipating the runway to reopen; we boarded our passenger. When the runway was opened; I asked ATC if taxiway a was plowed and opened; and they told me it was. There was at least 1 ft of snow at that point on the ramp area. I started the engines at the gate and coordination our deicing with the engines running. We pushed back 10 ft to be deiced with type I and type iv fluid. We then pushed back and the tug driver requested us to set the parking brake to disconnect. I told him we were not pushed back far enough to make a turn onto the ramp. He then attempted to push us back further but was unable to because of the snow. He told me he wanted to tow us forward to plow some of the snow. After I told him we would have to shut down our engines to tow forward; I set the parking brake and shut down both engines. With the brake released; he then tugged us forward and then attempted to push us back further. I again told him we were not back far enough. He then disconnected the tow bar to have the snow plow clear the area between the tug and the nose gear; reattached the tug; towed us forward and then pushed us back approximately 20 ft further. He asked me if we were back far enough and I told him in order for us to attempt to taxi we would require wing walkers. He then disconnected the tug and 2 wing walkers were positioned between us and the aircraft parked on gate X. As I added thrust; we started to move and when I turned the aircraft to the left; we began to slide to the right; which I was able to correct with differential thrust. As we continued to turn; I asked the first officer if it looked like we would clear the wing and he gave me a thumbs up. When I felt we were very close; I asked the first officer again if we would be clear; and he stated that we were still good and to continue. At that point; our right winglet made contact with the right trailing edge of the other aircraft's horizontal stabilizer. After debriefing with the first officer; he told me his vision was somewhat impaired by the glycol sheen on his window and the lights of the terminal; but that he was getting a wand-up signal from the wing walker all the way to the point of impact. I felt I had taken all the precautions required. Supplemental information from acn 679001: then as the wing came around I lost sight of 1 walker but could clearly see the guy with the lighted wand; and he held it up straight like it was going to clear the aircraft sitting on gate X. It was hard to judge for me; but he held that wand straight up and our right winglet struck the right back corner of the elevator of the aircraft sitting on gate X. Towed back to gate Y and had to wait 2 hours 30 mins while they plowed the gate area so we could be towed back to gate Y. We got back to the gate and deplaned and secured the aircraft.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AFTER DEICING AND WHILE TAXIING IN SNOW; A B737-700 WINGLET STRUCK ANOTHER ACFT WHEN THE FO COULD NOT SEE THE ACFT AND THE WING WALKER GAVE NO CLR STOP SIGNAL.

Narrative: WE ARRIVED AT THE GATE FOR AN ON-TIME PUSH. LIGHT SNOW HAD JUST BEGAN TO FALL; AND WE REQUESTED TO BE DEICED PRIOR TO DEP. VISIBILITY WAS DROPPING AND WE REQUIRED A TKOF ALTERNATE WHICH WE COORD WITH DISPATCH. RELEASE REVISION #1. WE PUSHED 10 FT OFF THE GATE TO BE DEICED USING TYPE I FLUID; THEN PROCEEDED TO PUSH FOR TAXI OUT. VISIBILITY WAS DROPPING AND AS WE APCHED THE DEP END OF THE RWY; WE STOPPED TO INSPECT OUR WINGS; HAVING EXCEEDED OUR HOLDOVER TIME BY 4 MINS AND THE WINGS BEING CONTAMINATED. WE RETURNED TO THE GATE TO REPLENISH OUR FUEL AND AGAIN TO BE DEICED. WE AGAIN PUSHED BACK 10 FT TO BE DEICED WITH BOTH TYPE I AND TYPE IV FLUID. WE THEN CONTINUED OUR PUSH FOR ENG START. WE WERE UNABLE TO START DUE TO 0 DUCT PRESSURE. WE TUGGED BACK ONTO THE GATE TO COORD OUR MEL FOR THE APU; RELEASE REVISION #2. AT THE GATE; I INSPECTED THE WINGS. THERE WAS SNOW ADHERING TO THE OUTER PORTION OF THE L WING; AND I FELT THE LAST APPLICATION OF THE DEICING FLUID WAS INADEQUATE; SO I AGAIN REQUESTED DEICING. WE DEICED AT THE GATE WITH BOTH TYPE I AND TYPE IV FLUID IN ANTICIPATING USE OF THE HUFFER FOR ENG START. NOT HAVING SHUT DOWN THE APU; WE THEN HAD SUFFICIENT DUCT PRESSURE. I HEARD ANOTHER COMPANY ACFT WHO WAS OFF THE GATE REQUESTING THE HUFFER BECAUSE THEY; TOO; WERE UNABLE TO START THEIR ENGS. I TOLD GND OPS WE WOULD NOT NEED THE HUFFER SO THEY COULD TOW IT OUT TO THE OTHER ACFT. AT THAT POINT; ATC INFORMED US THE RWY WAS CLOSED AND WOULD BE FOR ABOUT 1 HR. WE DEPLANED THE PAX AND I WENT DOWN TO OPS TO COORD OUR ANTICIPATED DEP. OPS TOLD ME WE WOULD BE THE FIRST OF 4 ACFT TO DEPART AND THE OTHERS WOULD HAVE TO WAIT TO BE DEICED. 15 MINS PRIOR TO OUR ANTICIPATING THE RWY TO REOPEN; WE BOARDED OUR PAX. WHEN THE RWY WAS OPENED; I ASKED ATC IF TXWY A WAS PLOWED AND OPENED; AND THEY TOLD ME IT WAS. THERE WAS AT LEAST 1 FT OF SNOW AT THAT POINT ON THE RAMP AREA. I STARTED THE ENGS AT THE GATE AND COORD OUR DEICING WITH THE ENGS RUNNING. WE PUSHED BACK 10 FT TO BE DEICED WITH TYPE I AND TYPE IV FLUID. WE THEN PUSHED BACK AND THE TUG DRIVER REQUESTED US TO SET THE PARKING BRAKE TO DISCONNECT. I TOLD HIM WE WERE NOT PUSHED BACK FAR ENOUGH TO MAKE A TURN ONTO THE RAMP. HE THEN ATTEMPTED TO PUSH US BACK FURTHER BUT WAS UNABLE TO BECAUSE OF THE SNOW. HE TOLD ME HE WANTED TO TOW US FORWARD TO PLOW SOME OF THE SNOW. AFTER I TOLD HIM WE WOULD HAVE TO SHUT DOWN OUR ENGS TO TOW FORWARD; I SET THE PARKING BRAKE AND SHUT DOWN BOTH ENGS. WITH THE BRAKE RELEASED; HE THEN TUGGED US FORWARD AND THEN ATTEMPTED TO PUSH US BACK FURTHER. I AGAIN TOLD HIM WE WERE NOT BACK FAR ENOUGH. HE THEN DISCONNECTED THE TOW BAR TO HAVE THE SNOW PLOW CLR THE AREA BTWN THE TUG AND THE NOSE GEAR; REATTACHED THE TUG; TOWED US FORWARD AND THEN PUSHED US BACK APPROX 20 FT FURTHER. HE ASKED ME IF WE WERE BACK FAR ENOUGH AND I TOLD HIM IN ORDER FOR US TO ATTEMPT TO TAXI WE WOULD REQUIRE WING WALKERS. HE THEN DISCONNECTED THE TUG AND 2 WING WALKERS WERE POSITIONED BTWN US AND THE ACFT PARKED ON GATE X. AS I ADDED THRUST; WE STARTED TO MOVE AND WHEN I TURNED THE ACFT TO THE L; WE BEGAN TO SLIDE TO THE R; WHICH I WAS ABLE TO CORRECT WITH DIFFERENTIAL THRUST. AS WE CONTINUED TO TURN; I ASKED THE FO IF IT LOOKED LIKE WE WOULD CLR THE WING AND HE GAVE ME A THUMBS UP. WHEN I FELT WE WERE VERY CLOSE; I ASKED THE FO AGAIN IF WE WOULD BE CLR; AND HE STATED THAT WE WERE STILL GOOD AND TO CONTINUE. AT THAT POINT; OUR R WINGLET MADE CONTACT WITH THE R TRAILING EDGE OF THE OTHER ACFT'S HORIZ STABILIZER. AFTER DEBRIEFING WITH THE FO; HE TOLD ME HIS VISION WAS SOMEWHAT IMPAIRED BY THE GLYCOL SHEEN ON HIS WINDOW AND THE LIGHTS OF THE TERMINAL; BUT THAT HE WAS GETTING A WAND-UP SIGNAL FROM THE WING WALKER ALL THE WAY TO THE POINT OF IMPACT. I FELT I HAD TAKEN ALL THE PRECAUTIONS REQUIRED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 679001: THEN AS THE WING CAME AROUND I LOST SIGHT OF 1 WALKER BUT COULD CLRLY SEE THE GUY WITH THE LIGHTED WAND; AND HE HELD IT UP STRAIGHT LIKE IT WAS GOING TO CLR THE ACFT SITTING ON GATE X. IT WAS HARD TO JUDGE FOR ME; BUT HE HELD THAT WAND STRAIGHT UP AND OUR R WINGLET STRUCK THE R BACK CORNER OF THE ELEVATOR OF THE ACFT SITTING ON GATE X. TOWED BACK TO GATE Y AND HAD TO WAIT 2 HRS 30 MINS WHILE THEY PLOWED THE GATE AREA SO WE COULD BE TOWED BACK TO GATE Y. WE GOT BACK TO THE GATE AND DEPLANED AND SECURED THE ACFT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.