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Aviation Safety Reporting System
|Local Time Of Day||0601 To 1200|
|Locale Reference||atc facility : fll.tower|
|Operator||common carrier : air carrier|
|Make Model Name||B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model|
|Operating Under FAR Part||Part 121|
|Flight Phase||ground : holding|
|Controlling Facilities||tower : fll.tower|
|Operator||common carrier : air carrier|
|Make Model Name||Airbus Industrie Undifferentiated or Other Model|
|Operating Under FAR Part||Part 121|
|Flight Phase||ground : position and hold|
|Affiliation||government : faa|
|Function||controller : local|
|Experience||controller limited radar : 15|
|Affiliation||company : air carrier|
|Function||flight crew : captain|
oversight : pic
|Anomaly||conflict : ground less severe|
conflict : airborne less severe
|Independent Detector||other controllera|
|Resolutory Action||none taken : unable|
ATC Human Performance
|ATC Facility||procedure or policy : fll.tower|
staffing : fll.tower
At the time of the first incident; I had already twice informed the supervisor that local south needed to be opened. The supervisor did not take any actions to open up local south; nor did he acknowledge; either verbally on non verbally; that he had even heard me. The only action that he took was to call up mia and tell them to put an IFR inbound from the southeast on a collision course with an IFR inbound from the west. I had not taken the handoff for the IFR aircraft inbound from the southeast because I saw that it conflicted with the IFR from the west. I was not able to call up mia on the landline and point out that by the LOA; they are required to provide separation for conflicting IFR traffic because I was too busy scanning both runways and using the radar to ensure that the helicopters who had an unusual request would not interfere with the aircraft traffic inbound for landing. I told the IFR aircraft inbound from the west that they were #1 and cleared them to land because I expected mia to follow the LOA that says that if I do not take the handoff then they are required to keep the aircraft in their airspace and sequence them from the west. Instead of widening out to follow the first IFR aircraft; mia descended the southeast IFR into my airspace and then cut in front of the arrival from the west. It was very distracting and stressful because there was no clear cut idea of who was actually controling which aircraft and which aircraft would be first. Obviously; under these conditions; I could not and did not provide visual separation. The IFR aircraft were close enough together that I was worried that I might have to send the IFR arrival; who had come from the west; around. If a random radar review is made of this and mia did not use visual separation; then an operational error occurred. There might have been an airspace violation because I never took the handoff or approved the southeast IFR aircraft's descent into my airspace. At the time of the second incident; I was still dealing with the first incident. The supervisor had made a bad judgement call not to split the positions and then made another error by putting two IFR aircraft in conflict because he was not aware of the traffic situation. The only way I could make the situation any safer was to stop all of my departures but I was under tremendous pressure by management not to go into departure delays. An example of that pressure is that the supervisors were well aware that they were leaving me alone; just before the arrival push; with only 4 controllers even though the min staffing level is 6 controllers. Miami approach said that they were not able to provide any departure gaps and the only briefing I received on the use of runway 13 departure was by the manager; mr X; who told that any time we were going to do runway 13 operations that lcs would be split off and the cn position would be open to prevent runway incursions. Even with 20 min breaks; I still could not open 5 positions with only 4 controllers. The managers also told me that runway 13 operations were only to be conducted when a supervisor was present. The supervisor said that anyone; including the controller in charge; can conduct runway 13 operations and there are no requirements for any positions to be open. The safest thing to have done was to have told the supervisor that I was stopping all the departures until lcs was split off but I did not want to get in trouble so I quickly scanned runway 9L and checked the radar for conflicts on final or VFR intruders in the departure corridor and then I cleared the first air carrier for takeoff and told the second air carrier to taxi into position and hold. I then went back to scanning runway 9R to make sure that the southeast IFR arrival that had landed first was clear of the runway so that I would not have to send the west IFR arrival around. The only way to scan the full length of runway 9R is to walk away from the lcn position to the other side of the tower cabin attendant and turn your back to runway 9L. Because I was watching runway 9R I did not see the airbus pull out onto runway 9L in front of the B757 that I had cleared for takeoff. I was not aware of what had happened until the airbus pilot question his position and hold clearance. When I turned and walked back to runway 9L I saw the acrs in a position that the should not have been and I felt sick to my stomach andhad chest pains and shortness of breath and I just never got any better. I took sick leave as soon as I was offered a break. I told the B757 to hold short and then I cleared the airbus for takeoff. At the time I thought that the airbus pilot had made a mistake and since I canceled the 757's takeoff clearance; I did not consider this to be a runway incursion or pilot deviation; but the B757 pilot did say something about it on the frequency. If I transposed the airplanes and cleared the B757 for takeoff with the airbus still on the runway; then there was an operational error on runway 9R at the same time that a runway incursion was occurring on runway 9L and both these incidents occurred about 10 mins after I first asked for the position to be split and the supervisor ignored my request.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: FLL CTLR DESCRIBED 2 INCIDENTS RELATING TO A POSSIBLE AIRSPACE VIOLATION AND OPERROR.
Narrative: AT THE TIME OF THE FIRST INCIDENT; I HAD ALREADY TWICE INFORMED THE SUPVR THAT LCL S NEEDED TO BE OPENED. THE SUPVR DID NOT TAKE ANY ACTIONS TO OPEN UP LCL S; NOR DID HE ACKNOWLEDGE; EITHER VERBALLY ON NON VERBALLY; THAT HE HAD EVEN HEARD ME. THE ONLY ACTION THAT HE TOOK WAS TO CALL UP MIA AND TELL THEM TO PUT AN IFR INBOUND FROM THE SE ON A COLLISION COURSE WITH AN IFR INBOUND FROM THE W. I HAD NOT TAKEN THE HDOF FOR THE IFR ACFT INBOUND FROM THE SE BECAUSE I SAW THAT IT CONFLICTED WITH THE IFR FROM THE W. I WAS NOT ABLE TO CALL UP MIA ON THE LANDLINE AND POINT OUT THAT BY THE LOA; THEY ARE REQUIRED TO PROVIDE SEPARATION FOR CONFLICTING IFR TFC BECAUSE I WAS TOO BUSY SCANNING BOTH RWYS AND USING THE RADAR TO ENSURE THAT THE HELIS WHO HAD AN UNUSUAL REQUEST WOULD NOT INTERFERE WITH THE ACFT TFC INBOUND FOR LNDG. I TOLD THE IFR ACFT INBOUND FROM THE W THAT THEY WERE #1 AND CLRED THEM TO LAND BECAUSE I EXPECTED MIA TO FOLLOW THE LOA THAT SAYS THAT IF I DO NOT TAKE THE HDOF THEN THEY ARE REQUIRED TO KEEP THE ACFT IN THEIR AIRSPACE AND SEQUENCE THEM FROM THE W. INSTEAD OF WIDENING OUT TO FOLLOW THE FIRST IFR ACFT; MIA DSNDED THE SE IFR INTO MY AIRSPACE AND THEN CUT IN FRONT OF THE ARR FROM THE W. IT WAS VERY DISTRACTING AND STRESSFUL BECAUSE THERE WAS NO CLR CUT IDEA OF WHO WAS ACTUALLY CTLING WHICH ACFT AND WHICH ACFT WOULD BE FIRST. OBVIOUSLY; UNDER THESE CONDITIONS; I COULD NOT AND DID NOT PROVIDE VISUAL SEPARATION. THE IFR ACFT WERE CLOSE ENOUGH TOGETHER THAT I WAS WORRIED THAT I MIGHT HAVE TO SEND THE IFR ARR; WHO HAD COME FROM THE W; AROUND. IF A RANDOM RADAR REVIEW IS MADE OF THIS AND MIA DID NOT USE VISUAL SEPARATION; THEN AN OPERROR OCCURRED. THERE MIGHT HAVE BEEN AN AIRSPACE VIOLATION BECAUSE I NEVER TOOK THE HDOF OR APPROVED THE SE IFR ACFT'S DSCNT INTO MY AIRSPACE. AT THE TIME OF THE SECOND INCIDENT; I WAS STILL DEALING WITH THE FIRST INCIDENT. THE SUPVR HAD MADE A BAD JUDGEMENT CALL NOT TO SPLIT THE POSITIONS AND THEN MADE ANOTHER ERROR BY PUTTING TWO IFR ACFT IN CONFLICT BECAUSE HE WAS NOT AWARE OF THE TFC SITUATION. THE ONLY WAY I COULD MAKE THE SITUATION ANY SAFER WAS TO STOP ALL OF MY DEPS BUT I WAS UNDER TREMENDOUS PRESSURE BY MANAGEMENT NOT TO GO INTO DEP DELAYS. AN EXAMPLE OF THAT PRESSURE IS THAT THE SUPVRS WERE WELL AWARE THAT THEY WERE LEAVING ME ALONE; JUST BEFORE THE ARR PUSH; WITH ONLY 4 CTLRS EVEN THOUGH THE MIN STAFFING LEVEL IS 6 CTLRS. MIAMI APCH SAID THAT THEY WERE NOT ABLE TO PROVIDE ANY DEP GAPS AND THE ONLY BRIEFING I RECEIVED ON THE USE OF RWY 13 DEP WAS BY THE MANAGER; MR X; WHO TOLD THAT ANY TIME WE WERE GOING TO DO RWY 13 OPS THAT LCS WOULD BE SPLIT OFF AND THE CN POS WOULD BE OPEN TO PREVENT RWY INCURSIONS. EVEN WITH 20 MIN BREAKS; I STILL COULD NOT OPEN 5 POSITIONS WITH ONLY 4 CTLRS. THE MANAGERS ALSO TOLD ME THAT RWY 13 OPS WERE ONLY TO BE CONDUCTED WHEN A SUPVR WAS PRESENT. THE SUPVR SAID THAT ANYONE; INCLUDING THE CIC; CAN CONDUCT RWY 13 OPS AND THERE ARE NO REQUIREMENTS FOR ANY POSITIONS TO BE OPEN. THE SAFEST THING TO HAVE DONE WAS TO HAVE TOLD THE SUPVR THAT I WAS STOPPING ALL THE DEPS UNTIL LCS WAS SPLIT OFF BUT I DID NOT WANT TO GET IN TROUBLE SO I QUICKLY SCANNED RWY 9L AND CHECKED THE RADAR FOR CONFLICTS ON FINAL OR VFR INTRUDERS IN THE DEP CORRIDOR AND THEN I CLRED THE FIRST ACR FOR TKOF AND TOLD THE SECOND ACR TO TAXI INTO POS AND HOLD. I THEN WENT BACK TO SCANNING RWY 9R TO MAKE SURE THAT THE SE IFR ARR THAT HAD LANDED FIRST WAS CLR OF THE RWY SO THAT I WOULD NOT HAVE TO SEND THE W IFR ARR AROUND. THE ONLY WAY TO SCAN THE FULL LENGTH OF RWY 9R IS TO WALK AWAY FROM THE LCN POS TO THE OTHER SIDE OF THE TWR CAB AND TURN YOUR BACK TO RWY 9L. BECAUSE I WAS WATCHING RWY 9R I DID NOT SEE THE AIRBUS PULL OUT ONTO RWY 9L IN FRONT OF THE B757 THAT I HAD CLRED FOR TKOF. I WAS NOT AWARE OF WHAT HAD HAPPENED UNTIL THE AIRBUS PLT QUESTION HIS POS AND HOLD CLRNC. WHEN I TURNED AND WALKED BACK TO RWY 9L I SAW THE ACRS IN A POSITION THAT THE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AND I FELT SICK TO MY STOMACH ANDHAD CHEST PAINS AND SHORTNESS OF BREATH AND I JUST NEVER GOT ANY BETTER. I TOOK SICK LEAVE AS SOON AS I WAS OFFERED A BREAK. I TOLD THE B757 TO HOLD SHORT AND THEN I CLRED THE AIRBUS FOR TKOF. AT THE TIME I THOUGHT THAT THE AIRBUS PLT HAD MADE A MISTAKE AND SINCE I CANCELED THE 757'S TKOF CLRNC; I DID NOT CONSIDER THIS TO BE A RWY INCURSION OR PLT DEV; BUT THE B757 PLT DID SAY SOMETHING ABOUT IT ON THE FREQUENCY. IF I TRANSPOSED THE AIRPLANES AND CLRED THE B757 FOR TKOF WITH THE AIRBUS STILL ON THE RWY; THEN THERE WAS AN OPERATIONAL ERROR ON RWY 9R AT THE SAME TIME THAT A RWY INCURSION WAS OCCURRING ON RWY 9L AND BOTH THESE INCIDENTS OCCURRED ABOUT 10 MINS AFTER I FIRST ASKED FOR THE POSITION TO BE SPLIT AND THE SUPVR IGNORED MY REQUEST.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.