Narrative:

During the takeoff roll; the aircraft would not lift off of the runway in a normal manner. When the nose did not rotate after considerable back pressure was applied on the side stick; I aborted the aircraft safely. Data shows 3600 ft of runway remaining after the aircraft was stopped. A forward center of gravity was found to be the cause of the problem. Correct loading of the aircraft would prevent this from happening.callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated that the air carrier utilizes an on board personal computer performance application that determines the distribution of passenger based on the current flight's passenger load. In this particular case; there were 57 passenger; a rare situation; and the baggage was fwd loaded. The software could not account for fwd light load passenger distribution because it always assumes that the passenger load would be higher and evenly distributed. According to the performance application; the aircraft as loaded was legal for flight. The reporter stated that the air carrier questioned the rejected takeoff above V1. The reporter's response was that because the aircraft would not rotate; it was not flyable; and that therefore the only option was to abort. It is the reporter's belief that the software has been modified to account for the flight's load distribution and that any flight with less than 100 passenger will have strictly controlled seating assignments.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN A320 WOULD NOT ROTATE AFTER CONSIDERABLE AFT STICK PRESSURE WAS APPLIED ON TKOF; AND THE TKOF WAS ABORTED. THE CAPT REPORTS THAT THE CAUSE WAS A FORWARD CG; DUE TO IMPROPER LOADING.

Narrative: DURING THE TKOF ROLL; THE ACFT WOULD NOT LIFT OFF OF THE RWY IN A NORMAL MANNER. WHEN THE NOSE DID NOT ROTATE AFTER CONSIDERABLE BACK PRESSURE WAS APPLIED ON THE SIDE STICK; I ABORTED THE ACFT SAFELY. DATA SHOWS 3600 FT OF RWY REMAINING AFTER THE ACFT WAS STOPPED. A FORWARD CENTER OF GRAVITY WAS FOUND TO BE THE CAUSE OF THE PROB. CORRECT LOADING OF THE ACFT WOULD PREVENT THIS FROM HAPPENING.CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT THE ACR UTILIZES AN ON BOARD PERSONAL COMPUTER PERFORMANCE APPLICATION THAT DETERMINES THE DISTRIBUTION OF PAX BASED ON THE CURRENT FLT'S PAX LOAD. IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE; THERE WERE 57 PAX; A RARE SITUATION; AND THE BAGGAGE WAS FWD LOADED. THE SOFTWARE COULD NOT ACCOUNT FOR FWD LIGHT LOAD PAX DISTRIBUTION BECAUSE IT ALWAYS ASSUMES THAT THE PAX LOAD WOULD BE HIGHER AND EVENLY DISTRIBUTED. ACCORDING TO THE PERFORMANCE APPLICATION; THE ACFT AS LOADED WAS LEGAL FOR FLT. THE RPTR STATED THAT THE ACR QUESTIONED THE REJECTED TKOF ABOVE V1. THE RPTR'S RESPONSE WAS THAT BECAUSE THE ACFT WOULD NOT ROTATE; IT WAS NOT FLYABLE; AND THAT THEREFORE THE ONLY OPTION WAS TO ABORT. IT IS THE RPTR'S BELIEF THAT THE SOFTWARE HAS BEEN MODIFIED TO ACCOUNT FOR THE FLT'S LOAD DISTRIBUTION AND THAT ANY FLT WITH LESS THAN 100 PAX WILL HAVE STRICTLY CONTROLLED SEATING ASSIGNMENTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.