Narrative:

The pairing of an inexperienced first officer flying with a new captain; both new to the airplane; can lead to trouble. My first officer is brand new to the airplane; to the airline; to part 121 flying and to flying in general (400 hours total time). He had completed IOE training only days before our flight. I have flown the line for over 4 yrs; but I am new to the left seat; and to the CL65. However; I have passed the magic 75 hours of time in the airplane and; therefore; legally able to be paired with new first officer's. Though enthusiastic; my first officer lacks fundamental skills -- most notably regarding radio communication and situational awareness. Furthermore; as a product of my airline's pilot development program; he has been drilled in checklist compliance (right now! Regardless of what the airplane or captain is doing) to the point of pestering the other pilot (who might be; say; in the middle of a sentence to ATC) to run a non time-critical checklist. Also; having no experience with the heavy volume ATC traffic of the east coast; he and his fellow graduates do not have their ears tuned to a call sign; and frequently talk over relevant ATC instructions. Furthermore; they seem trained not to ask ATC any questions -- or that asking a question is a form of weakness -- thus; it is not uncommon that they get 1/2 of a route clearance; or ATC instruction; and fail to ask for the rest. As new first officer's; these pilots are still figuring out the airplane; and their capts have to perform many of their duties preflight and on the ground. In an effort to depart on time (there is great pressure put on the captain to leave on time due to contractual penalties from our code-share airlines for late departures); I found myself having to do much of this first officer's job -- including weight and balance; prompting on ground control communications; keeping him from trying to run checklists while we were crossing an active runway; and so on. In short; I was babysitting a pilot who will be a very good first officer; but who is not ready to be in the right seat of a passenger jet -- particularly not on the east coast; at a hub; at night and working a system that is new to him. As a result; I was task saturated; and we missed an ATC instruction. The first officer was the PF; and I was working the radios; which I thought the safest option for our first flight together. Because of my close supervision of the first officer and the resulting task saturation; I had neglected to properly configure the audio panel from the ground crew communication position to the proper in-flight position. I could hear ATC fine -- I just wasn't transmitting; and I didn't realize this. We were cleared into position on the runway (the first officer still has the radios on the ground) and cleared for takeoff -- which I acknowledged. ATC cleared us a second time; which I thought odd; and I replied that we were rolling -- I didn't catch my no transmit error until we were handed off to departure; and they didn't reply to my check in call. Though rattled; I reconfigured; communication was fine; and I tried to figure out what else I had neglected. Level at 8000 ft; and with the first officer flying the airplane on autoplt; I told the first officer that I would be leaving communication #1 to contact company on communication #2 with our out- and off-times; and our fuel at takeoff -- all standard procedure. He replied that he had communication #1 -- I kept an ear cocked to communication #1 just in case he missed something; while I called company. While I was off communication #1; ATC gave us an instruction to turn to a heading to intercept a departure course; resume own navigation; climb to 14000 ft and to contact ZTL -- all of which I heard. The first officer acknowledged all instructions (which I still think is too many instructions at once; but that's another ASRS form); and I was back on communication #1 in time to check in with atlanta. I hadn't noticed that though we turned and were programmed to intercept; that 14000 ft was not in the altitude preselect. It is not uncommon to be held at 8000 ft on this departure for crossing traffic. I didn't think much of it -- thought I had missed an instruction while transmitting on communication #2. When ATC told us to resume normal speed (the hornet departure calls for 280 KIAS or less) while we were below 10000 ft; I realized something was wrong. I asked for higher; andafter a short pause; atlanta told us that charlotte had already cleared us to 14000 ft -- the first officer had never set it in the altitude preselect. I apologized for our error; and the flight proceeded without further incident.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CL65-200 PLT COMMENTS ABOUT NEW HIRE PLT'S INEXPERIENCE IN HIGH DEMAND ATC ENVIRONMENT AND THE CAPT'S TASK SATURATION WHILE HANDLING MOST TASKS.

Narrative: THE PAIRING OF AN INEXPERIENCED FO FLYING WITH A NEW CAPT; BOTH NEW TO THE AIRPLANE; CAN LEAD TO TROUBLE. MY FO IS BRAND NEW TO THE AIRPLANE; TO THE AIRLINE; TO PART 121 FLYING AND TO FLYING IN GENERAL (400 HRS TOTAL TIME). HE HAD COMPLETED IOE TRAINING ONLY DAYS BEFORE OUR FLT. I HAVE FLOWN THE LINE FOR OVER 4 YRS; BUT I AM NEW TO THE L SEAT; AND TO THE CL65. HOWEVER; I HAVE PASSED THE MAGIC 75 HRS OF TIME IN THE AIRPLANE AND; THEREFORE; LEGALLY ABLE TO BE PAIRED WITH NEW FO'S. THOUGH ENTHUSIASTIC; MY FO LACKS FUNDAMENTAL SKILLS -- MOST NOTABLY REGARDING RADIO COM AND SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. FURTHERMORE; AS A PRODUCT OF MY AIRLINE'S PLT DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM; HE HAS BEEN DRILLED IN CHKLIST COMPLIANCE (RIGHT NOW! REGARDLESS OF WHAT THE AIRPLANE OR CAPT IS DOING) TO THE POINT OF PESTERING THE OTHER PLT (WHO MIGHT BE; SAY; IN THE MIDDLE OF A SENTENCE TO ATC) TO RUN A NON TIME-CRITICAL CHKLIST. ALSO; HAVING NO EXPERIENCE WITH THE HVY VOLUME ATC TFC OF THE EAST COAST; HE AND HIS FELLOW GRADUATES DO NOT HAVE THEIR EARS TUNED TO A CALL SIGN; AND FREQUENTLY TALK OVER RELEVANT ATC INSTRUCTIONS. FURTHERMORE; THEY SEEM TRAINED NOT TO ASK ATC ANY QUESTIONS -- OR THAT ASKING A QUESTION IS A FORM OF WEAKNESS -- THUS; IT IS NOT UNCOMMON THAT THEY GET 1/2 OF A RTE CLRNC; OR ATC INSTRUCTION; AND FAIL TO ASK FOR THE REST. AS NEW FO'S; THESE PLTS ARE STILL FIGURING OUT THE AIRPLANE; AND THEIR CAPTS HAVE TO PERFORM MANY OF THEIR DUTIES PREFLT AND ON THE GND. IN AN EFFORT TO DEPART ON TIME (THERE IS GREAT PRESSURE PUT ON THE CAPT TO LEAVE ON TIME DUE TO CONTRACTUAL PENALTIES FROM OUR CODE-SHARE AIRLINES FOR LATE DEPS); I FOUND MYSELF HAVING TO DO MUCH OF THIS FO'S JOB -- INCLUDING WT AND BAL; PROMPTING ON GND CTL COMS; KEEPING HIM FROM TRYING TO RUN CHKLISTS WHILE WE WERE XING AN ACTIVE RWY; AND SO ON. IN SHORT; I WAS BABYSITTING A PLT WHO WILL BE A VERY GOOD FO; BUT WHO IS NOT READY TO BE IN THE R SEAT OF A PAX JET -- PARTICULARLY NOT ON THE EAST COAST; AT A HUB; AT NIGHT AND WORKING A SYS THAT IS NEW TO HIM. AS A RESULT; I WAS TASK SATURATED; AND WE MISSED AN ATC INSTRUCTION. THE FO WAS THE PF; AND I WAS WORKING THE RADIOS; WHICH I THOUGHT THE SAFEST OPTION FOR OUR FIRST FLT TOGETHER. BECAUSE OF MY CLOSE SUPERVISION OF THE FO AND THE RESULTING TASK SATURATION; I HAD NEGLECTED TO PROPERLY CONFIGURE THE AUDIO PANEL FROM THE GND CREW COM POS TO THE PROPER INFLT POS. I COULD HEAR ATC FINE -- I JUST WASN'T XMITTING; AND I DIDN'T REALIZE THIS. WE WERE CLRED INTO POS ON THE RWY (THE FO STILL HAS THE RADIOS ON THE GND) AND CLRED FOR TKOF -- WHICH I ACKNOWLEDGED. ATC CLRED US A SECOND TIME; WHICH I THOUGHT ODD; AND I REPLIED THAT WE WERE ROLLING -- I DIDN'T CATCH MY NO XMIT ERROR UNTIL WE WERE HANDED OFF TO DEP; AND THEY DIDN'T REPLY TO MY CHK IN CALL. THOUGH RATTLED; I RECONFIGURED; COM WAS FINE; AND I TRIED TO FIGURE OUT WHAT ELSE I HAD NEGLECTED. LEVEL AT 8000 FT; AND WITH THE FO FLYING THE AIRPLANE ON AUTOPLT; I TOLD THE FO THAT I WOULD BE LEAVING COM #1 TO CONTACT COMPANY ON COM #2 WITH OUR OUT- AND OFF-TIMES; AND OUR FUEL AT TKOF -- ALL STANDARD PROC. HE REPLIED THAT HE HAD COM #1 -- I KEPT AN EAR COCKED TO COM #1 JUST IN CASE HE MISSED SOMETHING; WHILE I CALLED COMPANY. WHILE I WAS OFF COM #1; ATC GAVE US AN INSTRUCTION TO TURN TO A HDG TO INTERCEPT A DEP COURSE; RESUME OWN NAV; CLB TO 14000 FT AND TO CONTACT ZTL -- ALL OF WHICH I HEARD. THE FO ACKNOWLEDGED ALL INSTRUCTIONS (WHICH I STILL THINK IS TOO MANY INSTRUCTIONS AT ONCE; BUT THAT'S ANOTHER ASRS FORM); AND I WAS BACK ON COM #1 IN TIME TO CHK IN WITH ATLANTA. I HADN'T NOTICED THAT THOUGH WE TURNED AND WERE PROGRAMMED TO INTERCEPT; THAT 14000 FT WAS NOT IN THE ALT PRESELECT. IT IS NOT UNCOMMON TO BE HELD AT 8000 FT ON THIS DEP FOR XING TFC. I DIDN'T THINK MUCH OF IT -- THOUGHT I HAD MISSED AN INSTRUCTION WHILE XMITTING ON COM #2. WHEN ATC TOLD US TO RESUME NORMAL SPD (THE HORNET DEP CALLS FOR 280 KIAS OR LESS) WHILE WE WERE BELOW 10000 FT; I REALIZED SOMETHING WAS WRONG. I ASKED FOR HIGHER; ANDAFTER A SHORT PAUSE; ATLANTA TOLD US THAT CHARLOTTE HAD ALREADY CLRED US TO 14000 FT -- THE FO HAD NEVER SET IT IN THE ALT PRESELECT. I APOLOGIZED FOR OUR ERROR; AND THE FLT PROCEEDED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.