Narrative:

Approximately 30 minutes prior to landing; I returned to the cockpit and got settled in my seat. It was the first officer's leg. Once I had situational awareness; and cruising at FL250 with the autoplt engaged; my first officer went to the restroom with the relief first officer taking his place. We were then given further descent to FL230. The relief first officer was handling the autoplt and I was talking on the radio. Then before leveling at FL230; we were given further descent to FL150 and we were told to keep our speed up on the arrival; which was at the time approximately 330 KIAS. Prior to leveling off at FL150; we were given FL100 and at about that time; the first officer returned and took over control of the aircraft. Passing approximately FL110; the controller then gave us instructions to cross rokim at FL100 then to fly heading 075 after rokim. As I was reading back the instructions; we were passing 10300 ft and was distracted by our rate of descent so close to our level-off altitude even though we had altitude cap. I did not ever get a chance to read back the instructions because at about 10100 ft; I told the first officer; 'level at FL100' and waived my hand although we still kept descending. I took the yoke and disconnected the autoplt passing FL100 and started pulling back on the yoke but discovered the controls (elevator not aileron) were stiff; requiring a good bit of force to get the nose to start back up and we bottomed out at 9700 ft before starting to climb back to FL100. At that time; the controller said; 'air carrier X show you at 9700 ft.' I got the aircraft back to FL100 and then said to him; 'sorry about that; but we were having a problem with the autoplt and we need to slow down now.' he never made another comment about us being a little low on the level-off and then gave us a speed of 230 KIAS. At that time; I started slowing to 230 KIAS with speed brakes and retarded the throttles to idle power. I told the first officer that I was now going to fly the aircraft and the approach and he should handle the radio. Also; I asked the relief first officer to look for any procedure with jammed or stiff flight controls. He told me that he did not find anything special other than to slow the aircraft; which I was already doing. We were given runway 25R for landing and while I flew; the first officer and relief first officer set up the ILS and FMC for the approach. We then received a clearance to 4000 ft and I continued the descent on downwind then we were given a 230 degree heading to intercept. As we turned final with the runway in sight we were given further descent to 3000 ft and I had the first officer ask for a slower speed. We were given 200 KIAS. The aircraft still felt stiff in elevator control but I was able to trim with no problem. We were given 180 KIAS until the marker. As I configured flaps for landing it still felt the same. I had the first officer ask for a slower speed so I could get stabilized and see what it felt like. The controller then switched us to the tower. After a departure on runway 25R; we were cleared to land. Since we had the airplane under control and were not delayed on our approach; I chose not to declare an emergency. As I approached the runway; I told the first officer to help with the flare if I needed it; but as I started to pull on the yoke to flare; it felt like something broke free and I adjusted my flight path to land with no problem. We then cleared the runway and taxied to the gate without any other problems. Previously the aircraft had a very similar; if not almost exact problem going into rdu and was taken out of service. Repairs to the elevator servos were performed; then it was ferried to ord and made a CAT III landing without a problem. However; a problem obviously still exists and I think the aircraft is unsafe to fly until the issue is thoroughly resolved. I reviewed the subsequent logbook write-ups and write-offs on 11/thu/05 at the layover hotel. Supplemental information from acn 677665: this was a dangerous situation that maintenance should have caught earlier (exact same write-up flight before last).

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW OF A B767-300 EXPERIENCED ALT DEV ON DSCNT WHEN AUTOPLT FAILED TO CAPTURE ALT. UNDER MANUAL CTL; ELEVATOR CTLS WERE STIFF.

Narrative: APPROX 30 MINUTES PRIOR TO LNDG; I RETURNED TO THE COCKPIT AND GOT SETTLED IN MY SEAT. IT WAS THE FO'S LEG. ONCE I HAD SITUATIONAL AWARENESS; AND CRUISING AT FL250 WITH THE AUTOPLT ENGAGED; MY FO WENT TO THE RESTROOM WITH THE RELIEF FO TAKING HIS PLACE. WE WERE THEN GIVEN FURTHER DSCNT TO FL230. THE RELIEF FO WAS HANDLING THE AUTOPLT AND I WAS TALKING ON THE RADIO. THEN BEFORE LEVELING AT FL230; WE WERE GIVEN FURTHER DSCNT TO FL150 AND WE WERE TOLD TO KEEP OUR SPD UP ON THE ARR; WHICH WAS AT THE TIME APPROX 330 KIAS. PRIOR TO LEVELING OFF AT FL150; WE WERE GIVEN FL100 AND AT ABOUT THAT TIME; THE FO RETURNED AND TOOK OVER CTL OF THE ACFT. PASSING APPROX FL110; THE CTLR THEN GAVE US INSTRUCTIONS TO CROSS ROKIM AT FL100 THEN TO FLY HDG 075 AFTER ROKIM. AS I WAS READING BACK THE INSTRUCTIONS; WE WERE PASSING 10300 FT AND WAS DISTRACTED BY OUR RATE OF DSCNT SO CLOSE TO OUR LEVEL-OFF ALT EVEN THOUGH WE HAD ALT CAP. I DID NOT EVER GET A CHANCE TO READ BACK THE INSTRUCTIONS BECAUSE AT ABOUT 10100 FT; I TOLD THE FO; 'LEVEL AT FL100' AND WAIVED MY HAND ALTHOUGH WE STILL KEPT DSNDING. I TOOK THE YOKE AND DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT PASSING FL100 AND STARTED PULLING BACK ON THE YOKE BUT DISCOVERED THE CTLS (ELEVATOR NOT AILERON) WERE STIFF; REQUIRING A GOOD BIT OF FORCE TO GET THE NOSE TO START BACK UP AND WE BOTTOMED OUT AT 9700 FT BEFORE STARTING TO CLB BACK TO FL100. AT THAT TIME; THE CTLR SAID; 'ACR X SHOW YOU AT 9700 FT.' I GOT THE ACFT BACK TO FL100 AND THEN SAID TO HIM; 'SORRY ABOUT THAT; BUT WE WERE HAVING A PROB WITH THE AUTOPLT AND WE NEED TO SLOW DOWN NOW.' HE NEVER MADE ANOTHER COMMENT ABOUT US BEING A LITTLE LOW ON THE LEVEL-OFF AND THEN GAVE US A SPD OF 230 KIAS. AT THAT TIME; I STARTED SLOWING TO 230 KIAS WITH SPD BRAKES AND RETARDED THE THROTTLES TO IDLE POWER. I TOLD THE FO THAT I WAS NOW GOING TO FLY THE ACFT AND THE APCH AND HE SHOULD HANDLE THE RADIO. ALSO; I ASKED THE RELIEF FO TO LOOK FOR ANY PROC WITH JAMMED OR STIFF FLT CTLS. HE TOLD ME THAT HE DID NOT FIND ANYTHING SPECIAL OTHER THAN TO SLOW THE ACFT; WHICH I WAS ALREADY DOING. WE WERE GIVEN RWY 25R FOR LNDG AND WHILE I FLEW; THE FO AND RELIEF FO SET UP THE ILS AND FMC FOR THE APCH. WE THEN RECEIVED A CLRNC TO 4000 FT AND I CONTINUED THE DSCNT ON DOWNWIND THEN WE WERE GIVEN A 230 DEG HDG TO INTERCEPT. AS WE TURNED FINAL WITH THE RWY IN SIGHT WE WERE GIVEN FURTHER DSCNT TO 3000 FT AND I HAD THE FO ASK FOR A SLOWER SPD. WE WERE GIVEN 200 KIAS. THE ACFT STILL FELT STIFF IN ELEVATOR CTL BUT I WAS ABLE TO TRIM WITH NO PROB. WE WERE GIVEN 180 KIAS UNTIL THE MARKER. AS I CONFIGURED FLAPS FOR LNDG IT STILL FELT THE SAME. I HAD THE FO ASK FOR A SLOWER SPD SO I COULD GET STABILIZED AND SEE WHAT IT FELT LIKE. THE CTLR THEN SWITCHED US TO THE TWR. AFTER A DEP ON RWY 25R; WE WERE CLRED TO LAND. SINCE WE HAD THE AIRPLANE UNDER CTL AND WERE NOT DELAYED ON OUR APCH; I CHOSE NOT TO DECLARE AN EMER. AS I APCHED THE RWY; I TOLD THE FO TO HELP WITH THE FLARE IF I NEEDED IT; BUT AS I STARTED TO PULL ON THE YOKE TO FLARE; IT FELT LIKE SOMETHING BROKE FREE AND I ADJUSTED MY FLT PATH TO LAND WITH NO PROB. WE THEN CLRED THE RWY AND TAXIED TO THE GATE WITHOUT ANY OTHER PROBS. PREVIOUSLY THE ACFT HAD A VERY SIMILAR; IF NOT ALMOST EXACT PROB GOING INTO RDU AND WAS TAKEN OUT OF SVC. REPAIRS TO THE ELEVATOR SERVOS WERE PERFORMED; THEN IT WAS FERRIED TO ORD AND MADE A CAT III LNDG WITHOUT A PROB. HOWEVER; A PROB OBVIOUSLY STILL EXISTS AND I THINK THE ACFT IS UNSAFE TO FLY UNTIL THE ISSUE IS THOROUGHLY RESOLVED. I REVIEWED THE SUBSEQUENT LOGBOOK WRITE-UPS AND WRITE-OFFS ON 11/THU/05 AT THE LAYOVER HOTEL. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 677665: THIS WAS A DANGEROUS SIT THAT MAINT SHOULD HAVE CAUGHT EARLIER (EXACT SAME WRITE-UP FLT BEFORE LAST).

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.