Narrative:

On 4 mi final to runway 28L at san francisco; the tower controller cleared a B747 across runway 28L to hold short of runway 28R. We were already on parallel visual approachs with an A319 and assigned the aircraft in charge of separation. The tower controller instructed the B747 to remain at idle power due to arriving aircraft (our aircraft). As the PF; I communicated to the first officer that I would remain high on the glide path and pass above the tail of the B747 in an effort to miss any potential effect their thrust may place on us. As we passed abeam the B747; our aircraft experienced movement similar to wake turbulence; but actually more pronounced. I was already hand flying and added thrust and reduced my rate of descent while stabilizing the aircraft. This action took me to the end of the touchdown zone before landing occurred. Upon taxiing clear of the active; we communicated to the ground controller our experience as we passed the B747. He didn't seem to be interested; so we contacted the tower supervisor via telephone from operations. He listened to my concerns with this clearance; the first of its kind for me; and also the last. His comment was that they were just trying to facilitate a speedier departure for the B747. As we taxied near the gate; the B747 was still in the same position; with another 2-3 aircraft most likely encountering the same situation that we did. He replied that they should not be cleared across until they are in all likelihood going to be cleared for an immediate takeoff. I was disappointed that the speedy movement of aircraft is again at the forefront of the process; rather than safety. A safe condition became a questionable situation. Preventive measures: for me and the air carrier -- a policy that denies this type of clearance. I will most assuredly decline this clearance in the future and will go around. For sfo ATC; and any other for that matter: my suggestion to the supervisor was that if an aircraft needs the longest runway (runway 28R) for departure; then cross that aircraft northbound on taxiway left (crossing runway 28L/right while the departing aircraft are using runway 1L/right); then east on taxiway C. At the end; they can then wait until their sequence for departure without the potential to impact other aircraft. This suggestion didn't appear to mean much other than the comment that he would emphasize the risks associated with aircraft at idle power; especially widebody transport's; located between active runways.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 EXPERIENCED JETBLAST DURING LNDG AT SFO FROM B747 ACFT HOLDING BTWN RWYS 28L AND 28R.

Narrative: ON 4 MI FINAL TO RWY 28L AT SAN FRANCISCO; THE TWR CTLR CLRED A B747 ACROSS RWY 28L TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 28R. WE WERE ALREADY ON PARALLEL VISUAL APCHS WITH AN A319 AND ASSIGNED THE ACFT IN CHARGE OF SEPARATION. THE TWR CTLR INSTRUCTED THE B747 TO REMAIN AT IDLE PWR DUE TO ARRIVING ACFT (OUR ACFT). AS THE PF; I COMMUNICATED TO THE FO THAT I WOULD REMAIN HIGH ON THE GLIDE PATH AND PASS ABOVE THE TAIL OF THE B747 IN AN EFFORT TO MISS ANY POTENTIAL EFFECT THEIR THRUST MAY PLACE ON US. AS WE PASSED ABEAM THE B747; OUR ACFT EXPERIENCED MOVEMENT SIMILAR TO WAKE TURB; BUT ACTUALLY MORE PRONOUNCED. I WAS ALREADY HAND FLYING AND ADDED THRUST AND REDUCED MY RATE OF DSCNT WHILE STABILIZING THE ACFT. THIS ACTION TOOK ME TO THE END OF THE TOUCHDOWN ZONE BEFORE LNDG OCCURRED. UPON TAXIING CLR OF THE ACTIVE; WE COMMUNICATED TO THE GND CTLR OUR EXPERIENCE AS WE PASSED THE B747. HE DIDN'T SEEM TO BE INTERESTED; SO WE CONTACTED THE TWR SUPVR VIA TELEPHONE FROM OPS. HE LISTENED TO MY CONCERNS WITH THIS CLRNC; THE FIRST OF ITS KIND FOR ME; AND ALSO THE LAST. HIS COMMENT WAS THAT THEY WERE JUST TRYING TO FACILITATE A SPEEDIER DEP FOR THE B747. AS WE TAXIED NEAR THE GATE; THE B747 WAS STILL IN THE SAME POS; WITH ANOTHER 2-3 ACFT MOST LIKELY ENCOUNTERING THE SAME SITUATION THAT WE DID. HE REPLIED THAT THEY SHOULD NOT BE CLRED ACROSS UNTIL THEY ARE IN ALL LIKELIHOOD GOING TO BE CLRED FOR AN IMMEDIATE TKOF. I WAS DISAPPOINTED THAT THE SPEEDY MOVEMENT OF ACFT IS AGAIN AT THE FOREFRONT OF THE PROCESS; RATHER THAN SAFETY. A SAFE CONDITION BECAME A QUESTIONABLE SITUATION. PREVENTIVE MEASURES: FOR ME AND THE ACR -- A POLICY THAT DENIES THIS TYPE OF CLRNC. I WILL MOST ASSUREDLY DECLINE THIS CLRNC IN THE FUTURE AND WILL GO AROUND. FOR SFO ATC; AND ANY OTHER FOR THAT MATTER: MY SUGGESTION TO THE SUPVR WAS THAT IF AN ACFT NEEDS THE LONGEST RWY (RWY 28R) FOR DEP; THEN CROSS THAT ACFT NBOUND ON TXWY L (XING RWY 28L/R WHILE THE DEPARTING ACFT ARE USING RWY 1L/R); THEN E ON TXWY C. AT THE END; THEY CAN THEN WAIT UNTIL THEIR SEQUENCE FOR DEP WITHOUT THE POTENTIAL TO IMPACT OTHER ACFT. THIS SUGGESTION DIDN'T APPEAR TO MEAN MUCH OTHER THAN THE COMMENT THAT HE WOULD EMPHASIZE THE RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH ACFT AT IDLE PWR; ESPECIALLY WDB'S; LOCATED BTWN ACTIVE RWYS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.