Narrative:

A commuter was inbound to iad on the delro 1 arrival. P40 prohibited airspace (camp david) was active and expanded; the expansion of P40 airspace prohibits any aircraft from flying within a 5 mi radius of camp david below 12500 ft MSL. There is also an associated ADIZ which requires additional controller vigilance. The traffic flying at 8000 ft MSL; appeared to be flying north of the arrival route and missed the turn towards iad at the mulrr intersection. When I observed the aircraft continuing wbound toward P40; I immediately issued a vector sbound; but there was not enough time to prevent the aircraft from entering P40. The supervisor was immediately advised. The aircraft was on my frequency for only 1 min 15 seconds before the incident occurred. Causal factors: 1) since 9/11/01; P40 prohibited airspace has been expanded whenever the president is in residence. None of the arrival rtes into iad have been changed; thereby placing the proximity of mulrr intersection extremely close (less than 2 mi) to the edge of P40 airspace. There is no margin for error; and no airway protection; ie; 2 mi either side of an airway. Aircraft was navigating with non precision /a equipment. 2) I was very busy working an arrival sector during a known arrival push. The handoff position was not staffed. There were inbound restrs placed on all other arrival fixes; but none over mulrr. 3) at the time of the incident; an air carrier Y heavy jet was inbound from a non standard arrival route because this airline is not permitted to fly the normal arrival rtes near P40 since 9/11. This alternate arrival route is only 15 mi northeast of iad airport and fitting this unexpected heavy jet into the arrival flow was extremely work intensive; requiring controller coordination and the changing of several pre-issued aircraft altitude and speed assignments to ensure separation and to establish an arrival gap big enough to accommodate the heavy jet and its wake. In fact; I missed aircraft X's initial call because of necessary coordination about this aircraft. Solutions: 1) arrival rtes and procedures must be changed to accommodate the new expanded P40 airspace. Since 9/11; many procedures and a lot of airspace have been changed for security reasons by people who are too far removed from the daily operation of simply moving and separating aircraft. There has been little procedural change to support these new requirements and this has introduced far too many complexities for the system and the controller's ability to handle aircraft safely and effectively. 2) there needs to be arrival restrs over mulrr whenever P40 is active. There is absolutely no margin for error on the part of either the controller or the pilot. Jamming arrs in this area with little time to act and no room to maneuver is asking for trouble. 3) staffing the handoff position helps by providing a second set of eyes and by limiting distrs to the radar controller by taking care of coordination and strip management.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PCT CTLR EXPRESSED CONCERN REGARDING NUMEROUS RESTR AREAS AROUND THE DCA AREA AND PUBLISHED ARR RTES THAT ARE IN CLOSE PROX.

Narrative: A COMMUTER WAS INBOUND TO IAD ON THE DELRO 1 ARR. P40 PROHIBITED AIRSPACE (CAMP DAVID) WAS ACTIVE AND EXPANDED; THE EXPANSION OF P40 AIRSPACE PROHIBITS ANY ACFT FROM FLYING WITHIN A 5 MI RADIUS OF CAMP DAVID BELOW 12500 FT MSL. THERE IS ALSO AN ASSOCIATED ADIZ WHICH REQUIRES ADDITIONAL CTLR VIGILANCE. THE TFC FLYING AT 8000 FT MSL; APPEARED TO BE FLYING N OF THE ARR RTE AND MISSED THE TURN TOWARDS IAD AT THE MULRR INTXN. WHEN I OBSERVED THE ACFT CONTINUING WBOUND TOWARD P40; I IMMEDIATELY ISSUED A VECTOR SBOUND; BUT THERE WAS NOT ENOUGH TIME TO PREVENT THE ACFT FROM ENTERING P40. THE SUPVR WAS IMMEDIATELY ADVISED. THE ACFT WAS ON MY FREQ FOR ONLY 1 MIN 15 SECONDS BEFORE THE INCIDENT OCCURRED. CAUSAL FACTORS: 1) SINCE 9/11/01; P40 PROHIBITED AIRSPACE HAS BEEN EXPANDED WHENEVER THE PRESIDENT IS IN RESIDENCE. NONE OF THE ARR RTES INTO IAD HAVE BEEN CHANGED; THEREBY PLACING THE PROX OF MULRR INTXN EXTREMELY CLOSE (LESS THAN 2 MI) TO THE EDGE OF P40 AIRSPACE. THERE IS NO MARGIN FOR ERROR; AND NO AIRWAY PROTECTION; IE; 2 MI EITHER SIDE OF AN AIRWAY. ACFT WAS NAVING WITH NON PRECISION /A EQUIP. 2) I WAS VERY BUSY WORKING AN ARR SECTOR DURING A KNOWN ARR PUSH. THE HDOF POS WAS NOT STAFFED. THERE WERE INBOUND RESTRS PLACED ON ALL OTHER ARR FIXES; BUT NONE OVER MULRR. 3) AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT; AN ACR Y HVY JET WAS INBOUND FROM A NON STANDARD ARR RTE BECAUSE THIS AIRLINE IS NOT PERMITTED TO FLY THE NORMAL ARR RTES NEAR P40 SINCE 9/11. THIS ALTERNATE ARR RTE IS ONLY 15 MI NE OF IAD ARPT AND FITTING THIS UNEXPECTED HVY JET INTO THE ARR FLOW WAS EXTREMELY WORK INTENSIVE; REQUIRING CTLR COORD AND THE CHANGING OF SEVERAL PRE-ISSUED ACFT ALT AND SPD ASSIGNMENTS TO ENSURE SEPARATION AND TO ESTABLISH AN ARR GAP BIG ENOUGH TO ACCOMMODATE THE HVY JET AND ITS WAKE. IN FACT; I MISSED ACFT X'S INITIAL CALL BECAUSE OF NECESSARY COORD ABOUT THIS ACFT. SOLUTIONS: 1) ARR RTES AND PROCS MUST BE CHANGED TO ACCOMMODATE THE NEW EXPANDED P40 AIRSPACE. SINCE 9/11; MANY PROCS AND A LOT OF AIRSPACE HAVE BEEN CHANGED FOR SECURITY REASONS BY PEOPLE WHO ARE TOO FAR REMOVED FROM THE DAILY OP OF SIMPLY MOVING AND SEPARATING ACFT. THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE PROCEDURAL CHANGE TO SUPPORT THESE NEW REQUIREMENTS AND THIS HAS INTRODUCED FAR TOO MANY COMPLEXITIES FOR THE SYS AND THE CTLR'S ABILITY TO HANDLE ACFT SAFELY AND EFFECTIVELY. 2) THERE NEEDS TO BE ARR RESTRS OVER MULRR WHENEVER P40 IS ACTIVE. THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO MARGIN FOR ERROR ON THE PART OF EITHER THE CTLR OR THE PLT. JAMMING ARRS IN THIS AREA WITH LITTLE TIME TO ACT AND NO ROOM TO MANEUVER IS ASKING FOR TROUBLE. 3) STAFFING THE HDOF POS HELPS BY PROVIDING A SECOND SET OF EYES AND BY LIMITING DISTRS TO THE RADAR CTLR BY TAKING CARE OF COORD AND STRIP MGMNT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.