Narrative:

We were on a visual approach to runway 7R at ZZZ airport; approximately 3-4 mi from the airport at approximately 1200-1400 ft AGL. When the throttles advanced; we heard a loud banging noise from the back of the airplane. I noticed that the right engine had failed. The first officer and I discussed the options -- to go around or to just continue and land. We were already completely configured -- gear down; flaps 28 degrees; the correct confign for a single engine landing. The runway was in sight; and not knowing whether we had hit a bird or something else that would have possibly compromised the left engine; we elected to land. In retrospect; I believe this was the correct decision. We declared an emergency; asked tower to call out the emergency equipment; and notified the flight attendants. We landed normally and pulled off the runway. We told the tower that we would be stopping to run checklists. I called for the engine failure checklist. We ran it; secured the engine; generators; hydraulics; etc; ran the other normal checklists; talked to the passenger and the flight attendants. The emergency crews inspected the aircraft. I had requested specifically that they check the right engine; and they said everything looked fine -- no evidence of damage or fire. We taxied to the gate. Afterwards; we discussed the incident with the maintenance crew who met the airplane and it became apparent to me that we had mis-idented the problem -- that in fact we had had an engine seizure rather than a failure. I had looked at the N1 and N2 gauges but thought that there was some indication. Because of this; we had run the incorrect checklist -- the engine failure as opposed to the engine seizure checklist. We did; of course; however; get the engine shut down and secured. I think this was partially due to the fact that I felt rushed; or allowed myself to feel rushed. I think if I had taken a little more time we would have idented the problem correctly. During events like this; there are so many items to cover that it is very easy to rush; which I unfortunately did here. I know that if this or a similar situation occurs again; I will have learned that in order to be sure things are done completely correctly; that I need to slow down and take my time.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD80 EXPERIENCES ENG SEIZURE ON FINAL APCH.

Narrative: WE WERE ON A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 7R AT ZZZ ARPT; APPROX 3-4 MI FROM THE ARPT AT APPROX 1200-1400 FT AGL. WHEN THE THROTTLES ADVANCED; WE HEARD A LOUD BANGING NOISE FROM THE BACK OF THE AIRPLANE. I NOTICED THAT THE R ENG HAD FAILED. THE FO AND I DISCUSSED THE OPTIONS -- TO GO AROUND OR TO JUST CONTINUE AND LAND. WE WERE ALREADY COMPLETELY CONFIGURED -- GEAR DOWN; FLAPS 28 DEGS; THE CORRECT CONFIGN FOR A SINGLE ENG LNDG. THE RWY WAS IN SIGHT; AND NOT KNOWING WHETHER WE HAD HIT A BIRD OR SOMETHING ELSE THAT WOULD HAVE POSSIBLY COMPROMISED THE L ENG; WE ELECTED TO LAND. IN RETROSPECT; I BELIEVE THIS WAS THE CORRECT DECISION. WE DECLARED AN EMER; ASKED TWR TO CALL OUT THE EMER EQUIP; AND NOTIFIED THE FLT ATTENDANTS. WE LANDED NORMALLY AND PULLED OFF THE RWY. WE TOLD THE TWR THAT WE WOULD BE STOPPING TO RUN CHKLISTS. I CALLED FOR THE ENG FAILURE CHKLIST. WE RAN IT; SECURED THE ENG; GENERATORS; HYDS; ETC; RAN THE OTHER NORMAL CHKLISTS; TALKED TO THE PAX AND THE FLT ATTENDANTS. THE EMER CREWS INSPECTED THE ACFT. I HAD REQUESTED SPECIFICALLY THAT THEY CHK THE R ENG; AND THEY SAID EVERYTHING LOOKED FINE -- NO EVIDENCE OF DAMAGE OR FIRE. WE TAXIED TO THE GATE. AFTERWARDS; WE DISCUSSED THE INCIDENT WITH THE MAINT CREW WHO MET THE AIRPLANE AND IT BECAME APPARENT TO ME THAT WE HAD MIS-IDENTED THE PROB -- THAT IN FACT WE HAD HAD AN ENG SEIZURE RATHER THAN A FAILURE. I HAD LOOKED AT THE N1 AND N2 GAUGES BUT THOUGHT THAT THERE WAS SOME INDICATION. BECAUSE OF THIS; WE HAD RUN THE INCORRECT CHKLIST -- THE ENG FAILURE AS OPPOSED TO THE ENG SEIZURE CHKLIST. WE DID; OF COURSE; HOWEVER; GET THE ENG SHUT DOWN AND SECURED. I THINK THIS WAS PARTIALLY DUE TO THE FACT THAT I FELT RUSHED; OR ALLOWED MYSELF TO FEEL RUSHED. I THINK IF I HAD TAKEN A LITTLE MORE TIME WE WOULD HAVE IDENTED THE PROB CORRECTLY. DURING EVENTS LIKE THIS; THERE ARE SO MANY ITEMS TO COVER THAT IT IS VERY EASY TO RUSH; WHICH I UNFORTUNATELY DID HERE. I KNOW THAT IF THIS OR A SIMILAR SITUATION OCCURS AGAIN; I WILL HAVE LEARNED THAT IN ORDER TO BE SURE THINGS ARE DONE COMPLETELY CORRECTLY; THAT I NEED TO SLOW DOWN AND TAKE MY TIME.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.