Narrative:

On preflight; flight attendant #4 noticed 1 large portable oxygen hose was unattached; although it should have been. Problem discovery: at takeoff; a passenger rang call light toward front of coach; another rear coach (both passenger units lights lit). The blue light didn't light up at flight attendant ceiling panel unit for rear call; but did for front. Later; there was a strong pungent; acrid burning odor at row 25. There was a possibility of an unseen ballast fire or no fire. There was no smoke. Flight attendant #4 phoned cockpit to report; then reported to purser. Stowed cart and investigated forward. Electrical power shut off. Passenger at 2 doors and window exits smelled odor. Flight attendant #3 felt dizzy. Copilot called and said; 'do you want to deploy masks?' flight attendant #4 grabbed portable oxygen; telling flight attendant #3 copilot will deploy masks. Copilot made announcement. Flight attendant #4 walked through cabin and saw all masks deployed. Flight attendant #4 grabbed a portable oxygen to give to another flight attendant; then to replace a small oxygen flight attendant #3 had. Problem: a large oxygen's knob was too stiff to turn on for flight attendants #2; #3 and #4. Problem: meanwhile a passenger's husband said his wife couldn't breathe. At same time many other passenger said oxygen wasn't working. Action: flight attendant #4 called copilot to advise; we would land in 5 mins. Flight attendant #4 checked that all lanyards were pulled and tugged on tubes. Some bags were inflated; some not. We diverted to ZZZ1. Copilot announced 'remain seated.' we deplaned through jetbridge. Passenger instructed to leave carry-on's behind. Electrical burning odor was still strong. Flight attendants #3 and #4 felt dizzy. Odor in cabin reported strong 9 hours later by gate agent. Our flight attendant training deals with responding to smoke/fire in cabin; but not toxic odors or airborne biohazard. We realize if smoke then we cannot use oxygen. There was no smoke. We are taught to use pbe for smoke/fire -- not enough pbe's for 8 staff. We were 'understaffed' by 2 flight attendants. Of 8 portable oxygen units on board; 1 large didn't work. The small oxygen units were rapidly depleted. If it was dark; we would not be able to locate oxygen compartments. Perhaps they should have glow-in-the-dark tape; or some photovoltaic light. As of the date of this report; the airline; although requested; has still not disclosed whether there was hazardous material in the cargo or what passenger and crew were exposed to; or the nature of the incident. One flight attendant has a respiratory infection now. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated her air carrier replied to her written question about the toxicity of the fumes. The reply said a static converter circuit board caught fire and that the fumes were toxic. The extent of the toxicity was unknown given the concentrations that could be experienced in their circumstances. The reporter was not sure she believed the report. She had not yet been informed about the oxygen generator's functionality during this event. Some passenger; including the 2 medically qualified ones; reported insufficient oxygen supplies from the passenger oxygen chemical oxygen generators. The reporter is going to ask her air carrier about the maintenance status of generators whose masks were pulled and; therefore; activated. If some bottles were not used after the lanyard was pulled; then the system had deficiencies.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B757-200 EXPERIENCES CABIN FUMES AND DIVERTED. THE PAX OXYGEN SYS DID NOT FUNCTION CORRECTLY.

Narrative: ON PREFLT; FLT ATTENDANT #4 NOTICED 1 LARGE PORTABLE OXYGEN HOSE WAS UNATTACHED; ALTHOUGH IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN. PROB DISCOVERY: AT TKOF; A PAX RANG CALL LIGHT TOWARD FRONT OF COACH; ANOTHER REAR COACH (BOTH PAX UNITS LIGHTS LIT). THE BLUE LIGHT DIDN'T LIGHT UP AT FLT ATTENDANT CEILING PANEL UNIT FOR REAR CALL; BUT DID FOR FRONT. LATER; THERE WAS A STRONG PUNGENT; ACRID BURNING ODOR AT ROW 25. THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY OF AN UNSEEN BALLAST FIRE OR NO FIRE. THERE WAS NO SMOKE. FLT ATTENDANT #4 PHONED COCKPIT TO RPT; THEN RPTED TO PURSER. STOWED CART AND INVESTIGATED FORWARD. ELECTRICAL PWR SHUT OFF. PAX AT 2 DOORS AND WINDOW EXITS SMELLED ODOR. FLT ATTENDANT #3 FELT DIZZY. COPLT CALLED AND SAID; 'DO YOU WANT TO DEPLOY MASKS?' FLT ATTENDANT #4 GRABBED PORTABLE OXYGEN; TELLING FLT ATTENDANT #3 COPLT WILL DEPLOY MASKS. COPLT MADE ANNOUNCEMENT. FLT ATTENDANT #4 WALKED THROUGH CABIN AND SAW ALL MASKS DEPLOYED. FLT ATTENDANT #4 GRABBED A PORTABLE OXYGEN TO GIVE TO ANOTHER FLT ATTENDANT; THEN TO REPLACE A SMALL OXYGEN FLT ATTENDANT #3 HAD. PROB: A LARGE OXYGEN'S KNOB WAS TOO STIFF TO TURN ON FOR FLT ATTENDANTS #2; #3 AND #4. PROB: MEANWHILE A PAX'S HUSBAND SAID HIS WIFE COULDN'T BREATHE. AT SAME TIME MANY OTHER PAX SAID OXYGEN WASN'T WORKING. ACTION: FLT ATTENDANT #4 CALLED COPLT TO ADVISE; WE WOULD LAND IN 5 MINS. FLT ATTENDANT #4 CHKED THAT ALL LANYARDS WERE PULLED AND TUGGED ON TUBES. SOME BAGS WERE INFLATED; SOME NOT. WE DIVERTED TO ZZZ1. COPLT ANNOUNCED 'REMAIN SEATED.' WE DEPLANED THROUGH JETBRIDGE. PAX INSTRUCTED TO LEAVE CARRY-ON'S BEHIND. ELECTRICAL BURNING ODOR WAS STILL STRONG. FLT ATTENDANTS #3 AND #4 FELT DIZZY. ODOR IN CABIN RPTED STRONG 9 HRS LATER BY GATE AGENT. OUR FLT ATTENDANT TRAINING DEALS WITH RESPONDING TO SMOKE/FIRE IN CABIN; BUT NOT TOXIC ODORS OR AIRBORNE BIOHAZARD. WE REALIZE IF SMOKE THEN WE CANNOT USE OXYGEN. THERE WAS NO SMOKE. WE ARE TAUGHT TO USE PBE FOR SMOKE/FIRE -- NOT ENOUGH PBE'S FOR 8 STAFF. WE WERE 'UNDERSTAFFED' BY 2 FLT ATTENDANTS. OF 8 PORTABLE OXYGEN UNITS ON BOARD; 1 LARGE DIDN'T WORK. THE SMALL OXYGEN UNITS WERE RAPIDLY DEPLETED. IF IT WAS DARK; WE WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO LOCATE OXYGEN COMPARTMENTS. PERHAPS THEY SHOULD HAVE GLOW-IN-THE-DARK TAPE; OR SOME PHOTOVOLTAIC LIGHT. AS OF THE DATE OF THIS RPT; THE AIRLINE; ALTHOUGH REQUESTED; HAS STILL NOT DISCLOSED WHETHER THERE WAS HAZARDOUS MATERIAL IN THE CARGO OR WHAT PAX AND CREW WERE EXPOSED TO; OR THE NATURE OF THE INCIDENT. ONE FLT ATTENDANT HAS A RESPIRATORY INFECTION NOW. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED HER ACR REPLIED TO HER WRITTEN QUESTION ABOUT THE TOXICITY OF THE FUMES. THE REPLY SAID A STATIC CONVERTER CIRCUIT BOARD CAUGHT FIRE AND THAT THE FUMES WERE TOXIC. THE EXTENT OF THE TOXICITY WAS UNKNOWN GIVEN THE CONCENTRATIONS THAT COULD BE EXPERIENCED IN THEIR CIRCUMSTANCES. THE RPTR WAS NOT SURE SHE BELIEVED THE RPT. SHE HAD NOT YET BEEN INFORMED ABOUT THE OXYGEN GENERATOR'S FUNCTIONALITY DURING THIS EVENT. SOME PAX; INCLUDING THE 2 MEDICALLY QUALIFIED ONES; RPTED INSUFFICIENT OXYGEN SUPPLIES FROM THE PAX OXYGEN CHEMICAL OXYGEN GENERATORS. THE RPTR IS GOING TO ASK HER ACR ABOUT THE MAINT STATUS OF GENERATORS WHOSE MASKS WERE PULLED AND; THEREFORE; ACTIVATED. IF SOME BOTTLES WERE NOT USED AFTER THE LANYARD WAS PULLED; THEN THE SYS HAD DEFICIENCIES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.