Narrative:

After entering the ramp area; we proceeded to dock at gate X. This was a nighttime arrival to a fixed jetway gate; full darkness and dry conditions. Upon approaching the gate area; I stopped the aircraft short of the lead-in line waiting for a guide man to arrive. Two ramp servicemen arrived on a tug. The driver of the tug parked the tug to the right of the lead-in line facing the aircraft with headlights on. The guide man exited the tug and assumed a position slightly to the left of the lead-in line. At no time did I see either ramp serviceman inspect the gate area; stationed equipment; or the position of the fixed jetway. The guide man simply jumped from the tug; picked up his wands and started motioning the pull ahead signal. I flashed the nose landing gear taxi light once to signal the guide to extinguish the tug's headlights. As we pulled further into the gate; I flashed both inboard wing mounted landing lights to again try to signal the guide man to extinguish the tug's headlights. As I was applying the brakes to stop the aircraft; the second serviceman noticed the situation and proceeded to the tug and turned off the headlights. I allowed the aircraft to move several ft forward. It was at this time I noticed the jetway not parked and the red warning stripe exposed on the jetway. I stopped the aircraft and set the parking brake. I flashed the taxi light once and pointed to the jetway. After considering the darkness; I illuminated my hand with the cockpit map reading light. The ramp servicemen recognized my signal and then both guide men walked to the end of the jetway and examined the jetway. They concluded that the jetway was parked and it was ok to proceed. Per fom guidance; I flashed the taxi light three times. The guide man proceeded to return to the tug; mount it; and start to drive away. The second ramp serviceman looked to the cockpit. I motioned to him by pointing to my ears that I wanted to communicate to him via headset. The guide man was not even looking at the aircraft at this time. The second ramp serviceman acquired a headset and plugged it into the flight interphone jack. I advised him that the red jetway not parked warning stripe was visible and thus; unsafe to continue into the gate. I also informed him that if the guide man wanted to drive away that I would shut down the remaining engine and call for a supervisor. I also informed the ramp serviceman that three flashes of the taxi light indicated that the captain needed to establish voice communications with the ground crew. His reply was; and I quote verbatim; 'nobody ever told us that.' the jetway operator arrived; retracted the jetway; the guide man resumed guidance; and I released the parking brake and taxied forward until the stop signal was given. The intent of this report is to highlight several areas of substandard performance which has caused safety to be compromised: 1) the safe operation of the aircraft while under the guidance is in grave jeopardy. 2) the conduct and execution of duties of the guidance crew is at a substandard level; if not an unacceptable level. 3) there are great inadequacies on the part of the ramp servicemen in the understanding and execution of SOP's for guidance and parking of aircraft. 4) the training of the ramp servicemen to conduct guidance and parking of aircraft is inadequate leading to an unsafe situation. 5) the responsibility of the safe operation of the aircraft is not being expressed by those responsible for the guiding and maneuvering of the aircraft to the proper parking position. 6) the supervision of personnel assigned to guide and park aircraft is inadequate. 7) the understanding of the responsibility to supervise; train; and hold accountable those conducting the guidance of aircraft while maneuvering and parking is non apparent. 8) this situation is typical of many such incidences occurring around the air carrier system daily. 9) the redress of deficiencies such as those noted within this report appears lacking. Improvement amongst the guidance and parking crews is non apparent. 10) this is an unsafe situation. And finally; the safeoperation of the aircraft is being compromised by several factions of the operation. Individually; these deficiencies may not lead to an accident; however; summarily; these events put us on a path towards personal injury and aircraft damage.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-500 CAPT RPTS ACR RAMP PERSONNEL ON AN EARLY MORNING ARR WERE IGNORANT OF COMPANY ACFT PARKING PROCS.

Narrative: AFTER ENTERING THE RAMP AREA; WE PROCEEDED TO DOCK AT GATE X. THIS WAS A NIGHTTIME ARR TO A FIXED JETWAY GATE; FULL DARKNESS AND DRY CONDITIONS. UPON APCHING THE GATE AREA; I STOPPED THE ACFT SHORT OF THE LEAD-IN LINE WAITING FOR A GUIDE MAN TO ARRIVE. TWO RAMP SERVICEMEN ARRIVED ON A TUG. THE DRIVER OF THE TUG PARKED THE TUG TO THE RIGHT OF THE LEAD-IN LINE FACING THE ACFT WITH HEADLIGHTS ON. THE GUIDE MAN EXITED THE TUG AND ASSUMED A POSITION SLIGHTLY TO THE LEFT OF THE LEAD-IN LINE. AT NO TIME DID I SEE EITHER RAMP SERVICEMAN INSPECT THE GATE AREA; STATIONED EQUIP; OR THE POSITION OF THE FIXED JETWAY. THE GUIDE MAN SIMPLY JUMPED FROM THE TUG; PICKED UP HIS WANDS AND STARTED MOTIONING THE PULL AHEAD SIGNAL. I FLASHED THE NOSE LNDG GEAR TAXI LIGHT ONCE TO SIGNAL THE GUIDE TO EXTINGUISH THE TUG'S HEADLIGHTS. AS WE PULLED FURTHER INTO THE GATE; I FLASHED BOTH INBOARD WING MOUNTED LNDG LIGHTS TO AGAIN TRY TO SIGNAL THE GUIDE MAN TO EXTINGUISH THE TUG'S HEADLIGHTS. AS I WAS APPLYING THE BRAKES TO STOP THE ACFT; THE SECOND SERVICEMAN NOTICED THE SIT AND PROCEEDED TO THE TUG AND TURNED OFF THE HEADLIGHTS. I ALLOWED THE ACFT TO MOVE SEVERAL FT FORWARD. IT WAS AT THIS TIME I NOTICED THE JETWAY NOT PARKED AND THE RED WARNING STRIPE EXPOSED ON THE JETWAY. I STOPPED THE ACFT AND SET THE PARKING BRAKE. I FLASHED THE TAXI LIGHT ONCE AND POINTED TO THE JETWAY. AFTER CONSIDERING THE DARKNESS; I ILLUMINATED MY HAND WITH THE COCKPIT MAP READING LIGHT. THE RAMP SERVICEMEN RECOGNIZED MY SIGNAL AND THEN BOTH GUIDE MEN WALKED TO THE END OF THE JETWAY AND EXAMINED THE JETWAY. THEY CONCLUDED THAT THE JETWAY WAS PARKED AND IT WAS OK TO PROCEED. PER FOM GUIDANCE; I FLASHED THE TAXI LIGHT THREE TIMES. THE GUIDE MAN PROCEEDED TO RETURN TO THE TUG; MOUNT IT; AND START TO DRIVE AWAY. THE SECOND RAMP SERVICEMAN LOOKED TO THE COCKPIT. I MOTIONED TO HIM BY POINTING TO MY EARS THAT I WANTED TO COMMUNICATE TO HIM VIA HEADSET. THE GUIDE MAN WAS NOT EVEN LOOKING AT THE ACFT AT THIS TIME. THE SECOND RAMP SERVICEMAN ACQUIRED A HEADSET AND PLUGGED IT INTO THE FLT INTERPHONE JACK. I ADVISED HIM THAT THE RED JETWAY NOT PARKED WARNING STRIPE WAS VISIBLE AND THUS; UNSAFE TO CONTINUE INTO THE GATE. I ALSO INFORMED HIM THAT IF THE GUIDE MAN WANTED TO DRIVE AWAY THAT I WOULD SHUT DOWN THE REMAINING ENG AND CALL FOR A SUPVR. I ALSO INFORMED THE RAMP SERVICEMAN THAT THREE FLASHES OF THE TAXI LIGHT INDICATED THAT THE CAPT NEEDED TO ESTABLISH VOICE COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE GND CREW. HIS REPLY WAS; AND I QUOTE VERBATIM; 'NOBODY EVER TOLD US THAT.' THE JETWAY OPERATOR ARRIVED; RETRACTED THE JETWAY; THE GUIDE MAN RESUMED GUIDANCE; AND I RELEASED THE PARKING BRAKE AND TAXIED FORWARD UNTIL THE STOP SIGNAL WAS GIVEN. THE INTENT OF THIS RPT IS TO HIGHLIGHT SEVERAL AREAS OF SUBSTANDARD PERFORMANCE WHICH HAS CAUSED SAFETY TO BE COMPROMISED: 1) THE SAFE OPERATION OF THE ACFT WHILE UNDER THE GUIDANCE IS IN GRAVE JEOPARDY. 2) THE CONDUCT AND EXECUTION OF DUTIES OF THE GUIDANCE CREW IS AT A SUBSTANDARD LEVEL; IF NOT AN UNACCEPTABLE LEVEL. 3) THERE ARE GREAT INADEQUACIES ON THE PART OF THE RAMP SERVICEMEN IN THE UNDERSTANDING AND EXECUTION OF SOP'S FOR GUIDANCE AND PARKING OF ACFT. 4) THE TRAINING OF THE RAMP SERVICEMEN TO CONDUCT GUIDANCE AND PARKING OF ACFT IS INADEQUATE LEADING TO AN UNSAFE SIT. 5) THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE SAFE OP OF THE ACFT IS NOT BEING EXPRESSED BY THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE GUIDING AND MANEUVERING OF THE ACFT TO THE PROPER PARKING POSITION. 6) THE SUPERVISION OF PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO GUIDE AND PARK ACFT IS INADEQUATE. 7) THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO SUPERVISE; TRAIN; AND HOLD ACCOUNTABLE THOSE CONDUCTING THE GUIDANCE OF ACFT WHILE MANEUVERING AND PARKING IS NON APPARENT. 8) THIS SIT IS TYPICAL OF MANY SUCH INCIDENCES OCCURRING AROUND THE ACR SYSTEM DAILY. 9) THE REDRESS OF DEFICIENCIES SUCH AS THOSE NOTED WITHIN THIS RPT APPEARS LACKING. IMPROVEMENT AMONGST THE GUIDANCE AND PARKING CREWS IS NON APPARENT. 10) THIS IS AN UNSAFE SIT. AND FINALLY; THE SAFEOPERATION OF THE ACFT IS BEING COMPROMISED BY SEVERAL FACTIONS OF THE OPERATION. INDIVIDUALLY; THESE DEFICIENCIES MAY NOT LEAD TO AN ACCIDENT; HOWEVER; SUMMARILY; THESE EVENTS PUT US ON A PATH TOWARDS PERSONAL INJURY AND ACFT DAMAGE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.