Narrative:

XA15 arrived at aircraft. Checked WX; ordered fuel; and figured aircraft performance for apa-slc-shr. Reviewed airport diagrams of all 3 airports. Found some items needing maintenance attention. XD45 blocked in slc. I completed the shutdown checklist; checked ATIS (was same as inbound); copied clearance; and entered it into FMS. I completed 'told' card; verified weight and balance manifest; went in FBO to settle charges and retrieve faxes; completed final predep walkaround; confirmed identify check and delivery of safety briefing by copilot; briefed him on salt lake 9 departure; started engines; and completed before taxi check and briefed our taxi out. XD58 blocked out for slc-shr trip. XE43 received WX shr: wind 340 degrees at 6 KTS; 10 mi visibility; temperature 12 degrees; dewpoint 12 degrees; altimeter 30.01 inches; density altitude 5000 ft. Center was busy and asked us to slow for the traffic he needed to get into and out of shr. Center cleared us for holding on shr VOR 335 degree radial 13000 ft. We were in icing conditions and were picking up some ice on leading edges. I ran all anti/deice equipment and briefed copilot on our confign for holding to account for ice. After passing shr VOR and 30 seconds into our teardrop entry; center instructed us to turn and join the outbound segment of the approach; and cleared us for the approach. Copilot was announcing our position on CTAF and there were no responses. There was no response to TA request. Broke out under overcast just after passing shr VOR. Copilot called airport at 12:30 O'clock position; I confirmed my sight of the runway and transitioned to visual flight. Anti/deice off. Center had been prompting for our earliest possible cancellation of IFR. I saw we were on final with runway 14 made with no traffic and at that time saw no reason we would not land on runway 14. I authority/authorized our cancellation and copilot relayed and received our cancellation. Just before 200 ft AGL; copilot completed before landing checklist. I saw the cones and asked copilot; 'are those cones?' I added power and leveled off and maintained speed. Copilot responded 'yeah.' after making decision not to go around; announced to copilot 'I'm going to land; do you see anything else down the runway?' I then closed throttles to regain slope to runway after cones. Copilot; 'ah; no.' after the landing; I pulled off and stopped on the taxiway; picked up my sheet and saw there was a NOTAM or that runway being closed. Somewhere during this chaotic morning; I put us in the position of mistaking shr's NOTAM for runway 14/32 closure with slc's NOTAM also for runway 14/32 closure. I arrived to short final for runway 14 at shr not knowing of its closure. Seeing the cones located about 1/4 way down runway 14; I knew there was something going on with runway 14 that I didn't know about. Either a NOTAM was missing; or I had missed or overlooked a NOTAM that we had briefed. Scanning the rest of the runway to see what else there might be; and not seeing an 'X;' I believed the rest of the runway was open. Our touchdown point having originally been before the cones; I added some power but leveled off. My decision not to go around involved seeing rising terrain beyond the runway; and believing there would likely be something less than 2200 ft from it to the ceiling. I had not originally planned to go beyond the airport and return to runway 5 or runway 23. Although that was a doable option; I felt that the remaining runway beyond the cones presented the safest option for the conclusion of the flight. The aircraft needed only 1/2 of the published 8300 ft and there was 3/4 of it in front of us. I decided to land the airplane safely and then figure out if I had missed something. At no time was the aircraft; crew; passenger; ground personnel; or ground equipment ever in any danger. Contributing factors: 1) was awakened by dispatch shortly after 10 hours rest completed; and given a completely new itinerary that was a 14 hour duty day. 2) before the rest period; I was granted my request for 2 hours of preflight time with the airplane before our scheduled takeoff time. All the hawker 800's we fly are early serial numbers originally sold to individual owners with individual preferences. They are all outfitted differently inside. 3) arrived at the aircraft to find: oxygen level less than 1/4; tks tank needed filling; one d-cell type flashlight missing; internal lavatory needed changing; 'maximum weight' placard for baggage compartment was missing; engine computer light was flashing in the master warning panel; our printer furnished to print our backup approach plates was not working. 4) dispatch had interrupted us crew) numerous occasions asking why we were late and when would/could we depart; while we were briefing the first 2 trips: apa-slc-shr. I figured we would brief those 2 legs together to reduce the amount of time we would need on the ground in slc knowing the late passenger would be upset. Somewhere at this time; we mistook shr's runway 14/32 closure for slc's NOTAM; also for its runway 14/32 being closed. It is my professional responsibility and requirement to know all things pertinent to a proposed flight. I do have control of taking the time I need; and thought I had done so this day. What I cannot control is the existence of those pressures. The passenger has paid millions of dollars to ride on our jet and the smallest disservice has to be answered for. I have answered for many disservices; all due to scheduling; maintenance; or WX/ATC. The folks who schedule us to be late do everything possible to place blame for a disservice elsewhere; predominately on flight crews. 5) the rest of the morning included a busy 2 flts to slc then shr and not re-examining the NOTAMS at shr. 6) we landed and took off on a runway at slc that had cones nearly 2000 ft from one end (runway 17/35). Therefore; the first sight of cones the same distance from the runway in shr did not immediately trigger us to think the runway was closed. 7) neither I nor the copilot saw an 'X' on the runway. 8) we received no response on CTAF regarding any traffic or runway in use. All our position reports inbound were; therefore; in the blind.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN HS800 PLT LANDED ON A CLOSED SHR RWY 14 AFTER MISTAKING SLC RWY 14-32 CLOSURE NOTAM WITH SHR. LANDED DESPITE SEEING CONES BUT NO RWY X BECAUSE OF TERRAIN AND IFR CANCELLATION.

Narrative: XA15 ARRIVED AT ACFT. CHKED WX; ORDERED FUEL; AND FIGURED ACFT PERFORMANCE FOR APA-SLC-SHR. REVIEWED ARPT DIAGRAMS OF ALL 3 ARPTS. FOUND SOME ITEMS NEEDING MAINT ATTN. XD45 BLOCKED IN SLC. I COMPLETED THE SHUTDOWN CHKLIST; CHKED ATIS (WAS SAME AS INBOUND); COPIED CLRNC; AND ENTERED IT INTO FMS. I COMPLETED 'TOLD' CARD; VERIFIED WT AND BAL MANIFEST; WENT IN FBO TO SETTLE CHARGES AND RETRIEVE FAXES; COMPLETED FINAL PREDEP WALKAROUND; CONFIRMED IDENT CHK AND DELIVERY OF SAFETY BRIEFING BY COPLT; BRIEFED HIM ON SALT LAKE 9 DEP; STARTED ENGS; AND COMPLETED BEFORE TAXI CHK AND BRIEFED OUR TAXI OUT. XD58 BLOCKED OUT FOR SLC-SHR TRIP. XE43 RECEIVED WX SHR: WIND 340 DEGS AT 6 KTS; 10 MI VISIBILITY; TEMP 12 DEGS; DEWPOINT 12 DEGS; ALTIMETER 30.01 INCHES; DENSITY ALT 5000 FT. CTR WAS BUSY AND ASKED US TO SLOW FOR THE TFC HE NEEDED TO GET INTO AND OUT OF SHR. CTR CLRED US FOR HOLDING ON SHR VOR 335 DEG RADIAL 13000 FT. WE WERE IN ICING CONDITIONS AND WERE PICKING UP SOME ICE ON LEADING EDGES. I RAN ALL ANTI/DEICE EQUIP AND BRIEFED COPLT ON OUR CONFIGN FOR HOLDING TO ACCOUNT FOR ICE. AFTER PASSING SHR VOR AND 30 SECONDS INTO OUR TEARDROP ENTRY; CTR INSTRUCTED US TO TURN AND JOIN THE OUTBOUND SEGMENT OF THE APCH; AND CLRED US FOR THE APCH. COPLT WAS ANNOUNCING OUR POS ON CTAF AND THERE WERE NO RESPONSES. THERE WAS NO RESPONSE TO TA REQUEST. BROKE OUT UNDER OVCST JUST AFTER PASSING SHR VOR. COPLT CALLED ARPT AT 12:30 O'CLOCK POS; I CONFIRMED MY SIGHT OF THE RWY AND TRANSITIONED TO VISUAL FLT. ANTI/DEICE OFF. CTR HAD BEEN PROMPTING FOR OUR EARLIEST POSSIBLE CANCELLATION OF IFR. I SAW WE WERE ON FINAL WITH RWY 14 MADE WITH NO TFC AND AT THAT TIME SAW NO REASON WE WOULD NOT LAND ON RWY 14. I AUTH OUR CANCELLATION AND COPLT RELAYED AND RECEIVED OUR CANCELLATION. JUST BEFORE 200 FT AGL; COPLT COMPLETED BEFORE LNDG CHKLIST. I SAW THE CONES AND ASKED COPLT; 'ARE THOSE CONES?' I ADDED PWR AND LEVELED OFF AND MAINTAINED SPD. COPLT RESPONDED 'YEAH.' AFTER MAKING DECISION NOT TO GO AROUND; ANNOUNCED TO COPLT 'I'M GOING TO LAND; DO YOU SEE ANYTHING ELSE DOWN THE RWY?' I THEN CLOSED THROTTLES TO REGAIN SLOPE TO RWY AFTER CONES. COPLT; 'AH; NO.' AFTER THE LNDG; I PULLED OFF AND STOPPED ON THE TXWY; PICKED UP MY SHEET AND SAW THERE WAS A NOTAM OR THAT RWY BEING CLOSED. SOMEWHERE DURING THIS CHAOTIC MORNING; I PUT US IN THE POS OF MISTAKING SHR'S NOTAM FOR RWY 14/32 CLOSURE WITH SLC'S NOTAM ALSO FOR RWY 14/32 CLOSURE. I ARRIVED TO SHORT FINAL FOR RWY 14 AT SHR NOT KNOWING OF ITS CLOSURE. SEEING THE CONES LOCATED ABOUT 1/4 WAY DOWN RWY 14; I KNEW THERE WAS SOMETHING GOING ON WITH RWY 14 THAT I DIDN'T KNOW ABOUT. EITHER A NOTAM WAS MISSING; OR I HAD MISSED OR OVERLOOKED A NOTAM THAT WE HAD BRIEFED. SCANNING THE REST OF THE RWY TO SEE WHAT ELSE THERE MIGHT BE; AND NOT SEEING AN 'X;' I BELIEVED THE REST OF THE RWY WAS OPEN. OUR TOUCHDOWN POINT HAVING ORIGINALLY BEEN BEFORE THE CONES; I ADDED SOME PWR BUT LEVELED OFF. MY DECISION NOT TO GO AROUND INVOLVED SEEING RISING TERRAIN BEYOND THE RWY; AND BELIEVING THERE WOULD LIKELY BE SOMETHING LESS THAN 2200 FT FROM IT TO THE CEILING. I HAD NOT ORIGINALLY PLANNED TO GO BEYOND THE ARPT AND RETURN TO RWY 5 OR RWY 23. ALTHOUGH THAT WAS A DOABLE OPTION; I FELT THAT THE REMAINING RWY BEYOND THE CONES PRESENTED THE SAFEST OPTION FOR THE CONCLUSION OF THE FLT. THE ACFT NEEDED ONLY 1/2 OF THE PUBLISHED 8300 FT AND THERE WAS 3/4 OF IT IN FRONT OF US. I DECIDED TO LAND THE AIRPLANE SAFELY AND THEN FIGURE OUT IF I HAD MISSED SOMETHING. AT NO TIME WAS THE ACFT; CREW; PAX; GND PERSONNEL; OR GND EQUIP EVER IN ANY DANGER. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) WAS AWAKENED BY DISPATCH SHORTLY AFTER 10 HRS REST COMPLETED; AND GIVEN A COMPLETELY NEW ITINERARY THAT WAS A 14 HR DUTY DAY. 2) BEFORE THE REST PERIOD; I WAS GRANTED MY REQUEST FOR 2 HRS OF PREFLT TIME WITH THE AIRPLANE BEFORE OUR SCHEDULED TKOF TIME. ALL THE HAWKER 800'S WE FLY ARE EARLY SERIAL NUMBERS ORIGINALLY SOLD TO INDIVIDUAL OWNERS WITH INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES. THEY ARE ALL OUTFITTED DIFFERENTLY INSIDE. 3) ARRIVED AT THE ACFT TO FIND: OXYGEN LEVEL LESS THAN 1/4; TKS TANK NEEDED FILLING; ONE D-CELL TYPE FLASHLIGHT MISSING; INTERNAL LAVATORY NEEDED CHANGING; 'MAX WT' PLACARD FOR BAGGAGE COMPARTMENT WAS MISSING; ENG COMPUTER LIGHT WAS FLASHING IN THE MASTER WARNING PANEL; OUR PRINTER FURNISHED TO PRINT OUR BACKUP APCH PLATES WAS NOT WORKING. 4) DISPATCH HAD INTERRUPTED US CREW) NUMEROUS OCCASIONS ASKING WHY WE WERE LATE AND WHEN WOULD/COULD WE DEPART; WHILE WE WERE BRIEFING THE FIRST 2 TRIPS: APA-SLC-SHR. I FIGURED WE WOULD BRIEF THOSE 2 LEGS TOGETHER TO REDUCE THE AMOUNT OF TIME WE WOULD NEED ON THE GND IN SLC KNOWING THE LATE PAX WOULD BE UPSET. SOMEWHERE AT THIS TIME; WE MISTOOK SHR'S RWY 14/32 CLOSURE FOR SLC'S NOTAM; ALSO FOR ITS RWY 14/32 BEING CLOSED. IT IS MY PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND REQUIREMENT TO KNOW ALL THINGS PERTINENT TO A PROPOSED FLT. I DO HAVE CTL OF TAKING THE TIME I NEED; AND THOUGHT I HAD DONE SO THIS DAY. WHAT I CANNOT CTL IS THE EXISTENCE OF THOSE PRESSURES. THE PAX HAS PAID MILLIONS OF DOLLARS TO RIDE ON OUR JET AND THE SMALLEST DISSERVICE HAS TO BE ANSWERED FOR. I HAVE ANSWERED FOR MANY DISSERVICES; ALL DUE TO SCHEDULING; MAINT; OR WX/ATC. THE FOLKS WHO SCHEDULE US TO BE LATE DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO PLACE BLAME FOR A DISSERVICE ELSEWHERE; PREDOMINATELY ON FLT CREWS. 5) THE REST OF THE MORNING INCLUDED A BUSY 2 FLTS TO SLC THEN SHR AND NOT RE-EXAMINING THE NOTAMS AT SHR. 6) WE LANDED AND TOOK OFF ON A RWY AT SLC THAT HAD CONES NEARLY 2000 FT FROM ONE END (RWY 17/35). THEREFORE; THE FIRST SIGHT OF CONES THE SAME DISTANCE FROM THE RWY IN SHR DID NOT IMMEDIATELY TRIGGER US TO THINK THE RWY WAS CLOSED. 7) NEITHER I NOR THE COPLT SAW AN 'X' ON THE RWY. 8) WE RECEIVED NO RESPONSE ON CTAF REGARDING ANY TFC OR RWY IN USE. ALL OUR POS RPTS INBOUND WERE; THEREFORE; IN THE BLIND.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.