Narrative:

On jul/sun/05 while operating from lansing; mi; to detroit; mi; I was the PNF working the radios. The conditions en route were VFR. As we got closer to detroit; the WX began to worsen. We were planning and had already set up for on the ILS runway 22R approach that would probably end in a visual approach once we got closer to dtw. ATC instructed us to descend from 7000 ft to 4000 ft and then reduce speed from 250 KTS to 180 KTS for spacing. We were on a heading that would take us to joydd. The conditions now at this time were IMC. We started to encounter light turbulence and I asked the captain if he would like to put the autoplt on. He replied; 'no; I would rather hand fly the aircraft.' there were various levels of thunderstorms northeast of the field around tarah extending close to joydd. ATC then issued a heading of approximately 130 degrees. This intercept heading would now have us on a right base vector to intercept the localizer for runway 22R at the nujnt radar fix. Captain (PF) was not happy with the ATC heading and altitude and I was told to tell ATC that we would like a turn to a heading of 150 degrees and a descent from 4000 ft to 3000 ft to avoid the WX. ATC said they were not able to issue that clearance and give us that altitude unless we had the field in sight. I stated that we were in IMC at the time. The captain (PF) then started a descent and turn on his own without ATC clearance. ATC asked what altitude we were currently at. I said we were already in a turn to 150 degrees and descending to 3000 ft. ATC then replied by saying; 'air carrier X do you think you can just do what you want out there? How do you know that I do not have traffic at that altitude?' the captain was upset by the ATC controller's remark and said;' I really don't care what ATC thinks. This is the heading and altitude that I need.' at this point the altitude pre-select chime in the cockpit alerted we were below the selected value. The aircraft was in a right bank nose down descending pitch attitude. I asked the captain where he was going. I stated; 'that chime was for us; you need to get back to your altitude.' I asked the captain once again; 'do you want the autoplt on?' he again replied; 'no; I would rather hand fly it.' as he began to arrest his descent rate; an abrupt pitch change caused the stick shaker to activate. I reached over and began to push the thrust levers forward; which the captain's hand was on. I then reached over and had to put the flight spoilers abruptly full forward back to their zero position. They were left out after the descent and speed reduction. I then assisted on the controls; stating; 'easy on the controls just a slow pitch increase.' after the event; he still insisted that he would hand fly the aircraft. I did not at any time raise my voice and handled the situation in a relaxed manner. I also did not ask for the flight controls because I did not want to escalate the situation. Being a flight instructor for 3 yrs; I have seen that it's not always the best reaction to just grab the controls. I handled the situation that was presented to me the way I saw fit. After returning to 3000 ft; ATC asked our altitude and if we had the field in sight. At this point we had returned to VMC. I assessed the condition of the captain and felt he was able to land the aircraft safely without the need for me to intervene. We were cleared for the visual approach and landed without incident on runway 22R. After landing; the captain asked me if he scared me. I told him 'with all the yrs of flight instructing it is hard to scare me although you had me concerned with the stick shaker.' I made the captain aware that I was not happy with what occurred. He also stated that this probably requires a report. I told him; 'file whatever report you feel is necessary.' we taxied to gate and completed the flight without further incident.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CAPT OF CARJ FAILS TO COMPLY WITH ATC CLRNCS AND CRM ADVOCACY OF HIS FO. ALTDEV; TRACK DEV; SPD DEV AND STICK SHAKER RESULT.

Narrative: ON JUL/SUN/05 WHILE OPERATING FROM LANSING; MI; TO DETROIT; MI; I WAS THE PNF WORKING THE RADIOS. THE CONDITIONS ENRTE WERE VFR. AS WE GOT CLOSER TO DETROIT; THE WX BEGAN TO WORSEN. WE WERE PLANNING AND HAD ALREADY SET UP FOR ON THE ILS RWY 22R APCH THAT WOULD PROBABLY END IN A VISUAL APCH ONCE WE GOT CLOSER TO DTW. ATC INSTRUCTED US TO DSND FROM 7000 FT TO 4000 FT AND THEN REDUCE SPD FROM 250 KTS TO 180 KTS FOR SPACING. WE WERE ON A HDG THAT WOULD TAKE US TO JOYDD. THE CONDITIONS NOW AT THIS TIME WERE IMC. WE STARTED TO ENCOUNTER LIGHT TURB AND I ASKED THE CAPT IF HE WOULD LIKE TO PUT THE AUTOPLT ON. HE REPLIED; 'NO; I WOULD RATHER HAND FLY THE ACFT.' THERE WERE VARIOUS LEVELS OF TSTMS NE OF THE FIELD AROUND TARAH EXTENDING CLOSE TO JOYDD. ATC THEN ISSUED A HDG OF APPROX 130 DEGS. THIS INTERCEPT HDG WOULD NOW HAVE US ON A R BASE VECTOR TO INTERCEPT THE LOC FOR RWY 22R AT THE NUJNT RADAR FIX. CAPT (PF) WAS NOT HAPPY WITH THE ATC HDG AND ALT AND I WAS TOLD TO TELL ATC THAT WE WOULD LIKE A TURN TO A HDG OF 150 DEGS AND A DSCNT FROM 4000 FT TO 3000 FT TO AVOID THE WX. ATC SAID THEY WERE NOT ABLE TO ISSUE THAT CLRNC AND GIVE US THAT ALT UNLESS WE HAD THE FIELD IN SIGHT. I STATED THAT WE WERE IN IMC AT THE TIME. THE CAPT (PF) THEN STARTED A DSCNT AND TURN ON HIS OWN WITHOUT ATC CLRNC. ATC ASKED WHAT ALT WE WERE CURRENTLY AT. I SAID WE WERE ALREADY IN A TURN TO 150 DEGS AND DSNDING TO 3000 FT. ATC THEN REPLIED BY SAYING; 'ACR X DO YOU THINK YOU CAN JUST DO WHAT YOU WANT OUT THERE? HOW DO YOU KNOW THAT I DO NOT HAVE TFC AT THAT ALT?' THE CAPT WAS UPSET BY THE ATC CTLR'S REMARK AND SAID;' I REALLY DON'T CARE WHAT ATC THINKS. THIS IS THE HDG AND ALT THAT I NEED.' AT THIS POINT THE ALT PRE-SELECT CHIME IN THE COCKPIT ALERTED WE WERE BELOW THE SELECTED VALUE. THE ACFT WAS IN A R BANK NOSE DOWN DSNDING PITCH ATTITUDE. I ASKED THE CAPT WHERE HE WAS GOING. I STATED; 'THAT CHIME WAS FOR US; YOU NEED TO GET BACK TO YOUR ALT.' I ASKED THE CAPT ONCE AGAIN; 'DO YOU WANT THE AUTOPLT ON?' HE AGAIN REPLIED; 'NO; I WOULD RATHER HAND FLY IT.' AS HE BEGAN TO ARREST HIS DSCNT RATE; AN ABRUPT PITCH CHANGE CAUSED THE STICK SHAKER TO ACTIVATE. I REACHED OVER AND BEGAN TO PUSH THE THRUST LEVERS FORWARD; WHICH THE CAPT'S HAND WAS ON. I THEN REACHED OVER AND HAD TO PUT THE FLT SPOILERS ABRUPTLY FULL FORWARD BACK TO THEIR ZERO POS. THEY WERE LEFT OUT AFTER THE DSCNT AND SPD REDUCTION. I THEN ASSISTED ON THE CTLS; STATING; 'EASY ON THE CTLS JUST A SLOW PITCH INCREASE.' AFTER THE EVENT; HE STILL INSISTED THAT HE WOULD HAND FLY THE ACFT. I DID NOT AT ANY TIME RAISE MY VOICE AND HANDLED THE SIT IN A RELAXED MANNER. I ALSO DID NOT ASK FOR THE FLT CTLS BECAUSE I DID NOT WANT TO ESCALATE THE SIT. BEING A FLT INSTRUCTOR FOR 3 YRS; I HAVE SEEN THAT IT'S NOT ALWAYS THE BEST REACTION TO JUST GRAB THE CTLS. I HANDLED THE SIT THAT WAS PRESENTED TO ME THE WAY I SAW FIT. AFTER RETURNING TO 3000 FT; ATC ASKED OUR ALT AND IF WE HAD THE FIELD IN SIGHT. AT THIS POINT WE HAD RETURNED TO VMC. I ASSESSED THE CONDITION OF THE CAPT AND FELT HE WAS ABLE TO LAND THE ACFT SAFELY WITHOUT THE NEED FOR ME TO INTERVENE. WE WERE CLRED FOR THE VISUAL APCH AND LANDED WITHOUT INCIDENT ON RWY 22R. AFTER LNDG; THE CAPT ASKED ME IF HE SCARED ME. I TOLD HIM 'WITH ALL THE YRS OF FLT INSTRUCTING IT IS HARD TO SCARE ME ALTHOUGH YOU HAD ME CONCERNED WITH THE STICK SHAKER.' I MADE THE CAPT AWARE THAT I WAS NOT HAPPY WITH WHAT OCCURRED. HE ALSO STATED THAT THIS PROBABLY REQUIRES A RPT. I TOLD HIM; 'FILE WHATEVER RPT YOU FEEL IS NECESSARY.' WE TAXIED TO GATE AND COMPLETED THE FLT WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.