Narrative:

While waiting to close out; the captain noticed an unusual appearance to the release knob of the elevator disconnect t-handle. Upon further investigation it was discovered that the center push-to-release knob was loose and could be completely removed from the t-handle housing. Maintenance was called and it was determined that the assembly was defective. The aircraft was OTS. It is unclear whether the function of the elevator disconnect t-handle would have worked had it been necessary to use. This was a new airplane. If not already happening; the function of these handles should be checked periodically by maintenance. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: this was the first revenue flight for this new aircraft. The reporter stated there must be some sort of aircraft acceptance check for all emergency systems before entering revenue service. The friction lock reportedly allows the t-handle to be pulled after disconnecting the left and right elevators allowing the control surfaces to act separately in the event of a power unit locking up. If the friction or release button is inoperative; no elevator disconnect would be possible. This airplane may have been delivered from the manufacturer in this condition as the logbook has no reports on the elevator disconnect.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PRIOR TO DEP; AND EMB145 FLC NOTED T-HANDLE FOR ELEVATOR DISCONNECT HAD CENTER 'PUSH TO RELEASE' BUTTON PROTRUDING AND LOOSE.

Narrative: WHILE WAITING TO CLOSE OUT; THE CAPT NOTICED AN UNUSUAL APPEARANCE TO THE RELEASE KNOB OF THE ELEVATOR DISCONNECT T-HANDLE. UPON FURTHER INVESTIGATION IT WAS DISCOVERED THAT THE CENTER PUSH-TO-RELEASE KNOB WAS LOOSE AND COULD BE COMPLETELY REMOVED FROM THE T-HANDLE HOUSING. MAINT WAS CALLED AND IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE ASSEMBLY WAS DEFECTIVE. THE ACFT WAS OTS. IT IS UNCLEAR WHETHER THE FUNCTION OF THE ELEVATOR DISCONNECT T-HANDLE WOULD HAVE WORKED HAD IT BEEN NECESSARY TO USE. THIS WAS A NEW AIRPLANE. IF NOT ALREADY HAPPENING; THE FUNCTION OF THESE HANDLES SHOULD BE CHKED PERIODICALLY BY MAINT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THIS WAS THE FIRST REVENUE FLT FOR THIS NEW ACFT. THE RPTR STATED THERE MUST BE SOME SORT OF ACFT ACCEPTANCE CHK FOR ALL EMER SYSTEMS BEFORE ENTERING REVENUE SERVICE. THE FRICTION LOCK REPORTEDLY ALLOWS THE T-HANDLE TO BE PULLED AFTER DISCONNECTING THE L AND R ELEVATORS ALLOWING THE CTL SURFACES TO ACT SEPARATELY IN THE EVENT OF A POWER UNIT LOCKING UP. IF THE FRICTION OR RELEASE BUTTON IS INOP; NO ELEVATOR DISCONNECT WOULD BE POSSIBLE. THIS AIRPLANE MAY HAVE BEEN DELIVERED FROM THE MANUFACTURER IN THIS CONDITION AS THE LOGBOOK HAS NO RPTS ON THE ELEVATOR DISCONNECT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.