Narrative:

Departing runway 24 via the teb 5 SID; the pilot flew through the initial restr of 1500 ft and leveled off at 2000 ft prior to 4.5 DME (teb). The initial rate of climb created a TCASII RA alert with traffic above and behind (2000 ft relative altitude and descending). This created a distraction combined with the immediate ATC communication for handoff to ny departure control. The PF; distraction by the TCASII RA flew through 1500 ft even though this was the initial altitude set by the PF in the altitude alerter and therefore being displayed by flight director command bars as the flight director was engaged and working. The pilot not flying; distraction by the TCASII RA and ATC communications (looking outside and talking on the radio); missed the normal procedural callout of '1000 ft to go.' what's more; our normal procedure at 1000 ft AGL is for the PNF to engage the yaw damper and begin a command and response of the after takeoff checklist with the pilot flying. Even though the teb 5 SID was briefed in detail by the crew; we should have given more consideration to the compression of time on this specific departure procedure. We could have deferred our normal callouts and checklist mindset for the immediate attention to the critical leveloff required at 1500 ft to avoid the ewr/lga arrival traffic conflict. The TCASII RA was a contributing factor but not the root cause.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A LEAR JET 60 DEPARTING TEB LEVELED AT 2000 FT EXCEEDING THE INITIAL 1500 FT LEVELOFF ALT WHEN DISTR BY A TCASII RA.

Narrative: DEPARTING RWY 24 VIA THE TEB 5 SID; THE PLT FLEW THROUGH THE INITIAL RESTR OF 1500 FT AND LEVELED OFF AT 2000 FT PRIOR TO 4.5 DME (TEB). THE INITIAL RATE OF CLB CREATED A TCASII RA ALERT WITH TFC ABOVE AND BEHIND (2000 FT RELATIVE ALT AND DSNDING). THIS CREATED A DISTR COMBINED WITH THE IMMEDIATE ATC COM FOR HANDOFF TO NY DEP CTL. THE PF; DISTR BY THE TCASII RA FLEW THROUGH 1500 FT EVEN THOUGH THIS WAS THE INITIAL ALT SET BY THE PF IN THE ALT ALERTER AND THEREFORE BEING DISPLAYED BY FLT DIRECTOR COMMAND BARS AS THE FLT DIRECTOR WAS ENGAGED AND WORKING. THE PLT NOT FLYING; DISTR BY THE TCASII RA AND ATC COMS (LOOKING OUTSIDE AND TALKING ON THE RADIO); MISSED THE NORMAL PROCEDURAL CALLOUT OF '1000 FT TO GO.' WHAT'S MORE; OUR NORMAL PROC AT 1000 FT AGL IS FOR THE PNF TO ENGAGE THE YAW DAMPER AND BEGIN A COMMAND AND RESPONSE OF THE AFTER TKOF CHKLIST WITH THE PLT FLYING. EVEN THOUGH THE TEB 5 SID WAS BRIEFED IN DETAIL BY THE CREW; WE SHOULD HAVE GIVEN MORE CONSIDERATION TO THE COMPRESSION OF TIME ON THIS SPECIFIC DEP PROC. WE COULD HAVE DEFERRED OUR NORMAL CALLOUTS AND CHKLIST MINDSET FOR THE IMMEDIATE ATTENTION TO THE CRITICAL LEVELOFF REQUIRED AT 1500 FT TO AVOID THE EWR/LGA ARR TFC CONFLICT. THE TCASII RA WAS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR BUT NOT THE ROOT CAUSE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.