Narrative:

The flight was scheduled for 56 mins sfo-lax. Push; taxi; takeoff were normal. I got an updated ATIS soon after level off so I could request the papers for the next leg. I programmed the arrival information into the performance page of the box as I was waiting for the papers. I was the captain and PF. Co-pilot and I got into a discussion of the effective pay date of a bid he was awarded in august while we were waiting. I also programmed the altitudes for the descent fixes into the box as I knew we would be busy just prior to top of descent. (I felt that I was doing a good job conflicting tasks at that point.) we looked over all the papers once they arrived and were discussing the fuel as we started down (I think it was pilot's discretion FL240). At approximately FL260 we were given 12000 ft at symon with no speed restr. As I was finishing up the ACARS release (approach brief was done); we were given a crossing restr of 10 mi north of fim VOR at or below FL180. I made note of this on my flight plan as I believed it was not possible to program such crossing restrs into the airbus FMGC. I checked to see how the descent was going (I put sadde on the progress page and fim was the takeoff point on the navigation display) and proceeded to finish up the ACARS release. I called for the descent check. I was apparently distraction and became convinced that the 180 degree restr was at fim. I checked the descent using 3-FOR-1 and made sure the FL180 items were complete (lights; no smoke ding; etc) thinking that I had the descent nailed by about 3 mi prior to fim. That was when ATC called (it was a female controller; but I didn't note the frequency) and asked our altitude. We were going through FL190 about 8 mi north of fim. This was when the co-pilot and I simultaneously realized that we both forgot about the 10 mi north. We fessed up to ATC and the controller reminded us that if we are unable to make a descent restr; we should tell her early so she can make alternate plans for traffic deconfliction. I apologized and admitted that I had forgotten about the 10 mi north and thought the FL180 was at fim. This was mostly due to my mismgmnt of the descent task load (although I thought I was on top of it until ATC called about out altitude). I would definitely say that the airbus FMGC programming limitations were a contributing factor; as there is no easy way to program in restrs prior to programmed fixes. I feel this was a distraction issue aided by the FMGC limitations of the airbus and the fact that we failed to set the altitude window to the most restrictive altitude in accordance with the SOP. I would; however; very much like to see the FAA require any possible altitude constraints issued by ATC be easily programmed into the FMGC.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN A320 CREW MISSED AN ALT CONSTRAINT BECAUSE THEY WERE DISTR AND ADDITIONALLY HAD DIFFICULTY PROGRAMMING THE FMGC.

Narrative: THE FLT WAS SCHEDULED FOR 56 MINS SFO-LAX. PUSH; TAXI; TKOF WERE NORMAL. I GOT AN UPDATED ATIS SOON AFTER LEVEL OFF SO I COULD REQUEST THE PAPERS FOR THE NEXT LEG. I PROGRAMMED THE ARR INFO INTO THE PERFORMANCE PAGE OF THE BOX AS I WAS WAITING FOR THE PAPERS. I WAS THE CAPT AND PF. CO-PLT AND I GOT INTO A DISCUSSION OF THE EFFECTIVE PAY DATE OF A BID HE WAS AWARDED IN AUGUST WHILE WE WERE WAITING. I ALSO PROGRAMMED THE ALTS FOR THE DSCNT FIXES INTO THE BOX AS I KNEW WE WOULD BE BUSY JUST PRIOR TO TOP OF DSCNT. (I FELT THAT I WAS DOING A GOOD JOB CONFLICTING TASKS AT THAT POINT.) WE LOOKED OVER ALL THE PAPERS ONCE THEY ARRIVED AND WERE DISCUSSING THE FUEL AS WE STARTED DOWN (I THINK IT WAS PLT'S DISCRETION FL240). AT APPROX FL260 WE WERE GIVEN 12000 FT AT SYMON WITH NO SPD RESTR. AS I WAS FINISHING UP THE ACARS RELEASE (APCH BRIEF WAS DONE); WE WERE GIVEN A XING RESTR OF 10 MI N OF FIM VOR AT OR BELOW FL180. I MADE NOTE OF THIS ON MY FLT PLAN AS I BELIEVED IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO PROGRAM SUCH XING RESTRS INTO THE AIRBUS FMGC. I CHKED TO SEE HOW THE DSCNT WAS GOING (I PUT SADDE ON THE PROGRESS PAGE AND FIM WAS THE TKOF POINT ON THE NAV DISPLAY) AND PROCEEDED TO FINISH UP THE ACARS RELEASE. I CALLED FOR THE DSCNT CHK. I WAS APPARENTLY DISTR AND BECAME CONVINCED THAT THE 180 DEG RESTR WAS AT FIM. I CHKED THE DSCNT USING 3-FOR-1 AND MADE SURE THE FL180 ITEMS WERE COMPLETE (LIGHTS; NO SMOKE DING; ETC) THINKING THAT I HAD THE DSCNT NAILED BY ABOUT 3 MI PRIOR TO FIM. THAT WAS WHEN ATC CALLED (IT WAS A FEMALE CTLR; BUT I DIDN'T NOTE THE FREQ) AND ASKED OUR ALT. WE WERE GOING THROUGH FL190 ABOUT 8 MI N OF FIM. THIS WAS WHEN THE CO-PLT AND I SIMULTANEOUSLY REALIZED THAT WE BOTH FORGOT ABOUT THE 10 MI N. WE FESSED UP TO ATC AND THE CTLR REMINDED US THAT IF WE ARE UNABLE TO MAKE A DSCNT RESTR; WE SHOULD TELL HER EARLY SO SHE CAN MAKE ALTERNATE PLANS FOR TFC DECONFLICTION. I APOLOGIZED AND ADMITTED THAT I HAD FORGOTTEN ABOUT THE 10 MI N AND THOUGHT THE FL180 WAS AT FIM. THIS WAS MOSTLY DUE TO MY MISMGMNT OF THE DSCNT TASK LOAD (ALTHOUGH I THOUGHT I WAS ON TOP OF IT UNTIL ATC CALLED ABOUT OUT ALT). I WOULD DEFINITELY SAY THAT THE AIRBUS FMGC PROGRAMMING LIMITATIONS WERE A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR; AS THERE IS NO EASY WAY TO PROGRAM IN RESTRS PRIOR TO PROGRAMMED FIXES. I FEEL THIS WAS A DISTR ISSUE AIDED BY THE FMGC LIMITATIONS OF THE AIRBUS AND THE FACT THAT WE FAILED TO SET THE ALT WINDOW TO THE MOST RESTRICTIVE ALT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SOP. I WOULD; HOWEVER; VERY MUCH LIKE TO SEE THE FAA REQUIRE ANY POSSIBLE ALT CONSTRAINTS ISSUED BY ATC BE EASILY PROGRAMMED INTO THE FMGC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.