Narrative:

I and another instructor were on an instrument training flight in an H269 helicopter. I was acting as safety pilot. We had just finished the dto GPS 35 approach and were cleared to go direct to the IAF (pinck) for the ILS runway 17 approach. Our intent was to do the ILS runway 17 approach and execute a missed approach at the threshold and turn eastbound. The current runway was runway 35. At approximately 1/2 mi prior to reaching pinck (OM) outbound, the tower asked what our present position was and if we were going to do the full published procedure turn. We reported we were 1/2 mi south of pinck (outbound) and noted we would be doing an abbreviated course reversal to speed things up (our ground speed was only 60 KTS). We were then told to report pinck inbound. Approximately 1 min later, we made our turn inbound to the OM. While making our turn inbound, the tower let us know a king air would be departing runway 35 on a 340 degree heading and to be on the lookout for him. Just as we approached pinck, the tower, king air, and experimental were congesting the frequency such that we could not report pinck inbound until we were 1/4 mi past the OM. The tower acknowledged our call that we were inbound and told us to look out for the king air. The tower did not specifically clear us for the approach or say we were cleared to land. We then reported the king air in sight. Almost immediately after our call, the tower communicated to the king air who was then rotating to be on the lookout for our helicopter approximately 4-5 mi from the threshold. This was the first hint that something was amiss as the tower should have known we were only 3 mi out by now and not 4-5 mi. Approximately 1 min later, the tower cleared the experimental for the option on runway 35. At this point, we were approximately 2 mi from the runway 17 threshold. I told the other CFI at this point to abandon the GS, keep our current altitude (approximately 1500 ft MSL) and just follow the localizer since I was uncomfortable with the fact that the experimental had been cleared for the option. Approximately 1 min later, I saw the experimental rotating to take off and opted to abandon the approach and initiated an immediate turn to the east (away from his pattern) and let the tower know we were executing a missed to the east and had the experimental in sight. At this point we were 1/4 mi or less from the threshold at approximately 1400 ft MSL. The tower excitedly told us that we should have reported the OM inbound. We communicated that we had reported inbound and that he had in fact acknowledged our call.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: HELI PLT EXPERIENCES TFC CONFLICT AT DTO DURING PRACTICE ILS TO RWY 17 WITH TFC DEPARTING FROM RWY 35.

Narrative: I AND ANOTHER INSTRUCTOR WERE ON AN INST TRAINING FLT IN AN H269 HELI. I WAS ACTING AS SAFETY PLT. WE HAD JUST FINISHED THE DTO GPS 35 APCH AND WERE CLRED TO GO DIRECT TO THE IAF (PINCK) FOR THE ILS RWY 17 APCH. OUR INTENT WAS TO DO THE ILS RWY 17 APCH AND EXECUTE A MISSED APCH AT THE THRESHOLD AND TURN EBOUND. THE CURRENT RWY WAS RWY 35. AT APPROX 1/2 MI PRIOR TO REACHING PINCK (OM) OUTBOUND, THE TWR ASKED WHAT OUR PRESENT POS WAS AND IF WE WERE GOING TO DO THE FULL PUBLISHED PROC TURN. WE RPTED WE WERE 1/2 MI S OF PINCK (OUTBOUND) AND NOTED WE WOULD BE DOING AN ABBREVIATED COURSE REVERSAL TO SPD THINGS UP (OUR GND SPD WAS ONLY 60 KTS). WE WERE THEN TOLD TO RPT PINCK INBOUND. APPROX 1 MIN LATER, WE MADE OUR TURN INBOUND TO THE OM. WHILE MAKING OUR TURN INBOUND, THE TWR LET US KNOW A KING AIR WOULD BE DEPARTING RWY 35 ON A 340 DEG HDG AND TO BE ON THE LOOKOUT FOR HIM. JUST AS WE APCHED PINCK, THE TWR, KING AIR, AND EXPERIMENTAL WERE CONGESTING THE FREQ SUCH THAT WE COULD NOT RPT PINCK INBOUND UNTIL WE WERE 1/4 MI PAST THE OM. THE TWR ACKNOWLEDGED OUR CALL THAT WE WERE INBOUND AND TOLD US TO LOOK OUT FOR THE KING AIR. THE TWR DID NOT SPECIFICALLY CLR US FOR THE APCH OR SAY WE WERE CLRED TO LAND. WE THEN RPTED THE KING AIR IN SIGHT. ALMOST IMMEDIATELY AFTER OUR CALL, THE TWR COMMUNICATED TO THE KING AIR WHO WAS THEN ROTATING TO BE ON THE LOOKOUT FOR OUR HELI APPROX 4-5 MI FROM THE THRESHOLD. THIS WAS THE FIRST HINT THAT SOMETHING WAS AMISS AS THE TWR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN WE WERE ONLY 3 MI OUT BY NOW AND NOT 4-5 MI. APPROX 1 MIN LATER, THE TWR CLRED THE EXPERIMENTAL FOR THE OPTION ON RWY 35. AT THIS POINT, WE WERE APPROX 2 MI FROM THE RWY 17 THRESHOLD. I TOLD THE OTHER CFI AT THIS POINT TO ABANDON THE GS, KEEP OUR CURRENT ALT (APPROX 1500 FT MSL) AND JUST FOLLOW THE LOC SINCE I WAS UNCOMFORTABLE WITH THE FACT THAT THE EXPERIMENTAL HAD BEEN CLRED FOR THE OPTION. APPROX 1 MIN LATER, I SAW THE EXPERIMENTAL ROTATING TO TAKE OFF AND OPTED TO ABANDON THE APCH AND INITIATED AN IMMEDIATE TURN TO THE E (AWAY FROM HIS PATTERN) AND LET THE TWR KNOW WE WERE EXECUTING A MISSED TO THE E AND HAD THE EXPERIMENTAL IN SIGHT. AT THIS POINT WE WERE 1/4 MI OR LESS FROM THE THRESHOLD AT APPROX 1400 FT MSL. THE TWR EXCITEDLY TOLD US THAT WE SHOULD HAVE RPTED THE OM INBOUND. WE COMMUNICATED THAT WE HAD RPTED INBOUND AND THAT HE HAD IN FACT ACKNOWLEDGED OUR CALL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.