Narrative:

We were departing runway 4. Departure instructions were to turn right to heading 120 degrees, climb and maintain 3000 ft. Prior to taking the runway, both pilots verified that the MCP displayed runway heading and 3000 ft. At 400 ft AGL the PF called for heading select 120 degrees. The PNF was turning the heading selector to 120 degrees when at approximately 700 ft AGL automation gave an altitude alert warning indicating that we exceeded our MCP altitude. Flight directors commanded a steep descent as if we had exceeded our designated altitude. The PF reacted by lowering the aircraft's nose and reducing power. GPWS announced 'don't sink, don't sink' and the PNF announced 'climb, climb!' the PF responded by increasing the pitch angle and adding power. The PNF selected vertical speed +1000 FPM. Both pilots then noted that the MCP had 50000 ft in the altitude window. The PNF reset the MCP to 3000 ft. At approximately 1500 ft, VNAV was selected and flaps were retracted on schedule. Guidance provided by the flight director was accurate and appropriate the remainder of the flight. Company procedures call for runway heading to be set in the MCP. This heading information is not to be changed until passing 400 ft AGL. It is my belief that this distracts the PNF during a critical phase of flight. Having the pre-assigned heading in the MCP would allow the PNF to simply 'punch' 'heading select' at 400 ft, thus allowing the PNF the ability to better monitor primary flight instruments. Our flight director system has proven to be very reliable. To 'look through' or ignore the flight director information is very difficult. The degree of difficulty was compounded with the low visibility/ceiling, an 80 degree turn initiated at 400 ft, a low altitude leveloff, and the need to keep the airspeed below 200 KTS since we were operating in class C airspace.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-800 MCP SOMEHOW RESET TO FL500 AT 700 FT AFTER TKOF CAUSING GPWS ALERTS.

Narrative: WE WERE DEPARTING RWY 4. DEP INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO TURN R TO HDG 120 DEGS, CLB AND MAINTAIN 3000 FT. PRIOR TO TAKING THE RWY, BOTH PLTS VERIFIED THAT THE MCP DISPLAYED RWY HDG AND 3000 FT. AT 400 FT AGL THE PF CALLED FOR HDG SELECT 120 DEGS. THE PNF WAS TURNING THE HDG SELECTOR TO 120 DEGS WHEN AT APPROX 700 FT AGL AUTOMATION GAVE AN ALT ALERT WARNING INDICATING THAT WE EXCEEDED OUR MCP ALT. FLT DIRECTORS COMMANDED A STEEP DSCNT AS IF WE HAD EXCEEDED OUR DESIGNATED ALT. THE PF REACTED BY LOWERING THE ACFT'S NOSE AND REDUCING PWR. GPWS ANNOUNCED 'DON'T SINK, DON'T SINK' AND THE PNF ANNOUNCED 'CLB, CLB!' THE PF RESPONDED BY INCREASING THE PITCH ANGLE AND ADDING PWR. THE PNF SELECTED VERT SPD +1000 FPM. BOTH PLTS THEN NOTED THAT THE MCP HAD 50000 FT IN THE ALT WINDOW. THE PNF RESET THE MCP TO 3000 FT. AT APPROX 1500 FT, VNAV WAS SELECTED AND FLAPS WERE RETRACTED ON SCHEDULE. GUIDANCE PROVIDED BY THE FLT DIRECTOR WAS ACCURATE AND APPROPRIATE THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT. COMPANY PROCS CALL FOR RWY HDG TO BE SET IN THE MCP. THIS HDG INFO IS NOT TO BE CHANGED UNTIL PASSING 400 FT AGL. IT IS MY BELIEF THAT THIS DISTRACTS THE PNF DURING A CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT. HAVING THE PRE-ASSIGNED HDG IN THE MCP WOULD ALLOW THE PNF TO SIMPLY 'PUNCH' 'HDG SELECT' AT 400 FT, THUS ALLOWING THE PNF THE ABILITY TO BETTER MONITOR PRIMARY FLT INSTS. OUR FLT DIRECTOR SYS HAS PROVEN TO BE VERY RELIABLE. TO 'LOOK THROUGH' OR IGNORE THE FLT DIRECTOR INFO IS VERY DIFFICULT. THE DEGREE OF DIFFICULTY WAS COMPOUNDED WITH THE LOW VISIBILITY/CEILING, AN 80 DEG TURN INITIATED AT 400 FT, A LOW ALT LEVELOFF, AND THE NEED TO KEEP THE AIRSPD BELOW 200 KTS SINCE WE WERE OPERATING IN CLASS C AIRSPACE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.