Narrative:

Moments after departing runway 18L in ZZZ, we experienced a pitch trim main system and back up system failure. We performed all appropriate checklists and could not resolve the issue. We requested to return to field and have equipment standing by. We did not declare an emergency. The emb-145 has a history of pitch trim problems and the situation needs to be resolved. Some contributing factors in regards to the handling of the incident include poor checklist design, night flying, and heavy workload. Also, ATC questions and conversation continuously distracted our completion of the checklist. Checklist design and revision procedures contributed to us missing one page of the checklist. We need a new checklist revision procedure. I also feel that ATC should give us time to run checklists, instead of calling to ask questions so frequently.callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated the main pitch trim and backup system failure is a chronic problem. Maintenance checked the central computer and no faults found and cleared the item with a ground check. The flight recorder was downloaded and sent to engineering. The problem is believed to be the actuators are not powerful enough to overcome the stabilizer air loads. The requirement of adding a few units of nose down trim prior to reaching 160 KTS is still followed. Maintenance replaced the main electric actuator and control unit, and test flew the airplane with no problems.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN EMB145 CAPT, MOMENTS AFTER TKOF, REQUESTED TO RETURN TO THE FIELD DUE TO A MAIN PITCH TRIM AND ALTERNATE PITCH TRIM FAILURE.

Narrative: MOMENTS AFTER DEPARTING RWY 18L IN ZZZ, WE EXPERIENCED A PITCH TRIM MAIN SYSTEM AND BACK UP SYSTEM FAILURE. WE PERFORMED ALL APPROPRIATE CHKLISTS AND COULD NOT RESOLVE THE ISSUE. WE REQUESTED TO RETURN TO FIELD AND HAVE EQUIPMENT STANDING BY. WE DID NOT DECLARE AN EMER. THE EMB-145 HAS A HISTORY OF PITCH TRIM PROBS AND THE SIT NEEDS TO BE RESOLVED. SOME CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IN REGARDS TO THE HANDLING OF THE INCIDENT INCLUDE POOR CHKLIST DESIGN, NIGHT FLYING, AND HEAVY WORKLOAD. ALSO, ATC QUESTIONS AND CONVERSATION CONTINUOUSLY DISTRACTED OUR COMPLETION OF THE CHKLIST. CHKLIST DESIGN AND REVISION PROCS CONTRIBUTED TO US MISSING ONE PAGE OF THE CHKLIST. WE NEED A NEW CHKLIST REVISION PROC. I ALSO FEEL THAT ATC SHOULD GIVE US TIME TO RUN CHKLISTS, INSTEAD OF CALLING TO ASK QUESTIONS SO FREQUENTLY.CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE MAIN PITCH TRIM AND BACKUP SYSTEM FAILURE IS A CHRONIC PROB. MAINT CHKED THE CENTRAL COMPUTER AND NO FAULTS FOUND AND CLEARED THE ITEM WITH A GND CHK. THE FLT RECORDER WAS DOWNLOADED AND SENT TO ENGINEERING. THE PROB IS BELIEVED TO BE THE ACTUATORS ARE NOT POWERFUL ENOUGH TO OVERCOME THE STABILIZER AIR LOADS. THE REQUIREMENT OF ADDING A FEW UNITS OF NOSE DOWN TRIM PRIOR TO REACHING 160 KTS IS STILL FOLLOWED. MAINT REPLACED THE MAIN ELECTRIC ACTUATOR AND CONTROL UNIT, AND TEST FLEW THE AIRPLANE WITH NO PROBS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.