Narrative:

We were flying the FMS bridge visual for runway 28R with a B757 on the visual for runway 28L. While established on the proper localizer and GS with the runway in sight, we received a TCASII climb RA. We hesitated to climb since the traffic was behind and likely above our altitude. The climb RA was quickly replaced with a 'clear of conflict' aural. Air carrier Y asked us to verify that we were lined up with runway 28R, which we verified. Both aircraft landed uneventfully, however, there was no need to have such tight spacing -- especially at night. I believe norcal approach should provide at least 1 mi stagger between aircraft on these close visuals. Normally they direct one aircraft to not pass the other, but they did not do that on this occasion. Both aircraft had acknowledged the other in sight and approach told us to maintain 210 KIAS until further advised. I don't know if they had been assigned a speed. When we were just outside samul intersection, approach simultaneously switched both aircraft to the sfo tower. Our ground speed appeared to be greater than theirs initially as we were just forward of their position when we joined the runway 28R localizer. Our procedures for the sfo visual approachs allow us to select the TA only position on the TCASII which I will likely do in the future to avoid the confusion we felt with an aircraft behind and above and a climb RA. The real answer though is to have approach provide more stagger between aircraft and to command one of the aircraft not to pass the other.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW OF B757 ON VISUAL BRIDGE APCH TO RWY 28R AT SFO IS SURPRISED TO FIND THEMSELVES CLOSELY ALIGNED WITH ANOTHER B757 ON A VISUAL APCH TO THE PARALLEL RWY, RWY 28L. DECLINE TO COMPLY WITH TCASII RA DURING ENCOUNTER.

Narrative: WE WERE FLYING THE FMS BRIDGE VISUAL FOR RWY 28R WITH A B757 ON THE VISUAL FOR RWY 28L. WHILE ESTABLISHED ON THE PROPER LOC AND GS WITH THE RWY IN SIGHT, WE RECEIVED A TCASII CLB RA. WE HESITATED TO CLB SINCE THE TFC WAS BEHIND AND LIKELY ABOVE OUR ALT. THE CLB RA WAS QUICKLY REPLACED WITH A 'CLR OF CONFLICT' AURAL. ACR Y ASKED US TO VERIFY THAT WE WERE LINED UP WITH RWY 28R, WHICH WE VERIFIED. BOTH ACFT LANDED UNEVENTFULLY, HOWEVER, THERE WAS NO NEED TO HAVE SUCH TIGHT SPACING -- ESPECIALLY AT NIGHT. I BELIEVE NORCAL APCH SHOULD PROVIDE AT LEAST 1 MI STAGGER BTWN ACFT ON THESE CLOSE VISUALS. NORMALLY THEY DIRECT ONE ACFT TO NOT PASS THE OTHER, BUT THEY DID NOT DO THAT ON THIS OCCASION. BOTH ACFT HAD ACKNOWLEDGED THE OTHER IN SIGHT AND APCH TOLD US TO MAINTAIN 210 KIAS UNTIL FURTHER ADVISED. I DON'T KNOW IF THEY HAD BEEN ASSIGNED A SPD. WHEN WE WERE JUST OUTSIDE SAMUL INTXN, APCH SIMULTANEOUSLY SWITCHED BOTH ACFT TO THE SFO TWR. OUR GND SPD APPEARED TO BE GREATER THAN THEIRS INITIALLY AS WE WERE JUST FORWARD OF THEIR POS WHEN WE JOINED THE RWY 28R LOC. OUR PROCS FOR THE SFO VISUAL APCHS ALLOW US TO SELECT THE TA ONLY POS ON THE TCASII WHICH I WILL LIKELY DO IN THE FUTURE TO AVOID THE CONFUSION WE FELT WITH AN ACFT BEHIND AND ABOVE AND A CLB RA. THE REAL ANSWER THOUGH IS TO HAVE APCH PROVIDE MORE STAGGER BTWN ACFT AND TO COMMAND ONE OF THE ACFT NOT TO PASS THE OTHER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.