Narrative:

We were repositioning an aircraft from cwa to rap. I was acting first officer but am a captain in the aircraft. We were about 30 mi east of rap when we told ellsworth that we had the airport in sight for a visual approach to runway 14. Approach told us to expect a visual approach in about 15 mi. We noticed that ellsworth approach was rather sidetracked and didn't always respond to our radio calls right away. We heard another aircraft on frequency. It sounded like an FAA IFR facility check aircraft. They were communicating with ellsworth and maintenance on several frequencys. At about 15 mi ene of rap, ellsworth cleared us for a visual to runway 14. We began descending to 4700 ft. Around 12 mi and 5000 ft in descent, ellsworth told us to look for traffic 12 O'clock position, 3 mi, 5000 ft northbound. We continued descending and looking for traffic. Ellsworth did not inform us what kind of traffic it was, and never did inform us that there was a jet doing instrument checks in the area. We were still descending when right away at 11 O'clock position, I saw traffic. It was a learjet moving fast northbound level at 5000 ft. It appeared to be 1 mi away. I pointed out the traffic to the PIC. He said he had it in sight but initially did not react. Then he began descending rapidly. At that time the jet began climbing rapidly. Ellsworth now told us to switch to rap tower. I switched over and informed tower we had the learjet in sight and it had passed. I feel that this could have been disastrous had we not picked up on traffic quickly and the learjet pilot had not initiated a climb instead of staying level. Factors that contributed were ellsworth being distraction by the extra workload of communicating with maintenance and the check aircraft. We could have performed better by questioning ellsworth about the check aircraft since we heard them on frequency. Keeping a vigilant eye outside on VMC days. Other factors could have been that the learjet crew was monitoring multiple frequencys and probably not looking out the window too much. After ellsworth informed us of the traffic they did call the learjet and point us out to them. In fact I donT think they saw us until their TCASII went off and they began the climb. At that time we were already descending rapidly to avoid them. It is hard to blame anyone in particular for this potential collision. I feel we could have done a better job of seeing and avoiding. I must say though, that ellsworth is usually very careful not to clear us for a visual until traffic conflicts are taken care of. It is also not typical of them to wait so long to issue a TA. I believe ellsworth was distraction by the maintenance and flight checks that were happening. Also, our aircraft did not yet have TCASII installed. That could have really helped.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN F27 DSNDING FOR A VISUAL APCH MANEUVERS TO AVOID AN FAA FLT CHK LEARJET IN VMC.

Narrative: WE WERE REPOSITIONING AN ACFT FROM CWA TO RAP. I WAS ACTING FO BUT AM A CAPT IN THE ACFT. WE WERE ABOUT 30 MI E OF RAP WHEN WE TOLD ELLSWORTH THAT WE HAD THE ARPT IN SIGHT FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 14. APCH TOLD US TO EXPECT A VISUAL APCH IN ABOUT 15 MI. WE NOTICED THAT ELLSWORTH APCH WAS RATHER SIDETRACKED AND DIDN'T ALWAYS RESPOND TO OUR RADIO CALLS RIGHT AWAY. WE HEARD ANOTHER ACFT ON FREQ. IT SOUNDED LIKE AN FAA IFR FACILITY CHK ACFT. THEY WERE COMMUNICATING WITH ELLSWORTH AND MAINT ON SEVERAL FREQS. AT ABOUT 15 MI ENE OF RAP, ELLSWORTH CLRED US FOR A VISUAL TO RWY 14. WE BEGAN DSNDING TO 4700 FT. AROUND 12 MI AND 5000 FT IN DSCNT, ELLSWORTH TOLD US TO LOOK FOR TFC 12 O'CLOCK POS, 3 MI, 5000 FT NBOUND. WE CONTINUED DSNDING AND LOOKING FOR TFC. ELLSWORTH DID NOT INFORM US WHAT KIND OF TFC IT WAS, AND NEVER DID INFORM US THAT THERE WAS A JET DOING INST CHKS IN THE AREA. WE WERE STILL DSNDING WHEN RIGHT AWAY AT 11 O'CLOCK POS, I SAW TFC. IT WAS A LEARJET MOVING FAST NBOUND LEVEL AT 5000 FT. IT APPEARED TO BE 1 MI AWAY. I POINTED OUT THE TFC TO THE PIC. HE SAID HE HAD IT IN SIGHT BUT INITIALLY DID NOT REACT. THEN HE BEGAN DSNDING RAPIDLY. AT THAT TIME THE JET BEGAN CLBING RAPIDLY. ELLSWORTH NOW TOLD US TO SWITCH TO RAP TWR. I SWITCHED OVER AND INFORMED TWR WE HAD THE LEARJET IN SIGHT AND IT HAD PASSED. I FEEL THAT THIS COULD HAVE BEEN DISASTROUS HAD WE NOT PICKED UP ON TFC QUICKLY AND THE LEARJET PLT HAD NOT INITIATED A CLB INSTEAD OF STAYING LEVEL. FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED WERE ELLSWORTH BEING DISTR BY THE EXTRA WORKLOAD OF COMMUNICATING WITH MAINT AND THE CHK ACFT. WE COULD HAVE PERFORMED BETTER BY QUESTIONING ELLSWORTH ABOUT THE CHK ACFT SINCE WE HEARD THEM ON FREQ. KEEPING A VIGILANT EYE OUTSIDE ON VMC DAYS. OTHER FACTORS COULD HAVE BEEN THAT THE LEARJET CREW WAS MONITORING MULTIPLE FREQS AND PROBABLY NOT LOOKING OUT THE WINDOW TOO MUCH. AFTER ELLSWORTH INFORMED US OF THE TFC THEY DID CALL THE LEARJET AND POINT US OUT TO THEM. IN FACT I DONT THINK THEY SAW US UNTIL THEIR TCASII WENT OFF AND THEY BEGAN THE CLB. AT THAT TIME WE WERE ALREADY DSNDING RAPIDLY TO AVOID THEM. IT IS HARD TO BLAME ANYONE IN PARTICULAR FOR THIS POTENTIAL COLLISION. I FEEL WE COULD HAVE DONE A BETTER JOB OF SEEING AND AVOIDING. I MUST SAY THOUGH, THAT ELLSWORTH IS USUALLY VERY CAREFUL NOT TO CLR US FOR A VISUAL UNTIL TFC CONFLICTS ARE TAKEN CARE OF. IT IS ALSO NOT TYPICAL OF THEM TO WAIT SO LONG TO ISSUE A TA. I BELIEVE ELLSWORTH WAS DISTR BY THE MAINT AND FLT CHKS THAT WERE HAPPENING. ALSO, OUR ACFT DID NOT YET HAVE TCASII INSTALLED. THAT COULD HAVE REALLY HELPED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.