Narrative:

We were flying a company procedure non-precision localizer approach to runway 27 at san. The WX was 700 ft broken, 6 mi visibility, light rain, winds 220 degrees/4 KTS. Socal approach assigned us a speed of 150 KTS to reebo, the FAF. We maintained 150 KTS as long as we could and then began to slow to our final approach speed of 125 KTS, 1-2 mi prior to reebo. The radio was too congested for me to advise socal of our need to slow in order to be stabilized and configured at reebo. The approach and landing was uneventful, we picked up the runway right at minimums. After landing, tower asked us our speed on final and then advised us to call socal on a landline. I called socal and spoke to a representative there. He advised me that we were assigned 150 KTS to reebo and that he had to break out the aircraft behind me due to loss of spacing. I explained that I maintained 150 KTS as long as I could but had to slow 1-2 mi out in order to be stabilized for the approach. We were on tower frequency at reebo, very busy flying the approach, and not able to tell them of our speed. He said that I did not sound 'very apologetic.' I said that I was sorry someone had to go around and that in the future I would be sure to tell them of my intentions to slow just prior to the FAF. Approach control needs to understand that there is a difference between IMC approachs to minimums and visual approachs. When the WX is right down to minimums, the airspeed requirements are more stringent in order to be stabilized for the approach. ATC should know this. Frequency congestion, pilot and controller workload are very high during IMC approachs and rapidly changing WX conditions. Aircraft separation during IMC/VMC needs to be considered. 6 mi visibility with a 700 ft ceiling and localizer approach is an approach to minimums.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-300 SLOWED TO FINAL APCH SPD EARLIER THAN APCH CTL REQUESTED CAUSING THE FOLLOWING TFC TO BE TAKEN OFF THE APCH.

Narrative: WE WERE FLYING A COMPANY PROC NON-PRECISION LOC APCH TO RWY 27 AT SAN. THE WX WAS 700 FT BROKEN, 6 MI VISIBILITY, LIGHT RAIN, WINDS 220 DEGS/4 KTS. SOCAL APCH ASSIGNED US A SPD OF 150 KTS TO REEBO, THE FAF. WE MAINTAINED 150 KTS AS LONG AS WE COULD AND THEN BEGAN TO SLOW TO OUR FINAL APCH SPD OF 125 KTS, 1-2 MI PRIOR TO REEBO. THE RADIO WAS TOO CONGESTED FOR ME TO ADVISE SOCAL OF OUR NEED TO SLOW IN ORDER TO BE STABILIZED AND CONFIGURED AT REEBO. THE APCH AND LNDG WAS UNEVENTFUL, WE PICKED UP THE RWY RIGHT AT MINIMUMS. AFTER LNDG, TWR ASKED US OUR SPD ON FINAL AND THEN ADVISED US TO CALL SOCAL ON A LANDLINE. I CALLED SOCAL AND SPOKE TO A REPRESENTATIVE THERE. HE ADVISED ME THAT WE WERE ASSIGNED 150 KTS TO REEBO AND THAT HE HAD TO BREAK OUT THE ACFT BEHIND ME DUE TO LOSS OF SPACING. I EXPLAINED THAT I MAINTAINED 150 KTS AS LONG AS I COULD BUT HAD TO SLOW 1-2 MI OUT IN ORDER TO BE STABILIZED FOR THE APCH. WE WERE ON TWR FREQ AT REEBO, VERY BUSY FLYING THE APCH, AND NOT ABLE TO TELL THEM OF OUR SPD. HE SAID THAT I DID NOT SOUND 'VERY APOLOGETIC.' I SAID THAT I WAS SORRY SOMEONE HAD TO GO AROUND AND THAT IN THE FUTURE I WOULD BE SURE TO TELL THEM OF MY INTENTIONS TO SLOW JUST PRIOR TO THE FAF. APCH CTL NEEDS TO UNDERSTAND THAT THERE IS A DIFFERENCE BTWN IMC APCHS TO MINIMUMS AND VISUAL APCHS. WHEN THE WX IS RIGHT DOWN TO MINIMUMS, THE AIRSPD REQUIREMENTS ARE MORE STRINGENT IN ORDER TO BE STABILIZED FOR THE APCH. ATC SHOULD KNOW THIS. FREQ CONGESTION, PLT AND CTLR WORKLOAD ARE VERY HIGH DURING IMC APCHS AND RAPIDLY CHANGING WX CONDITIONS. ACFT SEPARATION DURING IMC/VMC NEEDS TO BE CONSIDERED. 6 MI VISIBILITY WITH A 700 FT CEILING AND LOC APCH IS AN APCH TO MINIMUMS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.