Narrative:

During routine inspection I found that the normal safety wired drain cap on the flowmeter manifold had been replaced with a non-drilled, non-safetied cap. I wrote a write-up, but after research found that this was supposedly correct per service bulletin 72-678. The mandate of the service bulletin was to remove all unused safety wired hardware from the engine. I knew this cap had to be a mistake because it was safetied in the past and was in a system (fuel) where everything is safetied. Furthermore, in a worst case scenario the leakage or loss of the cap could cause an engine fire and possible loss of aircraft. As more and more aircraft came in with this condition I stepped up my campaign to rectify this accident waiting to happen. I contacted supervisors, lead technicians and air carrier engineers. The response was 'we're waiting for a response from boeing' or 'the drill-cap is no longer available.' I couldn't believe the lack of immediacy placed on this situation especially considering the serious consequences and easy fix pertaining to this cap. It was only after I used air carrier as soon as possible program and self-disclosed that I purposely undid the service bulletin 72-678 and installed and safetied a drilled cap the issue was dealt with in a timely manner. The matter was soon rectified with an alert bulletin.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B767 WITH GE-80C2 ENG HAS SVC BULLETIN TO REPLACE SAFETIED FLOWMETER DRAIN CAPS WITH NON SAFETIED CAPS. INSPECTOR POINTS OUT THIS IS NOT A SAFE SIT.

Narrative: DURING ROUTINE INSPECTION I FOUND THAT THE NORMAL SAFETY WIRED DRAIN CAP ON THE FLOWMETER MANIFOLD HAD BEEN REPLACED WITH A NON-DRILLED, NON-SAFETIED CAP. I WROTE A WRITE-UP, BUT AFTER RESEARCH FOUND THAT THIS WAS SUPPOSEDLY CORRECT PER SVC BULLETIN 72-678. THE MANDATE OF THE SVC BULLETIN WAS TO REMOVE ALL UNUSED SAFETY WIRED HARDWARE FROM THE ENG. I KNEW THIS CAP HAD TO BE A MISTAKE BECAUSE IT WAS SAFETIED IN THE PAST AND WAS IN A SYS (FUEL) WHERE EVERYTHING IS SAFETIED. FURTHERMORE, IN A WORST CASE SCENARIO THE LEAKAGE OR LOSS OF THE CAP COULD CAUSE AN ENG FIRE AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF ACFT. AS MORE AND MORE ACFT CAME IN WITH THIS CONDITION I STEPPED UP MY CAMPAIGN TO RECTIFY THIS ACCIDENT WAITING TO HAPPEN. I CONTACTED SUPVRS, LEAD TECHNICIANS AND ACR ENGINEERS. THE RESPONSE WAS 'WE'RE WAITING FOR A RESPONSE FROM BOEING' OR 'THE DRILL-CAP IS NO LONGER AVAILABLE.' I COULDN'T BELIEVE THE LACK OF IMMEDIACY PLACED ON THIS SIT ESPECIALLY CONSIDERING THE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES AND EASY FIX PERTAINING TO THIS CAP. IT WAS ONLY AFTER I USED ACR ASAP PROGRAM AND SELF-DISCLOSED THAT I PURPOSELY UNDID THE SVC BULLETIN 72-678 AND INSTALLED AND SAFETIED A DRILLED CAP THE ISSUE WAS DEALT WITH IN A TIMELY MANNER. THE MATTER WAS SOON RECTIFIED WITH AN ALERT BULLETIN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.