Narrative:

On 10/04 at approximately xa:00, I was flying from sps to M39. I was approaching M39 and was talking to ft worth center. After checking the AWOS (2700 overcast and 1700 scattered and 5 miles visibility) I indicated to the ft worth controller that I would need the approach into M39. He immediately transferred me to a memphis center controller. I indicated to her that I had the weather at M39 and would need the approach. She asked me if I thought I could get the visual approach. I indicated that I thought I could. I was then cleared from 6000 ft MSL to 4200 ft MSL, whereupon I lost all radio communication with center. I was now in and out of a broken layer approaching the pgo VOR. I had good ground contact but I was unwilling to drop down further knowing there was an overcast ahead and many hills surrounding my destination, unless I was established on a published portion of the approach. I changed radios, I tried to contact other aircraft on the frequency. Despite hearing the other aircraft, none responded to my calls and I could not hear the controller. I considered squawking 7600 but felt that the problem was due to the terrain around me and not my radios. I joined the VOR - a approach to M39 and proceeded to fly inbound once established on a published portion of the approach. I was now solid IMC. I began relaying messages via a commuter flight shortly before reaching the final approach fix and was able to see the airport just inside the final approach fix. I was then cleared for the visual approach. I flew an angling base to final and landed safely at M39 on runway 9. I was unfamiliar with the area but subsequently talked to other pilots who informed me that this scenario happens routinely at M39. I asked for the approach twice, to two different controllers. I should have been given the approach. Assigning the approach should be routine/required if the ceiling and visibility at M39 is less than 3000 ft MSL and 3. Aircraft should be assigned the approach or IFR canceled before leaving 6000 ft MSL. The other solution would be to put a radio repeater at the pgo VOR. This was a very, very dangerous situation. My wisdom and training and experience saved my life and the life of my passenger. The controllers should have been well aware of the situation and the dangers I faced and not allowed me to be IMC below hilltops without being cleared for the approach including missed instructions and telling me that I would be without radio communications until reaching 6000 ft MSL. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter indicated that the ZME controller did not give any indication that communications might be a problem given the terrain and the assigned altitude. The pilot said he would have expected such a warning based upon his prior experience in similar circumstances. The reporter suggested that the ZME controller may not have had access to the M39 WX. The pilot indicated that he told both the ZFW and ZME controllers that an IFR approach would most likely be required. The 'other pilot' referred to in the report was a part 135 pilot who regularly utilizes the M39 airport. The 'squawking 7600' issue was discussed and the reporter is now aware that although communication may have been affected by terrain, radar coverage may have been maintained because of different communication/radar antenna locations. The value of the 7600 procedure was discussed regarding ATC planning and separation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: IFR GA ACFT LNDG M39 IS QUESTIONED BY ZME REGARDING VISUAL APCH POSSIBILITY AND DURING ATC DSCNT, LOSES COMS AND IS FORCED TO RELAY COMS VIA ANOTHER ACFT.

Narrative: ON 10/04 AT APPROX XA:00, I WAS FLYING FROM SPS TO M39. I WAS APPROACHING M39 AND WAS TALKING TO FT WORTH CTR. AFTER CHECKING THE AWOS (2700 OVERCAST AND 1700 SCATTERED AND 5 MILES VISIBILITY) I INDICATED TO THE FT WORTH CTLR THAT I WOULD NEED THE APCH INTO M39. HE IMMEDIATELY TRANSFERRED ME TO A MEMPHIS CTR CTLR. I INDICATED TO HER THAT I HAD THE WEATHER AT M39 AND WOULD NEED THE APCH. SHE ASKED ME IF I THOUGHT I COULD GET THE VISUAL APCH. I INDICATED THAT I THOUGHT I COULD. I WAS THEN CLEARED FROM 6000 FT MSL TO 4200 FT MSL, WHEREUPON I LOST ALL RADIO COM WITH CTR. I WAS NOW IN AND OUT OF A BROKEN LAYER APPROACHING THE PGO VOR. I HAD GOOD GND CONTACT BUT I WAS UNWILLING TO DROP DOWN FURTHER KNOWING THERE WAS AN OVERCAST AHEAD AND MANY HILLS SURROUNDING MY DESTINATION, UNLESS I WAS ESTABLISHED ON A PUBLISHED PORTION OF THE APCH. I CHANGED RADIOS, I TRIED TO CONTACT OTHER ACFT ON THE FREQ. DESPITE HEARING THE OTHER ACFT, NONE RESPONDED TO MY CALLS AND I COULD NOT HEAR THE CTLR. I CONSIDERED SQUAWKING 7600 BUT FELT THAT THE PROB WAS DUE TO THE TERRAIN AROUND ME AND NOT MY RADIOS. I JOINED THE VOR - A APCH TO M39 AND PROCEEDED TO FLY INBOUND ONCE ESTABLISHED ON A PUBLISHED PORTION OF THE APCH. I WAS NOW SOLID IMC. I BEGAN RELAYING MESSAGES VIA A COMMUTER FLT SHORTLY BEFORE REACHING THE FINAL APCH FIX AND WAS ABLE TO SEE THE ARPT JUST INSIDE THE FINAL APCH FIX. I WAS THEN CLRED FOR THE VISUAL APCH. I FLEW AN ANGLING BASE TO FINAL AND LANDED SAFELY AT M39 ON RWY 9. I WAS UNFAMILIAR WITH THE AREA BUT SUBSEQUENTLY TALKED TO OTHER PLTS WHO INFORMED ME THAT THIS SCENARIO HAPPENS ROUTINELY AT M39. I ASKED FOR THE APCH TWICE, TO TWO DIFFERENT CTLRS. I SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN THE APCH. ASSIGNING THE APCH SHOULD BE ROUTINE/REQUIRED IF THE CEILING AND VISIBILITY AT M39 IS LESS THAN 3000 FT MSL AND 3. ACFT SHOULD BE ASSIGNED THE APCH OR IFR CANCELED BEFORE LEAVING 6000 FT MSL. THE OTHER SOLUTION WOULD BE TO PUT A RADIO REPEATER AT THE PGO VOR. THIS WAS A VERY, VERY DANGEROUS SIT. MY WISDOM AND TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE SAVED MY LIFE AND THE LIFE OF MY PAX. THE CTLRS SHOULD HAVE BEEN WELL AWARE OF THE SIT AND THE DANGERS I FACED AND NOT ALLOWED ME TO BE IMC BELOW HILLTOPS WITHOUT BEING CLRED FOR THE APCH INCLUDING MISSED INSTRUCTIONS AND TELLING ME THAT I WOULD BE WITHOUT RADIO COMS UNTIL REACHING 6000 FT MSL. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR INDICATED THAT THE ZME CTLR DID NOT GIVE ANY INDICATION THAT COMS MIGHT BE A PROB GIVEN THE TERRAIN AND THE ASSIGNED ALT. THE PLT SAID HE WOULD HAVE EXPECTED SUCH A WARNING BASED UPON HIS PRIOR EXPERIENCE IN SIMILAR CIRCUMSTANCES. THE RPTR SUGGESTED THAT THE ZME CTLR MAY NOT HAVE HAD ACCESS TO THE M39 WX. THE PLT INDICATED THAT HE TOLD BOTH THE ZFW AND ZME CTLRS THAT AN IFR APCH WOULD MOST LIKELY BE REQUIRED. THE 'OTHER PLT' REFERRED TO IN THE RPT WAS A PART 135 PLT WHO REGULARLY UTILIZES THE M39 ARPT. THE 'SQUAWKING 7600' ISSUE WAS DISCUSSED AND THE RPTR IS NOW AWARE THAT ALTHOUGH COM MAY HAVE BEEN AFFECTED BY TERRAIN, RADAR COVERAGE MAY HAVE BEEN MAINTAINED BECAUSE OF DIFFERENT COM/RADAR ANTENNA LOCATIONS. THE VALUE OF THE 7600 PROC WAS DISCUSSED REGARDING ATC PLANNING AND SEPARATION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.