Narrative:

After a long week of schedule changes, early callouts, near minimum rest, but great teamwork, we found ourselves (the captain, myself, and the flight engineer) in ZZZ1 ready to depart for ZZZ2. As we were getting to depart and were doing the before start checklist, we were interrupted with a last min change to the cargo weights. The lady asked if she could just initial the changes rather than having to drive all the way across the ramp to make copies, and thus ruin the on-time departure with a delay. The captain said 'ok,' and we made the changes by hand. I asked the captain what we were going to call the fuel (as the first officer in the B727, I can't see the fuel gauges) and he said '24.0...16000 pounds in the wings and 8000 pounds in the center, which I entered into the weight and balance computer. (This is my only fuel-related duty as the first officer.) I then read the weights off to the captain and then handed the computer back to the flight engineer. We then completed the required checklists and departed. Somewhere passing through FL270, the flight engineer called up front to the captain to point out a problem with the fuel. I turned all the way around to see much less fuel than I would have thought, somewhere around 10000 pounds. We were all then aware of the fact that we would not have enough fuel to make it to ZZZ2 and that we would need to divert. We all thought that ZZZ3 would be the best diversion airport and that, being on the way, returning to ZZZ1 or continuing to ZZZ2 would not be safe, prudent, or legal. The captain directed me to communicate with center on radio #1, while he communicated with the company on radio #2 through comrdo. The captain wanted to let the company know of our need to divert to ZZZ3 before I was allowed to request center for direct ZZZ3. When he got a hold of company dispatch and informed them, I was allowed to request direct ZZZ3. As we cleared now direct to ZZZ3, in a standard idle power descent straight in to runway 31, no special assistance or handling was requested or required from center or approach. As it was my leg, I landed the aircraft uneventfully and we taxied into the cargo area to wait for fuel. After we shut down, the captain found one of the culprits: the '24.0' departure fuel box had been overwritten by the flight engineer to say '13.3.' the flight engineer was very upset and apologetic as he had overwritten the departure fuel amount without realizing that it was below minimum fuel required. We all vowed to never let that happen again. From there, I continued on to ZZZ3 and then on to ZZZ1, where I was removed from flying status along with the rest of the crew. Looking back, there was little that I could have done being that first officer's just don't deal with fuel. From now on, I'm going to note it.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B727-200 FREIGHTER CREW DEPARTED WITH INSUFFICIENT FUEL. THEY DIVERTED ENRTE TO REFUEL.

Narrative: AFTER A LONG WK OF SCHEDULE CHANGES, EARLY CALLOUTS, NEAR MINIMUM REST, BUT GREAT TEAMWORK, WE FOUND OURSELVES (THE CAPT, MYSELF, AND THE FLT ENGINEER) IN ZZZ1 READY TO DEPART FOR ZZZ2. AS WE WERE GETTING TO DEPART AND WERE DOING THE BEFORE START CHKLIST, WE WERE INTERRUPTED WITH A LAST MIN CHANGE TO THE CARGO WTS. THE LADY ASKED IF SHE COULD JUST INITIAL THE CHANGES RATHER THAN HAVING TO DRIVE ALL THE WAY ACROSS THE RAMP TO MAKE COPIES, AND THUS RUIN THE ON-TIME DEP WITH A DELAY. THE CAPT SAID 'OK,' AND WE MADE THE CHANGES BY HAND. I ASKED THE CAPT WHAT WE WERE GOING TO CALL THE FUEL (AS THE FO IN THE B727, I CAN'T SEE THE FUEL GAUGES) AND HE SAID '24.0...16000 LBS IN THE WINGS AND 8000 LBS IN THE CTR, WHICH I ENTERED INTO THE WT AND BAL COMPUTER. (THIS IS MY ONLY FUEL-RELATED DUTY AS THE FO.) I THEN READ THE WTS OFF TO THE CAPT AND THEN HANDED THE COMPUTER BACK TO THE FLT ENGINEER. WE THEN COMPLETED THE REQUIRED CHKLISTS AND DEPARTED. SOMEWHERE PASSING THROUGH FL270, THE FLT ENGINEER CALLED UP FRONT TO THE CAPT TO POINT OUT A PROB WITH THE FUEL. I TURNED ALL THE WAY AROUND TO SEE MUCH LESS FUEL THAN I WOULD HAVE THOUGHT, SOMEWHERE AROUND 10000 LBS. WE WERE ALL THEN AWARE OF THE FACT THAT WE WOULD NOT HAVE ENOUGH FUEL TO MAKE IT TO ZZZ2 AND THAT WE WOULD NEED TO DIVERT. WE ALL THOUGHT THAT ZZZ3 WOULD BE THE BEST DIVERSION ARPT AND THAT, BEING ON THE WAY, RETURNING TO ZZZ1 OR CONTINUING TO ZZZ2 WOULD NOT BE SAFE, PRUDENT, OR LEGAL. THE CAPT DIRECTED ME TO COMMUNICATE WITH CTR ON RADIO #1, WHILE HE COMMUNICATED WITH THE COMPANY ON RADIO #2 THROUGH COMRDO. THE CAPT WANTED TO LET THE COMPANY KNOW OF OUR NEED TO DIVERT TO ZZZ3 BEFORE I WAS ALLOWED TO REQUEST CTR FOR DIRECT ZZZ3. WHEN HE GOT A HOLD OF COMPANY DISPATCH AND INFORMED THEM, I WAS ALLOWED TO REQUEST DIRECT ZZZ3. AS WE CLRED NOW DIRECT TO ZZZ3, IN A STANDARD IDLE PWR DSCNT STRAIGHT IN TO RWY 31, NO SPECIAL ASSISTANCE OR HANDLING WAS REQUESTED OR REQUIRED FROM CTR OR APCH. AS IT WAS MY LEG, I LANDED THE ACFT UNEVENTFULLY AND WE TAXIED INTO THE CARGO AREA TO WAIT FOR FUEL. AFTER WE SHUT DOWN, THE CAPT FOUND ONE OF THE CULPRITS: THE '24.0' DEP FUEL BOX HAD BEEN OVERWRITTEN BY THE FLT ENGINEER TO SAY '13.3.' THE FLT ENGINEER WAS VERY UPSET AND APOLOGETIC AS HE HAD OVERWRITTEN THE DEP FUEL AMOUNT WITHOUT REALIZING THAT IT WAS BELOW MINIMUM FUEL REQUIRED. WE ALL VOWED TO NEVER LET THAT HAPPEN AGAIN. FROM THERE, I CONTINUED ON TO ZZZ3 AND THEN ON TO ZZZ1, WHERE I WAS REMOVED FROM FLYING STATUS ALONG WITH THE REST OF THE CREW. LOOKING BACK, THERE WAS LITTLE THAT I COULD HAVE DONE BEING THAT FO'S JUST DON'T DEAL WITH FUEL. FROM NOW ON, I'M GOING TO NOTE IT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.