Narrative:

We performed a rolling VFR takeoff on runway 35 departing ZZZ1 to ZZZ2. The captain was flying. During throttle up, the #2 N1 and torque was slow/lagging in setting takeoff power. It reached the required torque with a noticeable split in the power levers. We climbed to 400 ft AGL normally. At or just after 400 ft AGL, the aircraft started yawing to the right and the crew noticed the #2 N1 and torque were slowly spooling down. Around 1000 ft AGL, the #2 engine started going into and out of autofeather. The crew decided to perform the 'engine fire or failure in flight' checklist and proceeded to shut down the #2 engine. We climbed to pattern altitude and flew left traffic. The captain was talking on the #1 radio to traffic while the first officer went through the checklists and talked to company. The captain advised unicom of the situation and asked them to call the fire department. We flew left traffic pattern at altitude 2 times to go through all the checklists. During the third pattern we confirmed the fire trucks were standing by, extended left downwind and set up for a long final. The landing was normal, determined that an emergency evacuate/evacuation was not needed, relayed that intention over CTAF/unicom (which the rescue vehicles were monitoring), rolled to the end of runway 35 and taxied off the runway. We then shut down and secured the cockpit and called unicom for a tug. The fire trucks stayed with the aircraft until we were parked at the terminal. I let the CRM break down. The first officer thought I was just returning for an immediate landing. I should have stated my intentions to fly in the pattern until we got everything done. That may have slowed things down a bit. We did do a good job of assuming a role. Example: captain talking on 1/CTAF, first officer doing checklists and calling company. It has now been a few days since the incident. A couple of mechanics came to ZZZ1 to fix the aircraft and they ran the engine using performance standards. Everything seemed to be almost perfect. However, during the ferry flight from ZZZ1 to ZZZ2, we got the #2 engine to go into an endless autofeather cycle by bringing the power back and then throttling back up again. The #2 engine also went into an autofeather cycle (in/out of autofeather in rapid succession) on short final into ZZZ2. We turned off the autofeather system and landed normally. Most autofeather checks on the ground checked fine. We did get it to go into a cycle once. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated the cycling continued until the engine was shut down. The reporter said an emergency was declared and the checklist was completed and the landing was uneventful. The reporter stated the only work performed on the engine was an engine driven fuel pump and the engine fuel control unit. The reporter said the airplane is not fixed but has not flown the airplane since the engine shut down. The reporter stated the airplane sits out on the line but is not flown.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A BE1900 ON CLBOUT BTWN 400-1000 FT DECLARED AN EMER AND RETURNED TO ARPT DUE TO THE R ENG LOST PWR AND THE ENG BEGAN GOING INTO AND OUT OF AUTOFEATHER.

Narrative: WE PERFORMED A ROLLING VFR TKOF ON RWY 35 DEPARTING ZZZ1 TO ZZZ2. THE CAPT WAS FLYING. DURING THROTTLE UP, THE #2 N1 AND TORQUE WAS SLOW/LAGGING IN SETTING TKOF PWR. IT REACHED THE REQUIRED TORQUE WITH A NOTICEABLE SPLIT IN THE PWR LEVERS. WE CLBED TO 400 FT AGL NORMALLY. AT OR JUST AFTER 400 FT AGL, THE ACFT STARTED YAWING TO THE R AND THE CREW NOTICED THE #2 N1 AND TORQUE WERE SLOWLY SPOOLING DOWN. AROUND 1000 FT AGL, THE #2 ENG STARTED GOING INTO AND OUT OF AUTOFEATHER. THE CREW DECIDED TO PERFORM THE 'ENG FIRE OR FAILURE IN FLT' CHKLIST AND PROCEEDED TO SHUT DOWN THE #2 ENG. WE CLBED TO PATTERN ALT AND FLEW L TFC. THE CAPT WAS TALKING ON THE #1 RADIO TO TFC WHILE THE FO WENT THROUGH THE CHKLISTS AND TALKED TO COMPANY. THE CAPT ADVISED UNICOM OF THE SIT AND ASKED THEM TO CALL THE FIRE DEPT. WE FLEW L TFC PATTERN AT ALT 2 TIMES TO GO THROUGH ALL THE CHKLISTS. DURING THE THIRD PATTERN WE CONFIRMED THE FIRE TRUCKS WERE STANDING BY, EXTENDED L DOWNWIND AND SET UP FOR A LONG FINAL. THE LNDG WAS NORMAL, DETERMINED THAT AN EMER EVAC WAS NOT NEEDED, RELAYED THAT INTENTION OVER CTAF/UNICOM (WHICH THE RESCUE VEHICLES WERE MONITORING), ROLLED TO THE END OF RWY 35 AND TAXIED OFF THE RWY. WE THEN SHUT DOWN AND SECURED THE COCKPIT AND CALLED UNICOM FOR A TUG. THE FIRE TRUCKS STAYED WITH THE ACFT UNTIL WE WERE PARKED AT THE TERMINAL. I LET THE CRM BREAK DOWN. THE FO THOUGHT I WAS JUST RETURNING FOR AN IMMEDIATE LNDG. I SHOULD HAVE STATED MY INTENTIONS TO FLY IN THE PATTERN UNTIL WE GOT EVERYTHING DONE. THAT MAY HAVE SLOWED THINGS DOWN A BIT. WE DID DO A GOOD JOB OF ASSUMING A ROLE. EXAMPLE: CAPT TALKING ON 1/CTAF, FO DOING CHKLISTS AND CALLING COMPANY. IT HAS NOW BEEN A FEW DAYS SINCE THE INCIDENT. A COUPLE OF MECHS CAME TO ZZZ1 TO FIX THE ACFT AND THEY RAN THE ENG USING PERFORMANCE STANDARDS. EVERYTHING SEEMED TO BE ALMOST PERFECT. HOWEVER, DURING THE FERRY FLT FROM ZZZ1 TO ZZZ2, WE GOT THE #2 ENG TO GO INTO AN ENDLESS AUTOFEATHER CYCLE BY BRINGING THE PWR BACK AND THEN THROTTLING BACK UP AGAIN. THE #2 ENG ALSO WENT INTO AN AUTOFEATHER CYCLE (IN/OUT OF AUTOFEATHER IN RAPID SUCCESSION) ON SHORT FINAL INTO ZZZ2. WE TURNED OFF THE AUTOFEATHER SYS AND LANDED NORMALLY. MOST AUTOFEATHER CHKS ON THE GND CHKED FINE. WE DID GET IT TO GO INTO A CYCLE ONCE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE CYCLING CONTINUED UNTIL THE ENG WAS SHUT DOWN. THE RPTR SAID AN EMER WAS DECLARED AND THE CHKLIST WAS COMPLETED AND THE LNDG WAS UNEVENTFUL. THE RPTR STATED THE ONLY WORK PERFORMED ON THE ENG WAS AN ENG DRIVEN FUEL PUMP AND THE ENG FUEL CTL UNIT. THE RPTR SAID THE AIRPLANE IS NOT FIXED BUT HAS NOT FLOWN THE AIRPLANE SINCE THE ENG SHUT DOWN. THE RPTR STATED THE AIRPLANE SITS OUT ON THE LINE BUT IS NOT FLOWN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.