Narrative:

Sav ATIS/ASOS were not available. During taxi out, we became aware that the controller on duty was working ground, clearance, tower, approach and departure -- all on different frequencys. We were cleared to 10000 ft. After takeoff, at approximately 3500 ft, we were instructed to stop climb at 4000 ft. We promptly leveled off and the captain pointed out the traffic at 10 O'clock position and 2000 ft above. I confirmed that I had traffic in sight and we observed that traffic appeared to be on a parallel course. The captain called traffic in sight and ATC asked if we could maintain visual separation. I agreed with the captain that we could and we began the climb. In the climb pitch attitude, I could no longer see the aircraft, but the captain was closely watching it. At approximately 5500 ft, ATC asked 'are you sure you have traffic in sight? He's pretty worried.' a moment later he added 'you guys are in conflict.' at the same time the TCAS generated an RA. It commanded a descent. Since I did not have the other aircraft in sight, I immediately reduced thrust to idle and followed the TCAS guidance for a 1500-2000 FPM descent. I also turned slightly right of course away from the other aircraft. While I was complying with the RA, the captain (who still had the other aircraft in sight) observed that aircraft begin a steep descent which would put us back in conflict. He then commanded 'climb, climb!' since this instruction conflicted with the RA and I could not see the other aircraft, I offered a xfer of control. Captain took control of the aircraft, began a climb and we cleared the conflict. Factors affecting: night, high controller workload, other aircraft appeared to not have TCAS, therefore his evasive maneuver actually worsened the situation. Since both of us were on different frequencys we could not hear each other communicate either. In the future, I am unlikely to accept a clearance to remain visual and climb or descend at night. This also displayed a potential fault in the TCAS since RA's may be inaccurate when used to avoid non-TCAS equipped aircraft who are also taking evasive action. There were a number of links in the chain of events leading to this event. In the end, the captain's willingness to take control, disregard the TCAS and maneuver us out of danger saved us. I believe that the controller did a dis-service by even offering a climb to 2 aircraft who were on conflicting courses. His workload (at least 5 separate frequencys) contributed to the incident. Supplemental information from acn 631118: during our climb we received an RA to descend. The first officer was flying and had lost contact with the aircraft and started to descend. I had the aircraft in sight and it looked to me that we would remain clear if we continued the climb.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CARJ RECEIVES A TCAS RA TO AVOID TFC THAT THE CAPT, PNF HAS A VISUAL ON. THE CAPT TAKES OVER AND INITIATES A CLB TO AVOID THE VISUAL TFC.

Narrative: SAV ATIS/ASOS WERE NOT AVAILABLE. DURING TAXI OUT, WE BECAME AWARE THAT THE CTLR ON DUTY WAS WORKING GND, CLRNC, TWR, APCH AND DEP -- ALL ON DIFFERENT FREQS. WE WERE CLRED TO 10000 FT. AFTER TKOF, AT APPROX 3500 FT, WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO STOP CLB AT 4000 FT. WE PROMPTLY LEVELED OFF AND THE CAPT POINTED OUT THE TFC AT 10 O'CLOCK POS AND 2000 FT ABOVE. I CONFIRMED THAT I HAD TFC IN SIGHT AND WE OBSERVED THAT TFC APPEARED TO BE ON A PARALLEL COURSE. THE CAPT CALLED TFC IN SIGHT AND ATC ASKED IF WE COULD MAINTAIN VISUAL SEPARATION. I AGREED WITH THE CAPT THAT WE COULD AND WE BEGAN THE CLB. IN THE CLB PITCH ATTITUDE, I COULD NO LONGER SEE THE ACFT, BUT THE CAPT WAS CLOSELY WATCHING IT. AT APPROX 5500 FT, ATC ASKED 'ARE YOU SURE YOU HAVE TFC IN SIGHT? HE'S PRETTY WORRIED.' A MOMENT LATER HE ADDED 'YOU GUYS ARE IN CONFLICT.' AT THE SAME TIME THE TCAS GENERATED AN RA. IT COMMANDED A DSCNT. SINCE I DID NOT HAVE THE OTHER ACFT IN SIGHT, I IMMEDIATELY REDUCED THRUST TO IDLE AND FOLLOWED THE TCAS GUIDANCE FOR A 1500-2000 FPM DSCNT. I ALSO TURNED SLIGHTLY R OF COURSE AWAY FROM THE OTHER ACFT. WHILE I WAS COMPLYING WITH THE RA, THE CAPT (WHO STILL HAD THE OTHER ACFT IN SIGHT) OBSERVED THAT ACFT BEGIN A STEEP DSCNT WHICH WOULD PUT US BACK IN CONFLICT. HE THEN COMMANDED 'CLB, CLB!' SINCE THIS INSTRUCTION CONFLICTED WITH THE RA AND I COULD NOT SEE THE OTHER ACFT, I OFFERED A XFER OF CTL. CAPT TOOK CTL OF THE ACFT, BEGAN A CLB AND WE CLRED THE CONFLICT. FACTORS AFFECTING: NIGHT, HIGH CTLR WORKLOAD, OTHER ACFT APPEARED TO NOT HAVE TCAS, THEREFORE HIS EVASIVE MANEUVER ACTUALLY WORSENED THE SIT. SINCE BOTH OF US WERE ON DIFFERENT FREQS WE COULD NOT HEAR EACH OTHER COMMUNICATE EITHER. IN THE FUTURE, I AM UNLIKELY TO ACCEPT A CLRNC TO REMAIN VISUAL AND CLB OR DSND AT NIGHT. THIS ALSO DISPLAYED A POTENTIAL FAULT IN THE TCAS SINCE RA'S MAY BE INACCURATE WHEN USED TO AVOID NON-TCAS EQUIPPED ACFT WHO ARE ALSO TAKING EVASIVE ACTION. THERE WERE A NUMBER OF LINKS IN THE CHAIN OF EVENTS LEADING TO THIS EVENT. IN THE END, THE CAPT'S WILLINGNESS TO TAKE CTL, DISREGARD THE TCAS AND MANEUVER US OUT OF DANGER SAVED US. I BELIEVE THAT THE CTLR DID A DIS-SVC BY EVEN OFFERING A CLB TO 2 ACFT WHO WERE ON CONFLICTING COURSES. HIS WORKLOAD (AT LEAST 5 SEPARATE FREQS) CONTRIBUTED TO THE INCIDENT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 631118: DURING OUR CLB WE RECEIVED AN RA TO DSND. THE FO WAS FLYING AND HAD LOST CONTACT WITH THE ACFT AND STARTED TO DSND. I HAD THE ACFT IN SIGHT AND IT LOOKED TO ME THAT WE WOULD REMAIN CLR IF WE CONTINUED THE CLB.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.