Narrative:

We were cleared for the VOR runway 5 approach by myr approach control. Within 10 mi that approach allows you to descend to 700 ft. We broke out of the overcast in a descent with some limited forward visibility only to see a banner towing aircraft crossing our approach path ahead and what appeared to be just below current altitude. A little more descent rate and a few seconds sooner and we would have hit the banner towing aircraft. At least 3 banner towing aircraft were in the air traffic area at that time. We were advised by the tower that they had been VFR all day and nothing unusual by their standards existed. We were not advised nor were there any NOTAMS out concerning banner operations. They apparently have certain altitude limitations and are supposed to avoid the approach path to runway 5. We were advised that not all of them have radio and/or transponder capability. This particular aircraft was in full view of the tower yet we were not advised. We do not know if he had radio or transponder. The tower was indifferent to the situation but radar controller was very concerned but had no way of providing assistance. We spoke to the 'approach' facility on departure a few mins later. We do not know if it was the same individual during the approach. The other aircraft position should have resulted in our missed approach had we been advised that he was apparently not where he was supposed to be. Local 'procedures' were narrated to us after we expressed concern. Not included in those were any coordination between the tower and approach control. Nothing is established, per the approach control, that would provide transition/coordination/advisory between IFR and VFR operations. More positive control of the VFR operations should be affected. IFR aircraft should be advised. Violations of the approach path should be dealt with by cre tower. We feel it was the tower's responsibility to provide our separation from the participating VFR operations. Departures/arrs could have been suspended during the IFR approach. The 700 ft MSL MDA seems to result in overlap with existing VFR procedures. We have not seen those procedures in writing so it is hard to understand how we were supposed to avoid conflict. Potential disaster was frightening and a startling surprise. We are concerned that the tower controller seemed complacent to the situation. The controllers should have been more in control of the air traffic area. Perhaps the lack of IFR/VFR coordination procedures prevented them from expressing any concern but that was in stark contrast to the radar controller. He welcomed the NASA report to help prevent a catastrophe.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN IMC BE9L ON A VOR APCH IN CLASS D AIRSPACE BROKE OUT AT 1000 FT TO CONFLICT WITH A BANNER TOWING ACFT. NO TA WAS GIVEN.

Narrative: WE WERE CLRED FOR THE VOR RWY 5 APCH BY MYR APCH CTL. WITHIN 10 MI THAT APCH ALLOWS YOU TO DSND TO 700 FT. WE BROKE OUT OF THE OVCST IN A DSCNT WITH SOME LIMITED FORWARD VISIBILITY ONLY TO SEE A BANNER TOWING ACFT XING OUR APCH PATH AHEAD AND WHAT APPEARED TO BE JUST BELOW CURRENT ALT. A LITTLE MORE DSCNT RATE AND A FEW SECONDS SOONER AND WE WOULD HAVE HIT THE BANNER TOWING ACFT. AT LEAST 3 BANNER TOWING ACFT WERE IN THE ATA AT THAT TIME. WE WERE ADVISED BY THE TWR THAT THEY HAD BEEN VFR ALL DAY AND NOTHING UNUSUAL BY THEIR STANDARDS EXISTED. WE WERE NOT ADVISED NOR WERE THERE ANY NOTAMS OUT CONCERNING BANNER OPS. THEY APPARENTLY HAVE CERTAIN ALT LIMITATIONS AND ARE SUPPOSED TO AVOID THE APCH PATH TO RWY 5. WE WERE ADVISED THAT NOT ALL OF THEM HAVE RADIO AND/OR XPONDER CAPABILITY. THIS PARTICULAR ACFT WAS IN FULL VIEW OF THE TWR YET WE WERE NOT ADVISED. WE DO NOT KNOW IF HE HAD RADIO OR XPONDER. THE TWR WAS INDIFFERENT TO THE SIT BUT RADAR CTLR WAS VERY CONCERNED BUT HAD NO WAY OF PROVIDING ASSISTANCE. WE SPOKE TO THE 'APCH' FACILITY ON DEP A FEW MINS LATER. WE DO NOT KNOW IF IT WAS THE SAME INDIVIDUAL DURING THE APCH. THE OTHER ACFT POS SHOULD HAVE RESULTED IN OUR MISSED APCH HAD WE BEEN ADVISED THAT HE WAS APPARENTLY NOT WHERE HE WAS SUPPOSED TO BE. LCL 'PROCS' WERE NARRATED TO US AFTER WE EXPRESSED CONCERN. NOT INCLUDED IN THOSE WERE ANY COORD BTWN THE TWR AND APCH CTL. NOTHING IS ESTABLISHED, PER THE APCH CTL, THAT WOULD PROVIDE TRANSITION/COORD/ADVISORY BTWN IFR AND VFR OPS. MORE POSITIVE CTL OF THE VFR OPS SHOULD BE AFFECTED. IFR ACFT SHOULD BE ADVISED. VIOLATIONS OF THE APCH PATH SHOULD BE DEALT WITH BY CRE TWR. WE FEEL IT WAS THE TWR'S RESPONSIBILITY TO PROVIDE OUR SEPARATION FROM THE PARTICIPATING VFR OPS. DEPS/ARRS COULD HAVE BEEN SUSPENDED DURING THE IFR APCH. THE 700 FT MSL MDA SEEMS TO RESULT IN OVERLAP WITH EXISTING VFR PROCS. WE HAVE NOT SEEN THOSE PROCS IN WRITING SO IT IS HARD TO UNDERSTAND HOW WE WERE SUPPOSED TO AVOID CONFLICT. POTENTIAL DISASTER WAS FRIGHTENING AND A STARTLING SURPRISE. WE ARE CONCERNED THAT THE TWR CTLR SEEMED COMPLACENT TO THE SIT. THE CTLRS SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE IN CTL OF THE ATA. PERHAPS THE LACK OF IFR/VFR COORD PROCS PREVENTED THEM FROM EXPRESSING ANY CONCERN BUT THAT WAS IN STARK CONTRAST TO THE RADAR CTLR. HE WELCOMED THE NASA RPT TO HELP PREVENT A CATASTROPHE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.