Narrative:

About 40 mins prior to departure, the gate agent (mty) approached me to inform our crew that the aircraft had to be moved from the GA ramp to gate X. I asked the gate agent if we were to taxi ourselves or to be towed. We were already hooked up. He spoke some english and responded 'towed.' I then tried to coordination with the tug driver who spoke no english. I thought 1 of 2 things was happening regarding this tow: 1) the ramp crew and ground control had an arrangement for the movement of the aircraft. 2) the ramp agent (tug driver) would use and understand hand signals. I entered aircraft and just finished the flight compartment's safety inspection and security checks. At this point the aircraft's parking brakes were not engaged. We closed the door (passenger) and the tug driver drove off with us in tow. We tried to contact ground control in time but the tug driver had entered an active taxiway. The ground frequency was also busy. The first taxiway was taxiway D. The tug driver seemed to plan a turn onto taxiway B, another into the gate area. There was an air carrier Y MD80 that had to give way to our tug and aircraft on taxiway B. We later talked to ground control and he told us there was no pre-arrangement for the aircraft movement. He also thought the air carrier Y pilot would file a complaint. The only person around who spoke english was the gate agent. I informed him of the entire situation. He said he would talk to the tug driver. The tug driver had his back turned to us during towing. He could not see the landing light flash even if he knew what it meant. He did point to the air carrier Y MD80 just before our turn onto taxiway B and just after taxiway B. We were towing the aircraft without a brake release signal and parked without a brake set signal. I should have coordination better with the driver through the ramp agent although the language barrier was still substantial. The tug driver must realize that he must coordination with the person riding the brakes and not enter an active taxiway without clearance. There was no headset around. We could have an english speaking operator on a headset for better communication. If all else failed, we could have taxied ourselves which in this case would have been easier and safer. Supplemental information from acn 629706: we attempted to contact ground control at that time, but were unable to reach the controller due to frequency congestion. Additionally, we were not able to understand anything being communicated on the frequency since all conversation with other aircraft was in spanish. When the tug driver failed to stop prior to transitioning taxiway B, we assumed that a procedure existed locally at monterey in which aircraft could be repositioned in this manner without a specific ATC clearance. Our tug driver had effectively 'cut him off' and the MD80 had to stop in order to avoid taxiing into us. We immediately contacted ground control to let him know that we were not in communication with our tug driver and that we would be out of the way momentarily. When I contacted ground control approximately 10 mins later to pick up a clearance, he informed us that in the future we needed a clearance prior to transitioning of taxiway B. My recommendations to prevent another such incident are as follows: 1) have crews repos aircraft under its own power from remote pulling to the terminal area. 2) ensure that all personnel involved in handing aircraft are familiar with proper internationally accepted standards for handling such an aircraft, such as runway signs and markings, ATC procedures, and standard hand signals.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CL65 FLT CREW COMES IN CONFLICT WITH AN MD80 WHILE UNDER TOW. THEY HAD NO COM WITH TUG DRIVER, AND NO ATC CLRNC.

Narrative: ABOUT 40 MINS PRIOR TO DEP, THE GATE AGENT (MTY) APCHED ME TO INFORM OUR CREW THAT THE ACFT HAD TO BE MOVED FROM THE GA RAMP TO GATE X. I ASKED THE GATE AGENT IF WE WERE TO TAXI OURSELVES OR TO BE TOWED. WE WERE ALREADY HOOKED UP. HE SPOKE SOME ENGLISH AND RESPONDED 'TOWED.' I THEN TRIED TO COORD WITH THE TUG DRIVER WHO SPOKE NO ENGLISH. I THOUGHT 1 OF 2 THINGS WAS HAPPENING REGARDING THIS TOW: 1) THE RAMP CREW AND GND CTL HAD AN ARRANGEMENT FOR THE MOVEMENT OF THE ACFT. 2) THE RAMP AGENT (TUG DRIVER) WOULD USE AND UNDERSTAND HAND SIGNALS. I ENTERED ACFT AND JUST FINISHED THE FLT COMPARTMENT'S SAFETY INSPECTION AND SECURITY CHKS. AT THIS POINT THE ACFT'S PARKING BRAKES WERE NOT ENGAGED. WE CLOSED THE DOOR (PAX) AND THE TUG DRIVER DROVE OFF WITH US IN TOW. WE TRIED TO CONTACT GND CTL IN TIME BUT THE TUG DRIVER HAD ENTERED AN ACTIVE TXWY. THE GND FREQ WAS ALSO BUSY. THE FIRST TXWY WAS TXWY D. THE TUG DRIVER SEEMED TO PLAN A TURN ONTO TXWY B, ANOTHER INTO THE GATE AREA. THERE WAS AN ACR Y MD80 THAT HAD TO GIVE WAY TO OUR TUG AND ACFT ON TXWY B. WE LATER TALKED TO GND CTL AND HE TOLD US THERE WAS NO PRE-ARRANGEMENT FOR THE ACFT MOVEMENT. HE ALSO THOUGHT THE ACR Y PLT WOULD FILE A COMPLAINT. THE ONLY PERSON AROUND WHO SPOKE ENGLISH WAS THE GATE AGENT. I INFORMED HIM OF THE ENTIRE SIT. HE SAID HE WOULD TALK TO THE TUG DRIVER. THE TUG DRIVER HAD HIS BACK TURNED TO US DURING TOWING. HE COULD NOT SEE THE LNDG LIGHT FLASH EVEN IF HE KNEW WHAT IT MEANT. HE DID POINT TO THE ACR Y MD80 JUST BEFORE OUR TURN ONTO TXWY B AND JUST AFTER TXWY B. WE WERE TOWING THE ACFT WITHOUT A BRAKE RELEASE SIGNAL AND PARKED WITHOUT A BRAKE SET SIGNAL. I SHOULD HAVE COORD BETTER WITH THE DRIVER THROUGH THE RAMP AGENT ALTHOUGH THE LANGUAGE BARRIER WAS STILL SUBSTANTIAL. THE TUG DRIVER MUST REALIZE THAT HE MUST COORD WITH THE PERSON RIDING THE BRAKES AND NOT ENTER AN ACTIVE TXWY WITHOUT CLRNC. THERE WAS NO HEADSET AROUND. WE COULD HAVE AN ENGLISH SPEAKING OPERATOR ON A HEADSET FOR BETTER COM. IF ALL ELSE FAILED, WE COULD HAVE TAXIED OURSELVES WHICH IN THIS CASE WOULD HAVE BEEN EASIER AND SAFER. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 629706: WE ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT GND CTL AT THAT TIME, BUT WERE UNABLE TO REACH THE CTLR DUE TO FREQ CONGESTION. ADDITIONALLY, WE WERE NOT ABLE TO UNDERSTAND ANYTHING BEING COMMUNICATED ON THE FREQ SINCE ALL CONVERSATION WITH OTHER ACFT WAS IN SPANISH. WHEN THE TUG DRIVER FAILED TO STOP PRIOR TO TRANSITIONING TXWY B, WE ASSUMED THAT A PROC EXISTED LOCALLY AT MONTEREY IN WHICH ACFT COULD BE REPOSITIONED IN THIS MANNER WITHOUT A SPECIFIC ATC CLRNC. OUR TUG DRIVER HAD EFFECTIVELY 'CUT HIM OFF' AND THE MD80 HAD TO STOP IN ORDER TO AVOID TAXIING INTO US. WE IMMEDIATELY CONTACTED GND CTL TO LET HIM KNOW THAT WE WERE NOT IN COM WITH OUR TUG DRIVER AND THAT WE WOULD BE OUT OF THE WAY MOMENTARILY. WHEN I CONTACTED GND CTL APPROX 10 MINS LATER TO PICK UP A CLRNC, HE INFORMED US THAT IN THE FUTURE WE NEEDED A CLRNC PRIOR TO TRANSITIONING OF TXWY B. MY RECOMMENDATIONS TO PREVENT ANOTHER SUCH INCIDENT ARE AS FOLLOWS: 1) HAVE CREWS REPOS ACFT UNDER ITS OWN PWR FROM REMOTE PULLING TO THE TERMINAL AREA. 2) ENSURE THAT ALL PERSONNEL INVOLVED IN HANDING ACFT ARE FAMILIAR WITH PROPER INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTED STANDARDS FOR HANDLING SUCH AN ACFT, SUCH AS RWY SIGNS AND MARKINGS, ATC PROCS, AND STANDARD HAND SIGNALS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.