Narrative:

I mention this event because I believe air traffic mgrs had other options available and (or) they should have taken steps to make other options available -- such as establishing alternate missed approach procedures. (Which they did at rog and asg airports.) the event: the aircraft had been cleared for ILS/DME runway 34 approach by fsm (razorback approach, fort smith, ar). The surface winds at the time I issued the landing clearance were 130 degrees at 10 KTS. The aircraft requested to circle to runway 16 and I issued a clearance to land runway 16. About 4 mi north of the airport the aircraft lost sight of the runway and executed a missed approach. The situation: although the winds favored landing runway 16 the ILS/DME runway 16 approach was not available because the published missed approach procedure was not available. (The missed approach required use of the rzc VORTAC which was OTS -- and had been inoperative since mid-july 2004.) surface winds between XA00 and XD00 were generally 120-150 degrees at 8 KTS. The ILS/DME runway 16 was turned off per FAA instructions -- it was operable and I had control to turn it on, but could not because of FAA's instructions. Based on radar and PIREPS the winds aloft were from the south at about 25 KTS. During the evening about 10 scheduled air carrier aircraft landed on runway 34 because there was no approach to runway 16 available to the pilots of those aircraft. (None of these pilots could or would accept the GPS runway 16 approach.) xna airport had been without an ILS approach to runway 16 for about 3 weeks -- the fdc NOTAM showed the approach 'procedure' not available. It is difficult for me to accept that requiring aircraft to land downwind or circle to land with low ceilings and visibilities is safer than issuing alternate missed approach instructions -- such as radar vectors or using another NAVAID (such as dak VORTAC). Summary: the FAA shut-down one of the ILS/DME runway 16 approachs to xna airport which was not in the best interest of aviation safety. First, 95% of the aircraft flying into xna have GPS or other navigational capability and could have flown the published missed approach without a signal from rzc VORTAC. Second, xna is under the razorback approach control and has radar coverage to the surface at the airport so alternate missed approach procedures could have been issued by ATC during approach/tower operations. Third, the FAA issued alternate missed approach procedures of the ILS runway 19 approach to rog and the ILS runway 18 to asg -- seems like they could have done the same at xna.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: XNA LCL CTLR EXPRESSED CONCERN REGARDING LACK OF PLANNED ALTERNATE MISSED APCH PROCS DURING SCHEDULE NAVAID OUTAGE.

Narrative: I MENTION THIS EVENT BECAUSE I BELIEVE AIR TFC MGRS HAD OTHER OPTIONS AVAILABLE AND (OR) THEY SHOULD HAVE TAKEN STEPS TO MAKE OTHER OPTIONS AVAILABLE -- SUCH AS ESTABLISHING ALTERNATE MISSED APCH PROCS. (WHICH THEY DID AT ROG AND ASG ARPTS.) THE EVENT: THE ACFT HAD BEEN CLRED FOR ILS/DME RWY 34 APCH BY FSM (RAZORBACK APCH, FORT SMITH, AR). THE SURFACE WINDS AT THE TIME I ISSUED THE LNDG CLRNC WERE 130 DEGS AT 10 KTS. THE ACFT REQUESTED TO CIRCLE TO RWY 16 AND I ISSUED A CLRNC TO LAND RWY 16. ABOUT 4 MI N OF THE ARPT THE ACFT LOST SIGHT OF THE RWY AND EXECUTED A MISSED APCH. THE SIT: ALTHOUGH THE WINDS FAVORED LNDG RWY 16 THE ILS/DME RWY 16 APCH WAS NOT AVAILABLE BECAUSE THE PUBLISHED MISSED APCH PROC WAS NOT AVAILABLE. (THE MISSED APCH REQUIRED USE OF THE RZC VORTAC WHICH WAS OTS -- AND HAD BEEN INOP SINCE MID-JULY 2004.) SURFACE WINDS BTWN XA00 AND XD00 WERE GENERALLY 120-150 DEGS AT 8 KTS. THE ILS/DME RWY 16 WAS TURNED OFF PER FAA INSTRUCTIONS -- IT WAS OPERABLE AND I HAD CTL TO TURN IT ON, BUT COULD NOT BECAUSE OF FAA'S INSTRUCTIONS. BASED ON RADAR AND PIREPS THE WINDS ALOFT WERE FROM THE S AT ABOUT 25 KTS. DURING THE EVENING ABOUT 10 SCHEDULED ACR ACFT LANDED ON RWY 34 BECAUSE THERE WAS NO APCH TO RWY 16 AVAILABLE TO THE PLTS OF THOSE ACFT. (NONE OF THESE PLTS COULD OR WOULD ACCEPT THE GPS RWY 16 APCH.) XNA ARPT HAD BEEN WITHOUT AN ILS APCH TO RWY 16 FOR ABOUT 3 WKS -- THE FDC NOTAM SHOWED THE APCH 'PROC' NOT AVAILABLE. IT IS DIFFICULT FOR ME TO ACCEPT THAT REQUIRING ACFT TO LAND DOWNWIND OR CIRCLE TO LAND WITH LOW CEILINGS AND VISIBILITIES IS SAFER THAN ISSUING ALTERNATE MISSED APCH INSTRUCTIONS -- SUCH AS RADAR VECTORS OR USING ANOTHER NAVAID (SUCH AS DAK VORTAC). SUMMARY: THE FAA SHUT-DOWN ONE OF THE ILS/DME RWY 16 APCHS TO XNA ARPT WHICH WAS NOT IN THE BEST INTEREST OF AVIATION SAFETY. FIRST, 95% OF THE ACFT FLYING INTO XNA HAVE GPS OR OTHER NAVIGATIONAL CAPABILITY AND COULD HAVE FLOWN THE PUBLISHED MISSED APCH WITHOUT A SIGNAL FROM RZC VORTAC. SECOND, XNA IS UNDER THE RAZORBACK APCH CTL AND HAS RADAR COVERAGE TO THE SURFACE AT THE ARPT SO ALTERNATE MISSED APCH PROCS COULD HAVE BEEN ISSUED BY ATC DURING APCH/TWR OPS. THIRD, THE FAA ISSUED ALTERNATE MISSED APCH PROCS OF THE ILS RWY 19 APCH TO ROG AND THE ILS RWY 18 TO ASG -- SEEMS LIKE THEY COULD HAVE DONE THE SAME AT XNA.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.