Narrative:

On preflight noted the stabilizer tail cone fairing rubbing on the left side of the rudder fairing. It appeared that the stabilizer fairing was mounted off center toward the right side. The stabilizer fairing moves up and down while we trim. From that motion, it appeared to have worn through the paint and primer on the rudder fairing. This is a great safety concern, due to the weak trim actuator. After takeoff the actuator is going to have to work against not only the air load, but also the forces created from friction. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter advised that the aircraft in question was removed from service and had the fairing realigned and refinished. He elaborated on the frequency of this type of problem with this fleet. In addition, he advised that the fleet has had an ongoing problem with insufficient actuator authority to overcome air loads if the aircraft is not kept aggressively in pitch trim after takeoff. Their company flight manual, in fact, has a limitation that the aircraft must be trimmed prior to 160 KTS after takeoff to preclude the possibility of an inability to trim after that point. He understands an air worthiness directive was issued on this problem. He reinforced his belief that inattention to additional sources of drag on the actuator such as noted in this report might well produce loads which the actuator is incapable of overcoming.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PLT OF AN EMB145 NOTED ABRASIONS OF THE PAINT AND PRIMER BETWEEN THE TRIMABLE STABILIZER AND THE STABILIZER FAIRING. PLT IS CONCERNED THAT THE ADDITIONAL DRAG OF SUCH FRICTION COUPLED WITH AIR LOADS MIGHT RENDER THE STABILIZER INCAPABLE OF TRIMMING.

Narrative: ON PREFLT NOTED THE STABILIZER TAIL CONE FAIRING RUBBING ON THE L SIDE OF THE RUDDER FAIRING. IT APPEARED THAT THE STABILIZER FAIRING WAS MOUNTED OFF CTR TOWARD THE R SIDE. THE STABILIZER FAIRING MOVES UP AND DOWN WHILE WE TRIM. FROM THAT MOTION, IT APPEARED TO HAVE WORN THROUGH THE PAINT AND PRIMER ON THE RUDDER FAIRING. THIS IS A GREAT SAFETY CONCERN, DUE TO THE WEAK TRIM ACTUATOR. AFTER TKOF THE ACTUATOR IS GOING TO HAVE TO WORK AGAINST NOT ONLY THE AIR LOAD, BUT ALSO THE FORCES CREATED FROM FRICTION. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR ADVISED THAT THE ACFT IN QUESTION WAS REMOVED FROM SVC AND HAD THE FAIRING REALIGNED AND REFINISHED. HE ELABORATED ON THE FREQUENCY OF THIS TYPE OF PROB WITH THIS FLEET. IN ADDITION, HE ADVISED THAT THE FLEET HAS HAD AN ONGOING PROB WITH INSUFFICIENT ACTUATOR AUTHORITY TO OVERCOME AIR LOADS IF THE ACFT IS NOT KEPT AGGRESSIVELY IN PITCH TRIM AFTER TKOF. THEIR COMPANY FLT MANUAL, IN FACT, HAS A LIMITATION THAT THE ACFT MUST BE TRIMMED PRIOR TO 160 KTS AFTER TKOF TO PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF AN INABILITY TO TRIM AFTER THAT POINT. HE UNDERSTANDS AN AIR WORTHINESS DIRECTIVE WAS ISSUED ON THIS PROB. HE REINFORCED HIS BELIEF THAT INATTENTION TO ADDITIONAL SOURCES OF DRAG ON THE ACTUATOR SUCH AS NOTED IN THIS REPORT MIGHT WELL PRODUCE LOADS WHICH THE ACTUATOR IS INCAPABLE OF OVERCOMING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.