Narrative:

The PIC accomplished all normal procedures prior to departure and picked up his clearance from norcal approach for the departure. His takeoff was uneventful until he attempted to raise the landing gear. It would not retract, though the gear lever would raise to the 'up' position. This reduced our climb performance significantly, but we were climbing and now in IFR conditions so he carried out the 'SID' procedure. During the initial turn, however, the captain's attitude indicator displayed a red 'fail' flag, followed by the loss of the GPS, then radios, then cockpit lights. I immediately illuminated my flashlight and said, 'check attitude, my side has no flags (air driven), check generators, check battery.' he replied with, 'battery and generators on, no annunciator warnings.' I said, 'loadshed and I will get the checklist', as I began to loadshed non essentials from my side. At that point, the captain realized he had inadvertently turned on the 'start and ignition' switches, believing they were the ignition switches, during departure, that had led to the power loss. He corrected this and we immediately regained power. The gear problem turned out to be an unrelated circuit breaker located on the captain's floor board that had popped. After resetting that breaker, the gear came up normally. The momentary power loss fortunately did not preclude any navigation, so we continued. What was learned? The captain is normally a jet captain. The king air trip proved to us being checked out on more than 1 aircraft is potentially hazardous. This incident is being used internally by our company in CRM training as well as reason to reduce the amount of dual qualified pilots to reflect the difficulty this practice brings to a flight operation. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated that his company operates some BE100 aircraft that have garrett engines and some that have pratt & whitney engines. Reporter advised that the garrett engines utilize a continuous ignition system while the pratt & whitney engines (the type involved in this incident) have an automatic ignition system which activates when sensing low engine RPM. Reporter stated that the switches for both system look the same and are located in the same position, but that the automatic ignition switch is a lift and lock switch. Reporter stated that the PF armed the automatic ignition switch by mistake on the takeoff roll and the subsequent electrical problems arose because of the switch selection combined with a depleted aircraft battery. Reporter feels that the requirement for pilots to be qualified in multiple aircraft types and configns is an unsafe practice.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BE10 FLT CREW EXPERIENCES A LOSS OF ELECTRICAL PWR AFTER CAPT ACTIVATED THE START IGNITION SWITCHES RATHER THAN THE AUTO IGNITION SWITCHES. CORRECTING THE SWITCH SELECTION RESOLVED THE ELECTRICAL PROB.

Narrative: THE PIC ACCOMPLISHED ALL NORMAL PROCS PRIOR TO DEP AND PICKED UP HIS CLRNC FROM NORCAL APCH FOR THE DEP. HIS TKOF WAS UNEVENTFUL UNTIL HE ATTEMPTED TO RAISE THE LNDG GEAR. IT WOULD NOT RETRACT, THOUGH THE GEAR LEVER WOULD RAISE TO THE 'UP' POS. THIS REDUCED OUR CLB PERFORMANCE SIGNIFICANTLY, BUT WE WERE CLBING AND NOW IN IFR CONDITIONS SO HE CARRIED OUT THE 'SID' PROC. DURING THE INITIAL TURN, HOWEVER, THE CAPT'S ATTITUDE INDICATOR DISPLAYED A RED 'FAIL' FLAG, FOLLOWED BY THE LOSS OF THE GPS, THEN RADIOS, THEN COCKPIT LIGHTS. I IMMEDIATELY ILLUMINATED MY FLASHLIGHT AND SAID, 'CHK ATTITUDE, MY SIDE HAS NO FLAGS (AIR DRIVEN), CHK GENERATORS, CHK BATTERY.' HE REPLIED WITH, 'BATTERY AND GENERATORS ON, NO ANNUNCIATOR WARNINGS.' I SAID, 'LOADSHED AND I WILL GET THE CHKLIST', AS I BEGAN TO LOADSHED NON ESSENTIALS FROM MY SIDE. AT THAT POINT, THE CAPT REALIZED HE HAD INADVERTENTLY TURNED ON THE 'START AND IGNITION' SWITCHES, BELIEVING THEY WERE THE IGNITION SWITCHES, DURING DEP, THAT HAD LED TO THE PWR LOSS. HE CORRECTED THIS AND WE IMMEDIATELY REGAINED PWR. THE GEAR PROB TURNED OUT TO BE AN UNRELATED CIRCUIT BREAKER LOCATED ON THE CAPT'S FLOOR BOARD THAT HAD POPPED. AFTER RESETTING THAT BREAKER, THE GEAR CAME UP NORMALLY. THE MOMENTARY PWR LOSS FORTUNATELY DID NOT PRECLUDE ANY NAV, SO WE CONTINUED. WHAT WAS LEARNED? THE CAPT IS NORMALLY A JET CAPT. THE KING AIR TRIP PROVED TO US BEING CHKED OUT ON MORE THAN 1 ACFT IS POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS. THIS INCIDENT IS BEING USED INTERNALLY BY OUR COMPANY IN CRM TRAINING AS WELL AS REASON TO REDUCE THE AMOUNT OF DUAL QUALIFIED PLTS TO REFLECT THE DIFFICULTY THIS PRACTICE BRINGS TO A FLT OP. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT HIS COMPANY OPERATES SOME BE100 ACFT THAT HAVE GARRETT ENGS AND SOME THAT HAVE PRATT & WHITNEY ENGS. RPTR ADVISED THAT THE GARRETT ENGS UTILIZE A CONTINUOUS IGNITION SYS WHILE THE PRATT & WHITNEY ENGS (THE TYPE INVOLVED IN THIS INCIDENT) HAVE AN AUTO IGNITION SYS WHICH ACTIVATES WHEN SENSING LOW ENG RPM. RPTR STATED THAT THE SWITCHES FOR BOTH SYS LOOK THE SAME AND ARE LOCATED IN THE SAME POS, BUT THAT THE AUTO IGNITION SWITCH IS A LIFT AND LOCK SWITCH. RPTR STATED THAT THE PF ARMED THE AUTO IGNITION SWITCH BY MISTAKE ON THE TKOF ROLL AND THE SUBSEQUENT ELECTRICAL PROBS AROSE BECAUSE OF THE SWITCH SELECTION COMBINED WITH A DEPLETED ACFT BATTERY. RPTR FEELS THAT THE REQUIREMENT FOR PLTS TO BE QUALIFIED IN MULTIPLE ACFT TYPES AND CONFIGNS IS AN UNSAFE PRACTICE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.