Narrative:

I was cleared by ground control to cross an active runway en route to my parking spot on the opposite side of the runway. I was advised that landing traffic for that runway was on a 4.5 mi final. As I accelerated toward the runway, and as the nose of my DC10 was passing over the hold short line for the runway, ground control suddenly changed the clearance and instructed me to hold short of the runway. It was impossible to stop the heavy DC10, and not be encroaching into the landing zone of the approaching aircraft, which I observed to still be several mi out on final. Not wanting to stop in the path of a landing jet, and then hope the pilot got the word to go around, I elected to continue across the runway without stopping. My first officer advised ground of our action, and they reclred us to cross the runway. We were well clear of the runway on the opposite side as the landing traffic touched down behind us. We are often faced with clrncs to cross active runways with landing traffic close in. I never doubted, in this case, that I had sufficient time to cross the runway without causing a conflict. Our clearance to cross, however, was given when we were some distance from the crossing taxiway, and it appears that the ground controller simply misjudged the time it would take us to cross, thus exceeding whatever safety margin they use to protect crossing traffic. During our crew debrief after the incident, we all agreed that we felt that the separation was closer than usual, and a safer course of action would have been to simply refuse the crossing clearance when it was first given.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A DC10 CREW APCHING A RWY WITH A CLRNC TO CROSS IS THEN TOLD TO HOLD SHORT BY MEM GND CTL BECAUSE OF TFC ON FINAL. THE PLT WAS UNABLE TO HOLD SHORT AND CONTINUED TO CROSS.

Narrative: I WAS CLRED BY GND CTL TO CROSS AN ACTIVE RWY ENRTE TO MY PARKING SPOT ON THE OPPOSITE SIDE OF THE RWY. I WAS ADVISED THAT LNDG TFC FOR THAT RWY WAS ON A 4.5 MI FINAL. AS I ACCELERATED TOWARD THE RWY, AND AS THE NOSE OF MY DC10 WAS PASSING OVER THE HOLD SHORT LINE FOR THE RWY, GND CTL SUDDENLY CHANGED THE CLRNC AND INSTRUCTED ME TO HOLD SHORT OF THE RWY. IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO STOP THE HVY DC10, AND NOT BE ENCROACHING INTO THE LNDG ZONE OF THE APCHING ACFT, WHICH I OBSERVED TO STILL BE SEVERAL MI OUT ON FINAL. NOT WANTING TO STOP IN THE PATH OF A LNDG JET, AND THEN HOPE THE PLT GOT THE WORD TO GO AROUND, I ELECTED TO CONTINUE ACROSS THE RWY WITHOUT STOPPING. MY FO ADVISED GND OF OUR ACTION, AND THEY RECLRED US TO CROSS THE RWY. WE WERE WELL CLR OF THE RWY ON THE OPPOSITE SIDE AS THE LNDG TFC TOUCHED DOWN BEHIND US. WE ARE OFTEN FACED WITH CLRNCS TO CROSS ACTIVE RWYS WITH LNDG TFC CLOSE IN. I NEVER DOUBTED, IN THIS CASE, THAT I HAD SUFFICIENT TIME TO CROSS THE RWY WITHOUT CAUSING A CONFLICT. OUR CLRNC TO CROSS, HOWEVER, WAS GIVEN WHEN WE WERE SOME DISTANCE FROM THE XING TXWY, AND IT APPEARS THAT THE GND CTLR SIMPLY MISJUDGED THE TIME IT WOULD TAKE US TO CROSS, THUS EXCEEDING WHATEVER SAFETY MARGIN THEY USE TO PROTECT XING TFC. DURING OUR CREW DEBRIEF AFTER THE INCIDENT, WE ALL AGREED THAT WE FELT THAT THE SEPARATION WAS CLOSER THAN USUAL, AND A SAFER COURSE OF ACTION WOULD HAVE BEEN TO SIMPLY REFUSE THE XING CLRNC WHEN IT WAS FIRST GIVEN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.