Narrative:

Aircraft dispatched with MEL xx-xx-xx-X, after departure, ECAM warning (engine reverser pressurized). Crew followed ECAM procedures and returned to field declaring an in flight emergency. Review of MEL procedures found that the directional pilot valve connectors were not removed. Confusion about engine service bulletin status and MEL procedural steps resulted in the non removal of the directional pilot valve connectors. Connectors were properly disconnected and stowed and the flight continued without further incident. Supplemental information from acn 626256: on takeoff roll we had a momentary ECAM indication of a #2 reverser pressurized. The indication went away and we continued the takeoff. After gear retraction, prior to 1000 ft AGL, the #2 reverser pressurized returned to the ECAM with no yaw or buffet to indicate the reverser had deployed. ECAM instructed the throttle to idle and engine power for safe flight only. We declared an emergency and returned to ZZZ with an overweight landing. Maximum landing weight for aircraft X is 308.7 and we were approximately 311.4 at touchdown sink. Speed at touchdown was recorded at flaps 20 for maintenance to do an overweight inspection. One tire required changing and the reverser system was inspected. It was determined a cannon plug was the cause. Callback conversation with reporter acn 626266 revealed the following information: the reporter stated the reverser was deferred per the minimum equipment list MEL reference xx-xx-xx-X. The reporter said the inoperative procedures had two choices, one to remove the pilot valve connectors and the second to leave the connectors connected to the pilot valve. The reporter stated the second choice depended upon accomplishment of a service bulletin and engineering change order. The reporter said this was the method taken and the connectors were left connected to the pilot valve. The reporter stated this is now corrected and the pilot valves are marked indicating the engineering change order and service bulletin accomplishment and the minimum equipment list revised. Callback conversation with reporter acn 626153 revealed the following information: the reporter stated the MEL has two procedures to render the reverser inoperative and caused confusion. The reporter said one step removed the connectors from the reverser directional pilot valve, the second step allowed the connectors to remain connected to the pilot valve if an engineering change order had been accomplished. The reporter stated the second step was chosen and resulted in the return to the field.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN A300 ON TKOF CLB AT 1000 FT DECLARED AN EMER AND RETURNED TO ARPT DUE TO ECAM WARNING 'REVERSER PRESSURIZED.'

Narrative: ACFT DISPATCHED WITH MEL XX-XX-XX-X, AFTER DEP, ECAM WARNING (ENG REVERSER PRESSURIZED). CREW FOLLOWED ECAM PROCS AND RETURNED TO FIELD DECLARING AN IN FLT EMER. REVIEW OF MEL PROCS FOUND THAT THE DIRECTIONAL PILOT VALVE CONNECTORS WERE NOT REMOVED. CONFUSION ABOUT ENG SERVICE BULLETIN STATUS AND MEL PROCEDURAL STEPS RESULTED IN THE NON REMOVAL OF THE DIRECTIONAL PILOT VALVE CONNECTORS. CONNECTORS WERE PROPERLY DISCONNECTED AND STOWED AND THE FLT CONTINUED WITHOUT FURTHER INCIDENT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 626256: ON TKOF ROLL WE HAD A MOMENTARY ECAM INDICATION OF A #2 REVERSER PRESSURIZED. THE INDICATION WENT AWAY AND WE CONTINUED THE TKOF. AFTER GEAR RETRACTION, PRIOR TO 1000 FT AGL, THE #2 REVERSER PRESSURIZED RETURNED TO THE ECAM WITH NO YAW OR BUFFET TO INDICATE THE REVERSER HAD DEPLOYED. ECAM INSTRUCTED THE THROTTLE TO IDLE AND ENG POWER FOR SAFE FLT ONLY. WE DECLARED AN EMER AND RETURNED TO ZZZ WITH AN OVERWEIGHT LNDG. MAX LNDG WEIGHT FOR ACFT X IS 308.7 AND WE WERE APPROX 311.4 AT TOUCHDOWN SINK. SPEED AT TOUCHDOWN WAS RECORDED AT FLAPS 20 FOR MAINT TO DO AN OVERWEIGHT INSPECTION. ONE TIRE REQUIRED CHANGING AND THE REVERSER SYSTEM WAS INSPECTED. IT WAS DETERMINED A CANNON PLUG WAS THE CAUSE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR ACN 626266 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE REVERSER WAS DEFERRED PER THE MINIMUM EQUIPMENT LIST MEL REF XX-XX-XX-X. THE RPTR SAID THE INOPERATIVE PROCS HAD TWO CHOICES, ONE TO REMOVE THE PILOT VALVE CONNECTORS AND THE SECOND TO LEAVE THE CONNECTORS CONNECTED TO THE PLT VALVE. THE RPTR STATED THE SECOND CHOICE DEPENDED UPON ACCOMPLISHMENT OF A SERVICE BULLETIN AND ENGINEERING CHANGE ORDER. THE RPTR SAID THIS WAS THE METHOD TAKEN AND THE CONNECTORS WERE LEFT CONNECTED TO THE PILOT VALVE. THE RPTR STATED THIS IS NOW CORRECTED AND THE PILOT VALVES ARE MARKED INDICATING THE ENGINEERING CHANGE ORDER AND SERVICE BULLETIN ACCOMPLISHMENT AND THE MINIMUM EQUIPMENT LIST REVISED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR ACN 626153 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE MEL HAS TWO PROCS TO RENDER THE REVERSER INOPERATIVE AND CAUSED CONFUSION. THE RPTR SAID ONE STEP REMOVED THE CONNECTORS FROM THE REVERSER DIRECTIONAL PILOT VALVE, THE SECOND STEP ALLOWED THE CONNECTORS TO REMAIN CONNECTED TO THE PILOT VALVE IF AN ENGINEERING CHANGE ORDER HAD BEEN ACCOMPLISHED. THE RPTR STATED THE SECOND STEP WAS CHOSEN AND RESULTED IN THE RETURN TO THE FIELD.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.