Narrative:

During engine start on #1 engine (I think), the start switch did not release and the start valve open light remained on. We complied with the procedures in the QRH. With the start valve open light out and the engine running normally, we continued the flight and wrote the problem up at destination. Supplemental information from acn 625829: when I informed the flight crew they should have had this problem addressed before leaving ZZZ2, their response was that everything functioned normal, the start valve open light went out when the start switch was rotated to off, indicating the start valve was closed, and they had no other problems. The flight crew inadvertently assumed that they could depart ZZZ2 with a known aircraft discrepancy, which removes the airworthiness of the aircraft, because no maintenance was required. This is against company policy and FAA requirements. Maintenance control should have been notified and en route MEL 80-2B issued if possible. I do not believe the flight crew intentionally violated company policy and FARS, but leaving a station with a known aircraft system problem is not allowed and flight crews should be aware of this.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737-400, ON ENG START, THE START SWITCH DID NOT RELEASE AND THE START VALVE REMAINED OPEN. MANUALLY MOVED START SWITCH PER QRH.

Narrative: DURING ENG START ON #1 ENG (I THINK), THE START SWITCH DID NOT RELEASE AND THE START VALVE OPEN LIGHT REMAINED ON. WE COMPLIED WITH THE PROCS IN THE QRH. WITH THE START VALVE OPEN LIGHT OUT AND THE ENG RUNNING NORMALLY, WE CONTINUED THE FLT AND WROTE THE PROB UP AT DEST. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 625829: WHEN I INFORMED THE FLT CREW THEY SHOULD HAVE HAD THIS PROB ADDRESSED BEFORE LEAVING ZZZ2, THEIR RESPONSE WAS THAT EVERYTHING FUNCTIONED NORMAL, THE START VALVE OPEN LIGHT WENT OUT WHEN THE START SWITCH WAS ROTATED TO OFF, INDICATING THE START VALVE WAS CLOSED, AND THEY HAD NO OTHER PROBS. THE FLT CREW INADVERTENTLY ASSUMED THAT THEY COULD DEPART ZZZ2 WITH A KNOWN ACFT DISCREPANCY, WHICH REMOVES THE AIRWORTHINESS OF THE ACFT, BECAUSE NO MAINT WAS REQUIRED. THIS IS AGAINST COMPANY POLICY AND FAA REQUIREMENTS. MAINT CTL SHOULD HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED AND ENRTE MEL 80-2B ISSUED IF POSSIBLE. I DO NOT BELIEVE THE FLT CREW INTENTIONALLY VIOLATED COMPANY POLICY AND FARS, BUT LEAVING A STATION WITH A KNOWN ACFT SYS PROB IS NOT ALLOWED AND FLT CREWS SHOULD BE AWARE OF THIS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.