Narrative:

On runway 31C, tower had just cleared us for takeoff and before we started to roll, a company airplane behind us said 'company on the runway, flaps.' I looked at the flap position indicator and to my horror, they were up. We told tower we'd like to exit the runway as we had not started to roll. Tower said to exit and cleared the airplane behind us into position. We swapped places with them. I stopped the airplane in the #1 position and said 'let's start over, before taxi checklist.' we completed it and the 'before takeoff checklist' again, and told tower we were ready. Subsequent takeoff and flight were uneventful. This was the first day of a new hire IOE and the 4TH leg of the day. An FAA inspector was on the jumpseat and he was on the jumpseat the previous leg. The FAA inspector was very pleasant and I did not feel threatened or intimidated, but his presence was felt as I know I was more tense, and the first officer was more nervous than he had been. I had flown the previous leg with the inspector and company pilot in the jumpseats. The leg had gone well, but my attempts at instruction did little but make the first officer more nervous. Nothing like an FAA inspector, a company check airman and another experienced company pilot breathing down your neck on the first day on the job. The first officer and I talked about who would fly the next leg at the gate at mdw. When the FAA inspector showed up, we decided I would fly the leg to mdw. At mdw, we decided he would fly the next leg. I was thinking how to handle the taxi out at mdw with the usual runway xings, the turn out of traffic and the low altitude leveloff with the first officer flying. I had not seen him fly and departing mdw can be demanding for an experienced B737 pilot. I discussed these issues with the first officer and we were in agreement that it was time for him to fly a leg. The load sheet came and the fuel audit did not check. The first officer was taking it hard because the most likely cause was a mistake on his part of writing the incorrect in fuel. I tried to put my focus on what had to be done, call the fueler back to drip the tanks, make a PA, explain the fuel audit to the FAA inspector, make light of our 20 min delay, and assure the first officer that his first day of IOE was going well. After monitoring the dripsticking and verifying our fuel, we shut the door and prepared to push. We would take off on runway 4R, bleeds off and the first officer's takeoff. As we pushed back, ground control said to expect runway 31C for departure. The first officer reached for the performance computer. I said 'no, wait until after engine start.' I was thinking that I didn't want to taxi to runway 31C while he was computing takeoff data. On the previous taxi out, the takeoff runway was changed when we called for taxi. I told him to wait till we were out of traffic to do the performance computer. That worked fine before. This was mdw, and I wanted the data done before taxi. Mdw can be a busy taxi. After engine start, I cleared the ground crew off and said 'ok, now we can redo the takeoff data.' we figured the data and called for taxi. I didn't give him a chance to say 'standing by flaps,' I screwed up. The concern on my part for getting the takeoff data completed before taxi caused me to skip the 'before taxi checklist.' I am horrified I did this. It could have been prevented by going strictly by the book. Every situation is different and priorities change. I don't know if a change to our procedures would help. I think I was preoccupied with getting the takeoff data done before taxi and how I was going to handle letting the new hire fly for the first time out of mdw. Live and learn.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MULTIPLE DISTRS CONTRIBUTE TO A B737 CREW BEING ON THE RWY AT MDW WITHOUT FLAPS EXTENDED FOR TKOF. A FOLLOWING ACFT CALLS THE DISCREPANCY OUT PROMPTING THE CREW TO REQUEST TAXI OFF THE RWY.

Narrative: ON RWY 31C, TWR HAD JUST CLRED US FOR TKOF AND BEFORE WE STARTED TO ROLL, A COMPANY AIRPLANE BEHIND US SAID 'COMPANY ON THE RWY, FLAPS.' I LOOKED AT THE FLAP POS INDICATOR AND TO MY HORROR, THEY WERE UP. WE TOLD TWR WE'D LIKE TO EXIT THE RWY AS WE HAD NOT STARTED TO ROLL. TWR SAID TO EXIT AND CLRED THE AIRPLANE BEHIND US INTO POS. WE SWAPPED PLACES WITH THEM. I STOPPED THE AIRPLANE IN THE #1 POS AND SAID 'LET'S START OVER, BEFORE TAXI CHKLIST.' WE COMPLETED IT AND THE 'BEFORE TKOF CHKLIST' AGAIN, AND TOLD TWR WE WERE READY. SUBSEQUENT TKOF AND FLT WERE UNEVENTFUL. THIS WAS THE FIRST DAY OF A NEW HIRE IOE AND THE 4TH LEG OF THE DAY. AN FAA INSPECTOR WAS ON THE JUMPSEAT AND HE WAS ON THE JUMPSEAT THE PREVIOUS LEG. THE FAA INSPECTOR WAS VERY PLEASANT AND I DID NOT FEEL THREATENED OR INTIMIDATED, BUT HIS PRESENCE WAS FELT AS I KNOW I WAS MORE TENSE, AND THE FO WAS MORE NERVOUS THAN HE HAD BEEN. I HAD FLOWN THE PREVIOUS LEG WITH THE INSPECTOR AND COMPANY PLT IN THE JUMPSEATS. THE LEG HAD GONE WELL, BUT MY ATTEMPTS AT INSTRUCTION DID LITTLE BUT MAKE THE FO MORE NERVOUS. NOTHING LIKE AN FAA INSPECTOR, A COMPANY CHK AIRMAN AND ANOTHER EXPERIENCED COMPANY PLT BREATHING DOWN YOUR NECK ON THE FIRST DAY ON THE JOB. THE FO AND I TALKED ABOUT WHO WOULD FLY THE NEXT LEG AT THE GATE AT MDW. WHEN THE FAA INSPECTOR SHOWED UP, WE DECIDED I WOULD FLY THE LEG TO MDW. AT MDW, WE DECIDED HE WOULD FLY THE NEXT LEG. I WAS THINKING HOW TO HANDLE THE TAXI OUT AT MDW WITH THE USUAL RWY XINGS, THE TURN OUT OF TFC AND THE LOW ALT LEVELOFF WITH THE FO FLYING. I HAD NOT SEEN HIM FLY AND DEPARTING MDW CAN BE DEMANDING FOR AN EXPERIENCED B737 PLT. I DISCUSSED THESE ISSUES WITH THE FO AND WE WERE IN AGREEMENT THAT IT WAS TIME FOR HIM TO FLY A LEG. THE LOAD SHEET CAME AND THE FUEL AUDIT DID NOT CHK. THE FO WAS TAKING IT HARD BECAUSE THE MOST LIKELY CAUSE WAS A MISTAKE ON HIS PART OF WRITING THE INCORRECT IN FUEL. I TRIED TO PUT MY FOCUS ON WHAT HAD TO BE DONE, CALL THE FUELER BACK TO DRIP THE TANKS, MAKE A PA, EXPLAIN THE FUEL AUDIT TO THE FAA INSPECTOR, MAKE LIGHT OF OUR 20 MIN DELAY, AND ASSURE THE FO THAT HIS FIRST DAY OF IOE WAS GOING WELL. AFTER MONITORING THE DRIPSTICKING AND VERIFYING OUR FUEL, WE SHUT THE DOOR AND PREPARED TO PUSH. WE WOULD TAKE OFF ON RWY 4R, BLEEDS OFF AND THE FO'S TKOF. AS WE PUSHED BACK, GND CTL SAID TO EXPECT RWY 31C FOR DEP. THE FO REACHED FOR THE PERFORMANCE COMPUTER. I SAID 'NO, WAIT UNTIL AFTER ENG START.' I WAS THINKING THAT I DIDN'T WANT TO TAXI TO RWY 31C WHILE HE WAS COMPUTING TKOF DATA. ON THE PREVIOUS TAXI OUT, THE TKOF RWY WAS CHANGED WHEN WE CALLED FOR TAXI. I TOLD HIM TO WAIT TILL WE WERE OUT OF TFC TO DO THE PERFORMANCE COMPUTER. THAT WORKED FINE BEFORE. THIS WAS MDW, AND I WANTED THE DATA DONE BEFORE TAXI. MDW CAN BE A BUSY TAXI. AFTER ENG START, I CLRED THE GND CREW OFF AND SAID 'OK, NOW WE CAN REDO THE TKOF DATA.' WE FIGURED THE DATA AND CALLED FOR TAXI. I DIDN'T GIVE HIM A CHANCE TO SAY 'STANDING BY FLAPS,' I SCREWED UP. THE CONCERN ON MY PART FOR GETTING THE TKOF DATA COMPLETED BEFORE TAXI CAUSED ME TO SKIP THE 'BEFORE TAXI CHKLIST.' I AM HORRIFIED I DID THIS. IT COULD HAVE BEEN PREVENTED BY GOING STRICTLY BY THE BOOK. EVERY SIT IS DIFFERENT AND PRIORITIES CHANGE. I DON'T KNOW IF A CHANGE TO OUR PROCS WOULD HELP. I THINK I WAS PREOCCUPIED WITH GETTING THE TKOF DATA DONE BEFORE TAXI AND HOW I WAS GOING TO HANDLE LETTING THE NEW HIRE FLY FOR THE FIRST TIME OUT OF MDW. LIVE AND LEARN.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.