Narrative:

I was performing a syllabus event for a new co-pilot. It was his first flight in the right seat and I was doing a significant amount of training on checklists, proper flows and procedures. He received taxi clearance to runway 1R, but I thought we had clearance to runway 1L and that runway 1R was closed. I looked across the field and saw several planes lined up for takeoff on runway 1L and nose on runway 1R which further enforced my runway 1L clearance. We taxied out and I was continuing to instruct on proper checklists and procedures. We performed a takeoff brief, which is done on taxi out, and I asked the co-pilot to set up the navaids for krant intersection. He was not sure where krant was and I tried to explain where it was and how to set up the radios. A lot of chatter continued and I was not paying attention to the radios. I looked to clear final on runway 1R so as to taxi across and did not see any aircraft. I said something to the co-pilot and looked back on final and saw an F/A18 going around. He was on a tight base so that is why I didn't see him at first. We continued across and tower asked what we were doing and told us to hold short runway 1R. We complied, finished checklist, and took off and landed uneventfully. Several factors affected my performance and the crew's that day, including: 1) rushed to get off on time. 2) new co-pilot unfamiliar with plane, airport. 3) busy trying to instruct and taxi at the same time. 4) fatigue. I hadn't slept much the last few nights. 5) complacency. I'd done this before numerous times. 6) airplanes using different radio types, we used VHF, the other plane UHF. 7) reluctance of the co-pilot to question a senior instructor. I was lucky this time, it could have been worse. Complacency has no place in the cockpit, no matter how mundane. I'll be training and lecturing my fellow squadron mates on this incident and will no longer be distraction during critical communications.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A C130 MIL PIC, TRAINING A NEW FO, CROSSED RWY 1R AT ADW WITHOUT PERMISSION WHICH CAUSED AN F18 TO GO AROUND.

Narrative: I WAS PERFORMING A SYLLABUS EVENT FOR A NEW CO-PLT. IT WAS HIS FIRST FLT IN THE R SEAT AND I WAS DOING A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF TRAINING ON CHKLISTS, PROPER FLOWS AND PROCS. HE RECEIVED TAXI CLRNC TO RWY 1R, BUT I THOUGHT WE HAD CLRNC TO RWY 1L AND THAT RWY 1R WAS CLOSED. I LOOKED ACROSS THE FIELD AND SAW SEVERAL PLANES LINED UP FOR TKOF ON RWY 1L AND NOSE ON RWY 1R WHICH FURTHER ENFORCED MY RWY 1L CLRNC. WE TAXIED OUT AND I WAS CONTINUING TO INSTRUCT ON PROPER CHKLISTS AND PROCS. WE PERFORMED A TKOF BRIEF, WHICH IS DONE ON TAXI OUT, AND I ASKED THE CO-PLT TO SET UP THE NAVAIDS FOR KRANT INTXN. HE WAS NOT SURE WHERE KRANT WAS AND I TRIED TO EXPLAIN WHERE IT WAS AND HOW TO SET UP THE RADIOS. A LOT OF CHATTER CONTINUED AND I WAS NOT PAYING ATTN TO THE RADIOS. I LOOKED TO CLR FINAL ON RWY 1R SO AS TO TAXI ACROSS AND DID NOT SEE ANY ACFT. I SAID SOMETHING TO THE CO-PLT AND LOOKED BACK ON FINAL AND SAW AN F/A18 GOING AROUND. HE WAS ON A TIGHT BASE SO THAT IS WHY I DIDN'T SEE HIM AT FIRST. WE CONTINUED ACROSS AND TWR ASKED WHAT WE WERE DOING AND TOLD US TO HOLD SHORT RWY 1R. WE COMPLIED, FINISHED CHKLIST, AND TOOK OFF AND LANDED UNEVENTFULLY. SEVERAL FACTORS AFFECTED MY PERFORMANCE AND THE CREW'S THAT DAY, INCLUDING: 1) RUSHED TO GET OFF ON TIME. 2) NEW CO-PLT UNFAMILIAR WITH PLANE, ARPT. 3) BUSY TRYING TO INSTRUCT AND TAXI AT THE SAME TIME. 4) FATIGUE. I HADN'T SLEPT MUCH THE LAST FEW NIGHTS. 5) COMPLACENCY. I'D DONE THIS BEFORE NUMEROUS TIMES. 6) AIRPLANES USING DIFFERENT RADIO TYPES, WE USED VHF, THE OTHER PLANE UHF. 7) RELUCTANCE OF THE CO-PLT TO QUESTION A SENIOR INSTRUCTOR. I WAS LUCKY THIS TIME, IT COULD HAVE BEEN WORSE. COMPLACENCY HAS NO PLACE IN THE COCKPIT, NO MATTER HOW MUNDANE. I'LL BE TRAINING AND LECTURING MY FELLOW SQUADRON MATES ON THIS INCIDENT AND WILL NO LONGER BE DISTR DURING CRITICAL COMS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.