|37000 Feet||Browse and search NASA's
Aviation Safety Reporting System
|Local Time Of Day||1801 To 2400|
|Locale Reference||airport : phl.airport|
|Altitude||agl single value : 0|
|Operator||common carrier : air carrier|
|Make Model Name||A320|
|Operating Under FAR Part||Part 121|
|Flight Phase||ground : maintenance|
ground : preflight
|Affiliation||company : air carrier|
|Function||flight crew : captain|
instruction : trainee
|Affiliation||company : air carrier|
|Function||flight crew : first officer|
instruction : instructor
oversight : pic
|Anomaly||aircraft equipment problem : critical|
maintenance problem : non compliance with mel
non adherence : company policies
non adherence : far
non adherence : published procedure
other anomaly other
|Independent Detector||other flight crewa|
|Resolutory Action||none taken : anomaly accepted|
|Maintenance||contributing factor : schedule pressure|
performance deficiency : repair
performance deficiency : non compliance with legal requirements
I arrived at the gate to prepare for my second leg of captain IOE. Aircraft arrived in phl with the #2 thrust reverser deferred due to a #2 generator trip the previous day. Inbound crew wrote a discrepancy for another generator #2 trip. #2 thrust reverser was not the correct fix. A second MEL for an APU class ii maintenance message was also documented. Company technicians arrived and were instructed to defer the #2 generator under MEL 24-20-02. The MEL requires compliance with the following statements: APU and APU driven generator are verified to operate normally and used throughout the flight, and all indications and warnings associated with the remaining engine and APU driven generator channels (are cleared?). The company MEL policy states, in part: with multiple discrepancies, the interrelationship must be considered and good judgement exercised. Technicians performed a bite check and found a fault with an APU sensor. They advised that it was possible for the sensor failure to cause an APU failure. They stated they were unable to remove the APU MEL with a fault showing. Moc insisted that the APU MEL could be ignored because it was a class ii fault. The APU MEL, bite failure, and MEL preamble language caused me to believe we could not comply with the applicable generator #2 MEL. After 7 hours of often unprofessional and inadequate communication and pressure from various departments, we consulted with the flight operations duty officer (who remained professional and helpful). Based on his evaluation, we agreed to operate the flight. Once airborne, and after further review, I determined that we were likely not in full compliance based on the above conditions. We diverted to phx due to las vegas WX. On arrival, we were advised that the aircraft would continue to operate under both MEL provisions. Synopsis: the aircraft should not have left los angeles without fully repairing a faulted #2 generator. The 2 MEL provisions were not in concert and the aircraft should not have been dispatched under those conditions. The crew was unduly pressured and harassed by several departments despite the crews significant effort to work the problem properly and constructively. A significant delay occurred in the operation. FARS, company policy, and safety may have been violated.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: CAPT OF A320 FEELS PRESSURED BY COMPANY TO ACCEPT ACFT WHICH DOES NOT APPEAR TO MEET MEL REQUIREMENTS FOR FLT.
Narrative: I ARRIVED AT THE GATE TO PREPARE FOR MY SECOND LEG OF CAPT IOE. ACFT ARRIVED IN PHL WITH THE #2 THRUST REVERSER DEFERRED DUE TO A #2 GENERATOR TRIP THE PREVIOUS DAY. INBOUND CREW WROTE A DISCREPANCY FOR ANOTHER GENERATOR #2 TRIP. #2 THRUST REVERSER WAS NOT THE CORRECT FIX. A SECOND MEL FOR AN APU CLASS II MAINT MESSAGE WAS ALSO DOCUMENTED. COMPANY TECHNICIANS ARRIVED AND WERE INSTRUCTED TO DEFER THE #2 GENERATOR UNDER MEL 24-20-02. THE MEL REQUIRES COMPLIANCE WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS: APU AND APU DRIVEN GENERATOR ARE VERIFIED TO OPERATE NORMALLY AND USED THROUGHOUT THE FLT, AND ALL INDICATIONS AND WARNINGS ASSOCIATED WITH THE REMAINING ENG AND APU DRIVEN GENERATOR CHANNELS (ARE CLRED?). THE COMPANY MEL POLICY STATES, IN PART: WITH MULTIPLE DISCREPANCIES, THE INTERRELATIONSHIP MUST BE CONSIDERED AND GOOD JUDGEMENT EXERCISED. TECHNICIANS PERFORMED A BITE CHK AND FOUND A FAULT WITH AN APU SENSOR. THEY ADVISED THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE FOR THE SENSOR FAILURE TO CAUSE AN APU FAILURE. THEY STATED THEY WERE UNABLE TO REMOVE THE APU MEL WITH A FAULT SHOWING. MOC INSISTED THAT THE APU MEL COULD BE IGNORED BECAUSE IT WAS A CLASS II FAULT. THE APU MEL, BITE FAILURE, AND MEL PREAMBLE LANGUAGE CAUSED ME TO BELIEVE WE COULD NOT COMPLY WITH THE APPLICABLE GENERATOR #2 MEL. AFTER 7 HRS OF OFTEN UNPROFESSIONAL AND INADEQUATE COM AND PRESSURE FROM VARIOUS DEPTS, WE CONSULTED WITH THE FLT OPS DUTY OFFICER (WHO REMAINED PROFESSIONAL AND HELPFUL). BASED ON HIS EVALUATION, WE AGREED TO OPERATE THE FLT. ONCE AIRBORNE, AND AFTER FURTHER REVIEW, I DETERMINED THAT WE WERE LIKELY NOT IN FULL COMPLIANCE BASED ON THE ABOVE CONDITIONS. WE DIVERTED TO PHX DUE TO LAS VEGAS WX. ON ARR, WE WERE ADVISED THAT THE ACFT WOULD CONTINUE TO OPERATE UNDER BOTH MEL PROVISIONS. SYNOPSIS: THE ACFT SHOULD NOT HAVE LEFT LOS ANGELES WITHOUT FULLY REPAIRING A FAULTED #2 GENERATOR. THE 2 MEL PROVISIONS WERE NOT IN CONCERT AND THE ACFT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN DISPATCHED UNDER THOSE CONDITIONS. THE CREW WAS UNDULY PRESSURED AND HARASSED BY SEVERAL DEPTS DESPITE THE CREWS SIGNIFICANT EFFORT TO WORK THE PROB PROPERLY AND CONSTRUCTIVELY. A SIGNIFICANT DELAY OCCURRED IN THE OP. FARS, COMPANY POLICY, AND SAFETY MAY HAVE BEEN VIOLATED.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.