Narrative:

Our flight paperwork indicated that our aircraft had a fuel quantity indicator inoperative. This was listed on the release. During the walkaround inspection the first officer noted that 3 line maintenance technicians were performing a drip stick check on the #2 wing. The first officer was told by the line maintenance personnel that the aircraft had experienced fuel spills due to a shutoff not working. This seemed odd in light of the MEL for the fuel gauge inoperative. Under this MEL 1 of 3 methods can be used to determine the quantity of the fuel in the main tank. Method a is the automatic shutoff method. Later on the flight deck the line maintenance man explained that he filled to less than full via drip stick in order to avoid a spill. We asked why MEL 28-10 was not being used since this governs an inoperative fuel shutoff. The line maintenance guys were wondering the same thing. This began a 1 1/2 hour delay while line maintenance conferred with maintenance control. Ultimately maintenance control stayed with MEL number. There seemed to be more to the story than we were able to extract during our discussions with line maintenance personnel. It was a bit unclr, the complete history of this problem, which was 9 days old and set to expire under the CAT C time guidelines. The logbook was signed off and complete for our operation. We were given assurances from the line maintenance supervisor that all was well with the aircraft and the way in which these write-ups were handled. We felt confident that we had a safe aircraft to fly, and we managed as best we could from a passenger standpoint. This report is being made so that if maintenance, in reviewing this situation, finds discrepancies, in their handling of this MEL, we have recorded our knowledge of the situation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW OF B737-400 FEARS THAT INAPPROPRIATE DEFERRAL PROCS WERE FOLLOWED BY MAINT TECHNICIANS REGARDING AN INOP #2 MAIN FUEL GAUGE AND AN ALLEGED PROB WITH THE #2 MAIN FUEL SHUTOFF VALVE PERTAINING TO GND REFUELING PROCS.

Narrative: OUR FLT PAPERWORK INDICATED THAT OUR ACFT HAD A FUEL QUANTITY INDICATOR INOP. THIS WAS LISTED ON THE RELEASE. DURING THE WALKAROUND INSPECTION THE FO NOTED THAT 3 LINE MAINT TECHNICIANS WERE PERFORMING A DRIP STICK CHK ON THE #2 WING. THE FO WAS TOLD BY THE LINE MAINT PERSONNEL THAT THE ACFT HAD EXPERIENCED FUEL SPILLS DUE TO A SHUTOFF NOT WORKING. THIS SEEMED ODD IN LIGHT OF THE MEL FOR THE FUEL GAUGE INOP. UNDER THIS MEL 1 OF 3 METHODS CAN BE USED TO DETERMINE THE QUANTITY OF THE FUEL IN THE MAIN TANK. METHOD A IS THE AUTOMATIC SHUTOFF METHOD. LATER ON THE FLT DECK THE LINE MAINT MAN EXPLAINED THAT HE FILLED TO LESS THAN FULL VIA DRIP STICK IN ORDER TO AVOID A SPILL. WE ASKED WHY MEL 28-10 WAS NOT BEING USED SINCE THIS GOVERNS AN INOP FUEL SHUTOFF. THE LINE MAINT GUYS WERE WONDERING THE SAME THING. THIS BEGAN A 1 1/2 HR DELAY WHILE LINE MAINT CONFERRED WITH MAINT CTL. ULTIMATELY MAINT CTL STAYED WITH MEL NUMBER. THERE SEEMED TO BE MORE TO THE STORY THAN WE WERE ABLE TO EXTRACT DURING OUR DISCUSSIONS WITH LINE MAINT PERSONNEL. IT WAS A BIT UNCLR, THE COMPLETE HISTORY OF THIS PROB, WHICH WAS 9 DAYS OLD AND SET TO EXPIRE UNDER THE CAT C TIME GUIDELINES. THE LOGBOOK WAS SIGNED OFF AND COMPLETE FOR OUR OP. WE WERE GIVEN ASSURANCES FROM THE LINE MAINT SUPVR THAT ALL WAS WELL WITH THE ACFT AND THE WAY IN WHICH THESE WRITE-UPS WERE HANDLED. WE FELT CONFIDENT THAT WE HAD A SAFE ACFT TO FLY, AND WE MANAGED AS BEST WE COULD FROM A PAX STANDPOINT. THIS RPT IS BEING MADE SO THAT IF MAINT, IN REVIEWING THIS SIT, FINDS DISCREPANCIES, IN THEIR HANDLING OF THIS MEL, WE HAVE RECORDED OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE SIT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.