Narrative:

On taxi out, during the flight control check, the following ECAM message appeared, 'flight control elac #1 fault.' we called maintenance control and ran through the procedure in the handbook, chapter X page xx. A reset of elac #1 was unsuccessful. The restrs to flight were noted. Maintenance control advised that an MEL would be applied upon arrival in ZZZ. The specific MEL was not provided. I then spoke with the dispatcher to advise him of our status and get his input. We all agreed that we could proceed to ZZZ. The non normal procedure followed led us to believe we had a computer failure. We operated the flight at the urging of maintenance control. Since we experienced a failure after leaving the gate and that this failure would fall under the guideline of the MEL, the flight from ZZZ to ZZZ1 occurred without any further incidence. Maintenance inspected the aircraft upon arrival in ZZZ1 and discovered a problem different than a failed computer. I am not sure that this failure could have been placed on MEL or not. It seems that a better handling of the situation would have been to have the specific MEL referenced prior to departure and whatever special procedures accomplished prior to departure. Then we could have made a more informed decision about whether or not to proceed or return to the gate.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN AIRBUS 319 WAS DISPATCHED IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH AN ELEVATOR AILERON COMPUTER FAULT DEFERRED IN CONFLICT WITH THE MEL.

Narrative: ON TAXI OUT, DURING THE FLT CTL CHK, THE FOLLOWING ECAM MESSAGE APPEARED, 'FLT CTL ELAC #1 FAULT.' WE CALLED MAINT CTL AND RAN THROUGH THE PROC IN THE HANDBOOK, CHAPTER X PAGE XX. A RESET OF ELAC #1 WAS UNSUCCESSFUL. THE RESTRS TO FLT WERE NOTED. MAINT CTL ADVISED THAT AN MEL WOULD BE APPLIED UPON ARR IN ZZZ. THE SPECIFIC MEL WAS NOT PROVIDED. I THEN SPOKE WITH THE DISPATCHER TO ADVISE HIM OF OUR STATUS AND GET HIS INPUT. WE ALL AGREED THAT WE COULD PROCEED TO ZZZ. THE NON NORMAL PROC FOLLOWED LED US TO BELIEVE WE HAD A COMPUTER FAILURE. WE OPERATED THE FLT AT THE URGING OF MAINT CTL. SINCE WE EXPERIENCED A FAILURE AFTER LEAVING THE GATE AND THAT THIS FAILURE WOULD FALL UNDER THE GUIDELINE OF THE MEL, THE FLT FROM ZZZ TO ZZZ1 OCCURRED WITHOUT ANY FURTHER INCIDENCE. MAINT INSPECTED THE ACFT UPON ARR IN ZZZ1 AND DISCOVERED A PROB DIFFERENT THAN A FAILED COMPUTER. I AM NOT SURE THAT THIS FAILURE COULD HAVE BEEN PLACED ON MEL OR NOT. IT SEEMS THAT A BETTER HANDLING OF THE SIT WOULD HAVE BEEN TO HAVE THE SPECIFIC MEL REFED PRIOR TO DEP AND WHATEVER SPECIAL PROCS ACCOMPLISHED PRIOR TO DEP. THEN WE COULD HAVE MADE A MORE INFORMED DECISION ABOUT WHETHER OR NOT TO PROCEED OR RETURN TO THE GATE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.