Narrative:

I had been working the radar for 3 hours 15 mins, most of that time with moderate to heavy traffic and complexity due to thunderstorms in the area. 5 mins before the error, my d-side was replaced and the new controller is known to be weak and ineffectual. I had been told that 2 flow control decisions had been made that would lighten the workload and complexity of the sector, so the weak d-side didn't cause me any concern at first. Instead, the sector became 'red' and rapidly became almost out of control. I received a handoff on the aircraft X at FL350 and immediately typed in a 'pointout' data block to the lit-H controled at ZME. While talking to aircraft, the lit-H controller called my sector over the line at about the same time I told my d-side to make the pointout. I thought he picked up the line and made the coordination (he never answered, they did not call again). I then received a handoff from lit-H on the aircraft Y at FL350. Both aircraft were deviating (as were most aircraft in my sector) and I made the fatal error of assuming that they were not in confliction. While I dealt with all the other conflictions going on, my d-side apparently then called and pointed out the aircraft X. The lit-H controller accepted the pointout without reference to the aircraft Y because I had track control of both aircraft. The only person who may have seen the confliction must have assumed that the aircraft X was on an assigned heading to go behind the aircraft Y because my d-side did not tell him that he was actually deviating. Shortly after the aircraft X said he was back on course and I responded without looking at the data block because I felt there was no conflict, and I was 'covered up' in other areas. The conflict alert went off a few seconds before separation was lost and I was not able to save the situation in spite of turning and descending the aircraft Y and turning the aircraft X. When I heard my d-side's tape of the 10 mins in and before the error, he had made only 1 phone call (the pointout to ZME) and was responding to a call from another sector as the error was occurring. The entire 5 mins he had been working before the incident I had told him to make numerous pointouts to other sectors and ZME since virtually every aircraft required coordination of some sort and he apparently had simply sat there, stunned. The fault of this error is clearly mine -- I never should have assumed that someone else was taking care of a situation no matter how much I had going, but, 1) I should have had a handoff man. 2) the flow control restrs should have been adhered to. 3) my original d-side should not have left while the sector was so busy. 4) the ineptitude of the replacement d-side is a pervasive problem due to burnout, senescence, the chkout of weak controllers, and the overwork of controllers in general.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZFW CTLR EXPERIENCED OPERROR AT FL350 WITH 2 ACR'S DEVIATING AROUND WX.

Narrative: I HAD BEEN WORKING THE RADAR FOR 3 HRS 15 MINS, MOST OF THAT TIME WITH MODERATE TO HVY TFC AND COMPLEXITY DUE TO TSTMS IN THE AREA. 5 MINS BEFORE THE ERROR, MY D-SIDE WAS REPLACED AND THE NEW CTLR IS KNOWN TO BE WEAK AND INEFFECTUAL. I HAD BEEN TOLD THAT 2 FLOW CTL DECISIONS HAD BEEN MADE THAT WOULD LIGHTEN THE WORKLOAD AND COMPLEXITY OF THE SECTOR, SO THE WEAK D-SIDE DIDN'T CAUSE ME ANY CONCERN AT FIRST. INSTEAD, THE SECTOR BECAME 'RED' AND RAPIDLY BECAME ALMOST OUT OF CTL. I RECEIVED A HDOF ON THE ACFT X AT FL350 AND IMMEDIATELY TYPED IN A 'POINTOUT' DATA BLOCK TO THE LIT-H CTLED AT ZME. WHILE TALKING TO ACFT, THE LIT-H CTLR CALLED MY SECTOR OVER THE LINE AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME I TOLD MY D-SIDE TO MAKE THE POINTOUT. I THOUGHT HE PICKED UP THE LINE AND MADE THE COORD (HE NEVER ANSWERED, THEY DID NOT CALL AGAIN). I THEN RECEIVED A HDOF FROM LIT-H ON THE ACFT Y AT FL350. BOTH ACFT WERE DEVIATING (AS WERE MOST ACFT IN MY SECTOR) AND I MADE THE FATAL ERROR OF ASSUMING THAT THEY WERE NOT IN CONFLICTION. WHILE I DEALT WITH ALL THE OTHER CONFLICTIONS GOING ON, MY D-SIDE APPARENTLY THEN CALLED AND POINTED OUT THE ACFT X. THE LIT-H CTLR ACCEPTED THE POINTOUT WITHOUT REF TO THE ACFT Y BECAUSE I HAD TRACK CTL OF BOTH ACFT. THE ONLY PERSON WHO MAY HAVE SEEN THE CONFLICTION MUST HAVE ASSUMED THAT THE ACFT X WAS ON AN ASSIGNED HDG TO GO BEHIND THE ACFT Y BECAUSE MY D-SIDE DID NOT TELL HIM THAT HE WAS ACTUALLY DEVIATING. SHORTLY AFTER THE ACFT X SAID HE WAS BACK ON COURSE AND I RESPONDED WITHOUT LOOKING AT THE DATA BLOCK BECAUSE I FELT THERE WAS NO CONFLICT, AND I WAS 'COVERED UP' IN OTHER AREAS. THE CONFLICT ALERT WENT OFF A FEW SECONDS BEFORE SEPARATION WAS LOST AND I WAS NOT ABLE TO SAVE THE SIT IN SPITE OF TURNING AND DSNDING THE ACFT Y AND TURNING THE ACFT X. WHEN I HEARD MY D-SIDE'S TAPE OF THE 10 MINS IN AND BEFORE THE ERROR, HE HAD MADE ONLY 1 PHONE CALL (THE POINTOUT TO ZME) AND WAS RESPONDING TO A CALL FROM ANOTHER SECTOR AS THE ERROR WAS OCCURRING. THE ENTIRE 5 MINS HE HAD BEEN WORKING BEFORE THE INCIDENT I HAD TOLD HIM TO MAKE NUMEROUS POINTOUTS TO OTHER SECTORS AND ZME SINCE VIRTUALLY EVERY ACFT REQUIRED COORD OF SOME SORT AND HE APPARENTLY HAD SIMPLY SAT THERE, STUNNED. THE FAULT OF THIS ERROR IS CLRLY MINE -- I NEVER SHOULD HAVE ASSUMED THAT SOMEONE ELSE WAS TAKING CARE OF A SIT NO MATTER HOW MUCH I HAD GOING, BUT, 1) I SHOULD HAVE HAD A HDOF MAN. 2) THE FLOW CTL RESTRS SHOULD HAVE BEEN ADHERED TO. 3) MY ORIGINAL D-SIDE SHOULD NOT HAVE LEFT WHILE THE SECTOR WAS SO BUSY. 4) THE INEPTITUDE OF THE REPLACEMENT D-SIDE IS A PERVASIVE PROB DUE TO BURNOUT, SENESCENCE, THE CHKOUT OF WEAK CTLRS, AND THE OVERWORK OF CTLRS IN GENERAL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.