Narrative:

Departed bqk during tfr in effect without IFR clearance. Upon contact with ZJX for IFR pick-up, ZJX informed crew of tfr violation and fighters scrambled. Contributing factors: NOTAMS for bqk concerning tfr was inadequately described. Confusion between air crew and proper procedures required. Obtained IFR clearance with proper squawk from ZJX and continued outbound track to destination (adw) andrews AFB. Air crew perceived that with no control tower at bqk and on a stop-over IFR flight plan, that unicom (122.8) xmissions for engine start, taxi, takeoff were correct procedures until contact with ZJX (126.75) for IFR at initial climb out following takeoff. (ZJX unable on ground.) air crew confusion combined with inability to contact ZJX on ground along with secret service informing crew that 'all was taken care of, good to go...,' led to inaction of not obtaining IFR clearance on ground with no control tower during tfr. NOTAM system should expand critical procedures in more detail. NOTAM relating to tfr was inadequate and encrypted to the point that it was not understandable. ZJX should advise air crew upon entering tfr that departure requires specific procedures. Air crew thought that proper procedures were being taken with unicom xmissions and no control tower for departure during VMC conditions until ZJX IFR could be obtained. Main areas, if improved, will reduce future tfr violations: 1) improve/expand (more specific details) NOTAMS that relate to tfr to include reducing abbreviations. Spell out tfr 'temporary flight restr' area and include a summary of important operating guidelines. These guidelines should state that 'IFR only' clearance is required with specific 'identification friend of foe/selective identification feature code' while operating into and within tfr. 2) military support air crew/aircraft should be given for advise from supporting ARTCC within tfr that departure from no-tower air field requires pre-coordination prior to takeoff into tfr. 3) air crew should question/reduce confusion about proper procedures. Even though being in support of this event, picking up secret service with guidance that 'everything was coordination,' and following VMC departure from airfield (bqk) with no control tower using unicom until ZJX could be reached for IFR outbound, still led to tfr violation with fighter intercept. Better communication, both written (NOTAM) and verbal, would have eliminated this tfr violation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A MIL C32B (B757-200) MAKES AN UNAUTH, UNCOORD TFR ENTRY AFTER A VFR DEP FROM BQK.

Narrative: DEPARTED BQK DURING TFR IN EFFECT WITHOUT IFR CLRNC. UPON CONTACT WITH ZJX FOR IFR PICK-UP, ZJX INFORMED CREW OF TFR VIOLATION AND FIGHTERS SCRAMBLED. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: NOTAMS FOR BQK CONCERNING TFR WAS INADEQUATELY DESCRIBED. CONFUSION BTWN AIR CREW AND PROPER PROCS REQUIRED. OBTAINED IFR CLRNC WITH PROPER SQUAWK FROM ZJX AND CONTINUED OUTBOUND TRACK TO DEST (ADW) ANDREWS AFB. AIR CREW PERCEIVED THAT WITH NO CTL TWR AT BQK AND ON A STOP-OVER IFR FLT PLAN, THAT UNICOM (122.8) XMISSIONS FOR ENG START, TAXI, TKOF WERE CORRECT PROCS UNTIL CONTACT WITH ZJX (126.75) FOR IFR AT INITIAL CLBOUT FOLLOWING TKOF. (ZJX UNABLE ON GND.) AIR CREW CONFUSION COMBINED WITH INABILITY TO CONTACT ZJX ON GND ALONG WITH SECRET SVC INFORMING CREW THAT 'ALL WAS TAKEN CARE OF, GOOD TO GO...,' LED TO INACTION OF NOT OBTAINING IFR CLRNC ON GND WITH NO CTL TWR DURING TFR. NOTAM SYS SHOULD EXPAND CRITICAL PROCS IN MORE DETAIL. NOTAM RELATING TO TFR WAS INADEQUATE AND ENCRYPTED TO THE POINT THAT IT WAS NOT UNDERSTANDABLE. ZJX SHOULD ADVISE AIR CREW UPON ENTERING TFR THAT DEP REQUIRES SPECIFIC PROCS. AIR CREW THOUGHT THAT PROPER PROCS WERE BEING TAKEN WITH UNICOM XMISSIONS AND NO CTL TWR FOR DEP DURING VMC CONDITIONS UNTIL ZJX IFR COULD BE OBTAINED. MAIN AREAS, IF IMPROVED, WILL REDUCE FUTURE TFR VIOLATIONS: 1) IMPROVE/EXPAND (MORE SPECIFIC DETAILS) NOTAMS THAT RELATE TO TFR TO INCLUDE REDUCING ABBREVIATIONS. SPELL OUT TFR 'TEMPORARY FLT RESTR' AREA AND INCLUDE A SUMMARY OF IMPORTANT OPERATING GUIDELINES. THESE GUIDELINES SHOULD STATE THAT 'IFR ONLY' CLRNC IS REQUIRED WITH SPECIFIC 'IDENTIFICATION FRIEND OF FOE/SELECTIVE IDENTIFICATION FEATURE CODE' WHILE OPERATING INTO AND WITHIN TFR. 2) MIL SUPPORT AIR CREW/ACFT SHOULD BE GIVEN FOR ADVISE FROM SUPPORTING ARTCC WITHIN TFR THAT DEP FROM NO-TWR AIR FIELD REQUIRES PRE-COORD PRIOR TO TKOF INTO TFR. 3) AIR CREW SHOULD QUESTION/REDUCE CONFUSION ABOUT PROPER PROCS. EVEN THOUGH BEING IN SUPPORT OF THIS EVENT, PICKING UP SECRET SVC WITH GUIDANCE THAT 'EVERYTHING WAS COORD,' AND FOLLOWING VMC DEP FROM AIRFIELD (BQK) WITH NO CTL TWR USING UNICOM UNTIL ZJX COULD BE REACHED FOR IFR OUTBOUND, STILL LED TO TFR VIOLATION WITH FIGHTER INTERCEPT. BETTER COM, BOTH WRITTEN (NOTAM) AND VERBAL, WOULD HAVE ELIMINATED THIS TFR VIOLATION.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.