Narrative:

We were vectored onto final for runway 9 at swf and then cleared for the visual approach. The vectors put us high on final. It was a little hazy and the illusion may have made the airport appear further than what it was. The first officer disconnected the autoplt and started down. We received a GPWS activation for terrain once, and before we could have reacted, the terrain aural was gone. We were still in the process of configuring when the GPWS sounded, and it was my belief that the airplane may have 'thought' that we were descending quickly without the intention of landing. We were familiar with this approach from having done it several times this month on a 'clearance delivery' line. We also knew that we were well above the salt altitude on the extended centerline of runway 9 as depicted on the approach chart. The airport and surroundings were in clear sight in VMC. After the terrain aural had come and gone, we were still high on the approach, and the first officer was descending at a higher rate in order to comply with the stabilized approach policy by 500 ft. During this time, the GPWS sounded 'sink rate.' the first officer indicated that he was correcting, and the flight path was adjusted -- 'sink rate' was silenced. The approach did stabilize, and the rest was uneventful. There are several things that I should have done differently and will do differently in the future. I never should have accepted the approach clearance. Asking for vectors would have avoided the situation altogether. I have asked for vectors in the past if needed and this serves as a reminder to do so in the future if necessary. Even though we were aware of our position, familiar with the surroundings and already nearly at a missed approach altitude, we still should never question the GPWS during an approach. I am aware of the dangers of CFIT, and it is imperative that myself and all crews take steps in minimizing these dangers -- including avoiding the situation of a high, hard to get down, approach that only increases our workload. I have also reviewed all of the GPWS procedures in the FMS since this occurrence. In doing so, I learned that it is only acceptable to continue after a GPWS during daylight VMC conditions if you are sure that the flight path is safe. Our flight path was safe and at no time did I ever believe that we were in danger. However, I will do things differently next time, and if any policies or procedures were compromised it was truly unintentional. After looking at sunrise/sunset tables, the event occurred at 50-55 mins after sunset.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CARJ FLT CREW RECEIVE A GPWS 'TERRAIN' AND A 'SINK RATE' ALERT FROM THEIR GPWS WITHOUT STOPPING THEIR DSCNT WHILE ON A HIGH, DESTABILIZED APCH TO SWF, NY.

Narrative: WE WERE VECTORED ONTO FINAL FOR RWY 9 AT SWF AND THEN CLRED FOR THE VISUAL APCH. THE VECTORS PUT US HIGH ON FINAL. IT WAS A LITTLE HAZY AND THE ILLUSION MAY HAVE MADE THE ARPT APPEAR FURTHER THAN WHAT IT WAS. THE FO DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AND STARTED DOWN. WE RECEIVED A GPWS ACTIVATION FOR TERRAIN ONCE, AND BEFORE WE COULD HAVE REACTED, THE TERRAIN AURAL WAS GONE. WE WERE STILL IN THE PROCESS OF CONFIGURING WHEN THE GPWS SOUNDED, AND IT WAS MY BELIEF THAT THE AIRPLANE MAY HAVE 'THOUGHT' THAT WE WERE DSNDING QUICKLY WITHOUT THE INTENTION OF LNDG. WE WERE FAMILIAR WITH THIS APCH FROM HAVING DONE IT SEVERAL TIMES THIS MONTH ON A 'CD' LINE. WE ALSO KNEW THAT WE WERE WELL ABOVE THE SALT ALT ON THE EXTENDED CTRLINE OF RWY 9 AS DEPICTED ON THE APCH CHART. THE ARPT AND SURROUNDINGS WERE IN CLR SIGHT IN VMC. AFTER THE TERRAIN AURAL HAD COME AND GONE, WE WERE STILL HIGH ON THE APCH, AND THE FO WAS DSNDING AT A HIGHER RATE IN ORDER TO COMPLY WITH THE STABILIZED APCH POLICY BY 500 FT. DURING THIS TIME, THE GPWS SOUNDED 'SINK RATE.' THE FO INDICATED THAT HE WAS CORRECTING, AND THE FLT PATH WAS ADJUSTED -- 'SINK RATE' WAS SILENCED. THE APCH DID STABILIZE, AND THE REST WAS UNEVENTFUL. THERE ARE SEVERAL THINGS THAT I SHOULD HAVE DONE DIFFERENTLY AND WILL DO DIFFERENTLY IN THE FUTURE. I NEVER SHOULD HAVE ACCEPTED THE APCH CLRNC. ASKING FOR VECTORS WOULD HAVE AVOIDED THE SIT ALTOGETHER. I HAVE ASKED FOR VECTORS IN THE PAST IF NEEDED AND THIS SERVES AS A REMINDER TO DO SO IN THE FUTURE IF NECESSARY. EVEN THOUGH WE WERE AWARE OF OUR POS, FAMILIAR WITH THE SURROUNDINGS AND ALREADY NEARLY AT A MISSED APCH ALT, WE STILL SHOULD NEVER QUESTION THE GPWS DURING AN APCH. I AM AWARE OF THE DANGERS OF CFIT, AND IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT MYSELF AND ALL CREWS TAKE STEPS IN MINIMIZING THESE DANGERS -- INCLUDING AVOIDING THE SIT OF A HIGH, HARD TO GET DOWN, APCH THAT ONLY INCREASES OUR WORKLOAD. I HAVE ALSO REVIEWED ALL OF THE GPWS PROCS IN THE FMS SINCE THIS OCCURRENCE. IN DOING SO, I LEARNED THAT IT IS ONLY ACCEPTABLE TO CONTINUE AFTER A GPWS DURING DAYLIGHT VMC CONDITIONS IF YOU ARE SURE THAT THE FLT PATH IS SAFE. OUR FLT PATH WAS SAFE AND AT NO TIME DID I EVER BELIEVE THAT WE WERE IN DANGER. HOWEVER, I WILL DO THINGS DIFFERENTLY NEXT TIME, AND IF ANY POLICIES OR PROCS WERE COMPROMISED IT WAS TRULY UNINTENTIONAL. AFTER LOOKING AT SUNRISE/SUNSET TABLES, THE EVENT OCCURRED AT 50-55 MINS AFTER SUNSET.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.