Narrative:

I was the co-pilot on an IFR DA50 trip from bdl to fok. We were to pick up a passenger in fok waiting for us and take him to den. I was a new contract pilot with this company and this was the 5TH day of a 5-DAY trip. The captain that I was to fly with was a new hire also and he was picking up the trip in bdl, relieving the previous captain who had flown the trip for the last 4 days. I was advised that the relieving captain was an experienced far part 121 captain with 1500 hours of DA50 far 91 time. The airplane we were flying was rumored to be the oldest living DA50 out there. It is equipped with a global gnxs FMS and the older turn style radios. At the start of the trip, I was unfamiliar with this equipment, but over the last 4 days, I had become somewhat comfortable with its basic operation. I had asked the new captain if he had flown with this FMS before. 'I have 1500 hours in this airplane,' he responded indignantly. I shut the cabin door and sat down in the right seat. I pulled out the 'before start' checklist and got 1/2 way through it when the captain started to get real antsy. 'Hurry up, we don't need that. That line boy is out there waiting. Just give me everything from the start engine checklist.' I skipped down to the requested checklist and started the engines. The captain dispatched the line boy. I started to complete the after start checklist and the captain again started to get real anxious. 'Don't worry about that,' he said. 'Just get a clearance, we have to get going.' I contacted clearance delivery and was told to expect a full route clearance. The trip was real short, just over long island sound and the clearance included low altitude victor airways. I copied the clearance longhand while the captain was trying to encode it into the FMS. It appeared he was having difficulty, so he allowed me to do it. I deleted the garbage he had encoded and proceeded to input the proper route when he stopped me saying, 'listen, forget that. We don't need that. Where is the low altitude en route chart?' I produced the requested chart and handed it to him. He just folded it to the proper section and put it up on the dashboard, never setting up anything on the radios. 'Ok, I'm ready' he said, 'call ground.' I was dissuaded from getting the latest ATIS report, so I reported to ground that we had 'the information' and we were ready to taxi. Ground control sent us to runway 6, a short taxi from where we were. I don't think I was ever to fully complete the taxi checklist before he instructed me to 'call tower and tell them we're ready.' I have several yrs as a simulator instructor in this airplane and I know from experience that if you don't complete any checklist, at the least do a 'fats' check -- flaps, airbrakes, trims and v-spds. Looking down, I noticed that we had not calculated any takeoff performance numbers. Naturally, because I wasn't able to fully complete a single checklist. When I reported this to him, he looked me straight in the eye and said, 'I think it will fly. Don't you?' so with no flight plan in the FMS, no radios properly tuned, no v-spds bugged and without even as much as a brief on how we were supposed to complete this trip, off we went. Lined up on the runway, he pushed the power forward and started to accelerate, rotating at some arbitrary number of his choosing. As we climbed out, we were handed off to new york departure control and told to proceed direct groton (tmu). Of course, we couldn't do this because we had absolutely nothing set up in our navigation radios. Now he tried to get 'direct tmu' in the FMS but his HSI navigation source was set up in its default navigation #1 mode, not FMS mode. The LNAV also wouldn't engage without a flight plan in it so, he asked me to get the frequency of tmu off the low altitude chart. I was busy with ATC because they had given us a couple of handoffs in quick succession as we were climbing out and I was unable to watch what he was doing. He retrieved tmu's frequency off the chart and tried to dial it up in our old turn style radios, but he mistakenly tried to put it in the communication #2 radio I was communicating with. So now we were not communicating and we were not navigating. I had forgotten the frequency we were supposed to be on, so I called the original departure control frequency and asked them for the handoff frequency. Armed with that number, I went to the next controller and asked them what was the frequency they handed us off to, and I went down the line like that until I was able to re-establish radio contact with the proper sector. Upon checking in with the correct center, she cleared us direct to an intersection. We couldn't do that because we never had encoded the airway in the FMS to begin with. I took a look at how he had his VOR's set up and, by this time, he had found the proper VOR frequencys, but his HSI was pointing off into some awful direction. I asked him if he wanted vectors and he said 'no.' the flight lasted about 15 mins and miraculously we eventually worked our way over to the final approach course to one of the runways at fok and we were able to land. I got off the airplane, rented a car and drove home.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AFTER A SHORT BUT DISCOMFORTING FLT WITH A HIGHLY NON STANDARD CAPT, THE SCHEDULED FO LEAVES THE FA50 FLT WITHOUT TAKING THE OUTBOUND LEG PLANNED AT FOK, NY.

Narrative: I WAS THE CO-PLT ON AN IFR DA50 TRIP FROM BDL TO FOK. WE WERE TO PICK UP A PAX IN FOK WAITING FOR US AND TAKE HIM TO DEN. I WAS A NEW CONTRACT PLT WITH THIS COMPANY AND THIS WAS THE 5TH DAY OF A 5-DAY TRIP. THE CAPT THAT I WAS TO FLY WITH WAS A NEW HIRE ALSO AND HE WAS PICKING UP THE TRIP IN BDL, RELIEVING THE PREVIOUS CAPT WHO HAD FLOWN THE TRIP FOR THE LAST 4 DAYS. I WAS ADVISED THAT THE RELIEVING CAPT WAS AN EXPERIENCED FAR PART 121 CAPT WITH 1500 HRS OF DA50 FAR 91 TIME. THE AIRPLANE WE WERE FLYING WAS RUMORED TO BE THE OLDEST LIVING DA50 OUT THERE. IT IS EQUIPPED WITH A GLOBAL GNXS FMS AND THE OLDER TURN STYLE RADIOS. AT THE START OF THE TRIP, I WAS UNFAMILIAR WITH THIS EQUIP, BUT OVER THE LAST 4 DAYS, I HAD BECOME SOMEWHAT COMFORTABLE WITH ITS BASIC OP. I HAD ASKED THE NEW CAPT IF HE HAD FLOWN WITH THIS FMS BEFORE. 'I HAVE 1500 HRS IN THIS AIRPLANE,' HE RESPONDED INDIGNANTLY. I SHUT THE CABIN DOOR AND SAT DOWN IN THE R SEAT. I PULLED OUT THE 'BEFORE START' CHKLIST AND GOT 1/2 WAY THROUGH IT WHEN THE CAPT STARTED TO GET REAL ANTSY. 'HURRY UP, WE DON'T NEED THAT. THAT LINE BOY IS OUT THERE WAITING. JUST GIVE ME EVERYTHING FROM THE START ENG CHKLIST.' I SKIPPED DOWN TO THE REQUESTED CHKLIST AND STARTED THE ENGS. THE CAPT DISPATCHED THE LINE BOY. I STARTED TO COMPLETE THE AFTER START CHKLIST AND THE CAPT AGAIN STARTED TO GET REAL ANXIOUS. 'DON'T WORRY ABOUT THAT,' HE SAID. 'JUST GET A CLRNC, WE HAVE TO GET GOING.' I CONTACTED CLRNC DELIVERY AND WAS TOLD TO EXPECT A FULL RTE CLRNC. THE TRIP WAS REAL SHORT, JUST OVER LONG ISLAND SOUND AND THE CLRNC INCLUDED LOW ALT VICTOR AIRWAYS. I COPIED THE CLRNC LONGHAND WHILE THE CAPT WAS TRYING TO ENCODE IT INTO THE FMS. IT APPEARED HE WAS HAVING DIFFICULTY, SO HE ALLOWED ME TO DO IT. I DELETED THE GARBAGE HE HAD ENCODED AND PROCEEDED TO INPUT THE PROPER RTE WHEN HE STOPPED ME SAYING, 'LISTEN, FORGET THAT. WE DON'T NEED THAT. WHERE IS THE LOW ALT ENRTE CHART?' I PRODUCED THE REQUESTED CHART AND HANDED IT TO HIM. HE JUST FOLDED IT TO THE PROPER SECTION AND PUT IT UP ON THE DASHBOARD, NEVER SETTING UP ANYTHING ON THE RADIOS. 'OK, I'M READY' HE SAID, 'CALL GND.' I WAS DISSUADED FROM GETTING THE LATEST ATIS RPT, SO I RPTED TO GND THAT WE HAD 'THE INFO' AND WE WERE READY TO TAXI. GND CTL SENT US TO RWY 6, A SHORT TAXI FROM WHERE WE WERE. I DON'T THINK I WAS EVER TO FULLY COMPLETE THE TAXI CHKLIST BEFORE HE INSTRUCTED ME TO 'CALL TWR AND TELL THEM WE'RE READY.' I HAVE SEVERAL YRS AS A SIMULATOR INSTRUCTOR IN THIS AIRPLANE AND I KNOW FROM EXPERIENCE THAT IF YOU DON'T COMPLETE ANY CHKLIST, AT THE LEAST DO A 'FATS' CHK -- FLAPS, AIRBRAKES, TRIMS AND V-SPDS. LOOKING DOWN, I NOTICED THAT WE HAD NOT CALCULATED ANY TKOF PERFORMANCE NUMBERS. NATURALLY, BECAUSE I WASN'T ABLE TO FULLY COMPLETE A SINGLE CHKLIST. WHEN I RPTED THIS TO HIM, HE LOOKED ME STRAIGHT IN THE EYE AND SAID, 'I THINK IT WILL FLY. DON'T YOU?' SO WITH NO FLT PLAN IN THE FMS, NO RADIOS PROPERLY TUNED, NO V-SPDS BUGGED AND WITHOUT EVEN AS MUCH AS A BRIEF ON HOW WE WERE SUPPOSED TO COMPLETE THIS TRIP, OFF WE WENT. LINED UP ON THE RWY, HE PUSHED THE PWR FORWARD AND STARTED TO ACCELERATE, ROTATING AT SOME ARBITRARY NUMBER OF HIS CHOOSING. AS WE CLBED OUT, WE WERE HANDED OFF TO NEW YORK DEP CTL AND TOLD TO PROCEED DIRECT GROTON (TMU). OF COURSE, WE COULDN'T DO THIS BECAUSE WE HAD ABSOLUTELY NOTHING SET UP IN OUR NAV RADIOS. NOW HE TRIED TO GET 'DIRECT TMU' IN THE FMS BUT HIS HSI NAV SOURCE WAS SET UP IN ITS DEFAULT NAV #1 MODE, NOT FMS MODE. THE LNAV ALSO WOULDN'T ENGAGE WITHOUT A FLT PLAN IN IT SO, HE ASKED ME TO GET THE FREQ OF TMU OFF THE LOW ALT CHART. I WAS BUSY WITH ATC BECAUSE THEY HAD GIVEN US A COUPLE OF HDOFS IN QUICK SUCCESSION AS WE WERE CLBING OUT AND I WAS UNABLE TO WATCH WHAT HE WAS DOING. HE RETRIEVED TMU'S FREQ OFF THE CHART AND TRIED TO DIAL IT UP IN OUR OLD TURN STYLE RADIOS, BUT HE MISTAKENLY TRIED TO PUT IT IN THE COM #2 RADIO I WAS COMMUNICATING WITH. SO NOW WE WERE NOT COMMUNICATING AND WE WERE NOT NAVING. I HAD FORGOTTEN THE FREQ WE WERE SUPPOSED TO BE ON, SO I CALLED THE ORIGINAL DEP CTL FREQ AND ASKED THEM FOR THE HDOF FREQ. ARMED WITH THAT NUMBER, I WENT TO THE NEXT CTLR AND ASKED THEM WHAT WAS THE FREQ THEY HANDED US OFF TO, AND I WENT DOWN THE LINE LIKE THAT UNTIL I WAS ABLE TO RE-ESTABLISH RADIO CONTACT WITH THE PROPER SECTOR. UPON CHKING IN WITH THE CORRECT CTR, SHE CLRED US DIRECT TO AN INTXN. WE COULDN'T DO THAT BECAUSE WE NEVER HAD ENCODED THE AIRWAY IN THE FMS TO BEGIN WITH. I TOOK A LOOK AT HOW HE HAD HIS VOR'S SET UP AND, BY THIS TIME, HE HAD FOUND THE PROPER VOR FREQS, BUT HIS HSI WAS POINTING OFF INTO SOME AWFUL DIRECTION. I ASKED HIM IF HE WANTED VECTORS AND HE SAID 'NO.' THE FLT LASTED ABOUT 15 MINS AND MIRACULOUSLY WE EVENTUALLY WORKED OUR WAY OVER TO THE FINAL APCH COURSE TO ONE OF THE RWYS AT FOK AND WE WERE ABLE TO LAND. I GOT OFF THE AIRPLANE, RENTED A CAR AND DROVE HOME.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.